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PREFACE 
 
he Turkey in Europe Monitor was initially an electronic bulletin prepared by the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) on a monthly basis during the year preceding the December 
2004 European Council summit and its immediate aftermath. Following the December 1999 
Helsinki European Council, Turkey officially embarked upon the EU accession process as a candidate 
country. The Copenhagen European Council on December 2002 took this decision further by conclud-
ing that accession negotiations would be opened with Turkey upon the fulfilment of the Copenhagen 
political criteria. Major political developments in the country led to the decision to open accession 
negotiations at the December 2004 European Council summit.  
The aim of the Turkey in Europe Monitor in this context was to present objective and in-depth evalua-
tions of developments in the relationship between Turkey and the European Union, and Turkish poli-
cies undertaken with a view to EU membership. During 14 months, the Turkey in Europe Monitor 
was sent to over 3,500 international recipients, featuring key official documents and speeches, origi-
nal research, and evaluations of the process underway. This collection of essays, papers, speeches and 
official documents will continue to serve as a documentary record of the concerns and advances made 
at a key point in the relationship between Turkey and the EU.  
CEPS acknowledges the kind support of the EU Information Group of Turkey (ABIG) in the produc-
tion of the Turkey in Europe Monitor.  
 
Daniel Gros, Research Director, CEPS 
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CEPS 
Turkey in Europe Monitor 
No. 1, January 2004 
 
Introductory Note from CEPS 
 
This is the first of a series of monthly bulletins 
produced by the Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS) with the aim of providing ob-
jective and in-depth evaluation of develop-
ments in relations between Turkey and the 
European Union, and Turkish policies under-
taken on the road to EU membership. Future 
issues will include original documents, edito-
rials on specific issues, overviews of the major 
developments of the month and a section on 
Turkish business perspectives prepared mainly 
on the basis of information supplied by the 
Turkish Industry and Businessmen Association 
(TÜSIAD).  
 
This issue of CEPS Turkey in Europe Monitor 





pects for Turkish accession. It provides the full 
text of Romano Prodi’s speech delivered on 14 
January 2004 to the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly on his recent visit to Turkey. 
Romano Prodi was the first Commission 
President to visit Turkey since 1963 and his 
speech is considered to be highly significant in 
conveying the most recent views of the Com-
mission regarding the latest situation in EU-
Turkey relations and the developments regard-
ing Cyprus. This issue also provides the sec-
tion of the Commission’s Strategy Paper on 
Turkey, outlining the Conclusions of the 
Commission’s Regular Report of November 
2003 on Turkey.  
 







SPEECH OF ROMANO PRODI, THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
AT THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
Ankara, 14 January 2004 
 
President of the Turkish Grand National As-
sembly, 
Members of Parliament, 
Excellencies, 
Ladies and Gentleman, 
It is a great honour for me to address the Turk-
ish Grand National Assembly today. I know 
that this privilege has been extended to very 
few personalities in the past. I acknowledge 
this as an important symbolic honour for the 
European Union, and for the European Com-
mission in particular.  
Turkey and the region 
Since its creation exactly 80 years ago, the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly has been 
the centre of gravity of the political life in this 
country. Its contribution to the construction of 
a modern, secular country and to the develop-
ment of democracy has been immense. Since 
the founding of the Republic, Turkey has en-
deavoured in determined fashion to build such 
a society, overcoming a number of obstacles 
along the way. Meeting the standards of the 
contemporary civilisation was the paramount 
objective assigned by the founder of modern 
Turkey, Mustapha Kemal Atatürk. It was his 
ambition that Turkey should become a modern 2 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
 
democracy at peace with itself and with its 
neighbours. His vision was for Turkey to be 
fully part of the European family of nations.  
The huge support by the population for the 
democratic reforms reflects this attitude. From 
the revolutionary changes in the twenties to 
the most recent and groundbreaking political 
reforms, we can see that your assembly has 
always been at the frontline of progress. 
I am privileged to be the first Commission 
President to visit Turkey since Walter Halltein 
in 1963. Since then, the European Union has 
changed fundamentally from an economic 
community to a fully-fledged political Union. 
Turkey has also evolved substantially over 
these years. My visit reflects the fact that rela-
tions between the European Union and Turkey 
have never been so strong, and that important 
decisions for the future of Turkey’s candida-
ture are due to be taken later this year. 
As this is my first official visit to Turkey, I 
would like to recall Turkey’s important role in 
contributing to the security and stability of 
Europe during the cold war. This recognition 
partly explains our strong interest in Turkey 
developing into a prosperous and stable de-
mocracy based on rule of law and values 
which we all share.  
Turkey is endowed with unique characteristics 
among European countries: the combination of 
a secular, democratic state with a prevalently 
Moslem population. I am convinced that Tur-
key can bring a unique contribution to peace 
and regional stability at the beginning of this 
new century. Turkey's repeated call to fellow 
Moslem countries to actively promote democ-
racy and human rights constitutes a powerful 
message.  
The outbreak of the Iraqi war at Turkey's south 
eastern border understandably was a cause of 
considerable fear and anxiety amongst Turkish 
decision-makers and population. Last year, in 
this delicate situation, important decisions 
were taken in Turkey, including by the Grand 
National Assembly. Let me assure you that we 
are fully aware of the significance, for Turkey 
and for the region, of the stability and integrity 
of Iraq. 
Future of Europe 
Fifty years ago, far-sighted leaders in Europe 
embarked on a new course: they chose recon-
ciliation rather than conflict, peace, based on 
interdependence, rather than war, the rule of 
law rather than the force of arms. They laid the 
foundations for a Union, which has brought 
stability, security and prosperity, the largest 
single market in the world and a common cur-
rency. With economic progress have come 
social solidarity and a strong guarantee of civil 
rights and liberties. These are outstanding 
achievements, given Europe’s chequered his-
tory.  
We are also engaged in an unprecedented 
process to further develop our co-operation. 
Our goal is to create a European Union, which 
is able to respond to the expectations of its 
citizens and to play a full role in world affairs.  
I would have hoped to come to Turkey in the 
wake of a decision on a new constitution for 
the European Union. Unfortunately this is not 
yet the case, but we will continue to work to 
that goal, and I am confident that agreement 
will be achieved in due time. The EU’s institu-
tional architecture needs to be redesigned, so 
that our institutions can function more trans-
parently and more effectively. In view of 
enlargement, these reforms are more important 
than ever. Turkey, through its participation in 
the work of the Convention on the future of 
Europe, has contributed its experience and 
creativity to this common task.  
These achievements however need to be con-
solidated and expanded to meet new chal-
lenges, especially in foreign and security pol-
icy, in the fight against crime and injustice, 
and in economic integration. At the EU level 
we must seek to act decisively and with one 
voice. That means establishing a sounder insti-
tutional framework for a genuine Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and, above all, the 
political will to act together. 
EU-Turkey relations 
I would now like to share with you some 
thoughts about Turkey’s European aspirations. 
I am well aware that there is an impressive 
degree of consensus in Turkey in favour of 
joining the European Union. In fact there 
seems to be close to unanimous support for the 
modernisation strategy.  But there are concerns 
as to how Turkey is perceived within the EU. 
And it is true that EU-Turkey relations are in-
creasingly a subject of public debate. NO. 1 / JANUARY 2004 | 3 
 
Contrary to the situation in Turkey, the public 
opinion in the EU is not unanimous in favour-
ing a Turkish membership. It is in my view 
important for the political leadership in the EU 
and in Turkey to recognise and manage this 
political reality. There are those who are con-
cerned about the religious dimension. Others 
have raised issues such as the capacity of the 
Union to integrate a country of the size and 
with the demography of Turkey, the economic 
development of Turkey and Turkey’s geo-
graphical situation. We need to reply to these 
concerns. 
The fact that Turkey belongs to Europe was 
recognised already in our Association Agree-
ment of 1963. I know that the overwhelming 
majority of the Turkish people share the same 
values and objectives as other Europeans. 
They want to live in democracies based on the 
rule of law and the respect of human rights. 
Terrorist attacks in Turkey, as elsewhere, are 
intended to undermine such values. They will 
not succeed.   
Since Turkey was granted candidate status in 
Helsinki in December 1999, it has made im-
pressive progress towards meeting the Copen-
hagen political criteria. Candidate status has 
helped Turkey to embark upon a process of 
far-reaching constitutional and legislative re-
forms.  
We have been impressed by the determination 
of the Turkish Government to carry forward 
these reforms. By publicly declaring that po-
litical reforms are first and foremost for the 
benefit of Turkey's own citizens, the current 
government led by Prime Minister Erdoğan is 
following the footsteps of Turkey's march to-
wards modernisation.  
A major constitutional reform and seven legis-
lative packages have been adopted in a very 
short period of time. It is noteworthy that 
many of the reforms have been adopted 
unanimously, with bipartisan support from the 
majority and the opposition.   
In its successive reports, the European Com-
mission has recognised the scope and signifi-
cance of the reform process. These initiatives 
have addressed some of the most sensitive is-
sues in the Turkish context, such as the aboli-
tion of the death penalty and the lifting of the 
ban on languages other than Turkish, which is 
a sign of the growing maturity of the Turkish 
democracy. The question of full democratic 
control of the military, including full parlia-
mentary authority over the defence budget, is 
also being addressed. Turkey has ratified ma-
jor UN Covenants on Civil and Political rights 
as well as on Social and economic rights. Pris-
oners sentenced for non-violent expression of 
opinion have been released. The legislation on 
fighting against torture has been considerably 
strengthened and incommunicado detention 
has been abolished.  
Looking back over the last couple of years, I 
can say that there has been a profound change 
in the climate of our bilateral relations. We 
have moved a long way in terms of how we 
approach and perceive each other. Whereas 
earlier we could not agree on Turkey's position 
with respect to the Copenhagen political crite-
ria, we now very largely share a common as-
sessment of the situation, including in the area 
of human rights. We have deepened our dia-
logue on the political criteria and are discuss-
ing issues in detail, openly and without taboos.  
In its November Report, the Commission high-
lighted those areas where more progress is 
needed such as the strengthening of the inde-
pendence and efficiency of the judiciary, the 
overall framework for the exercise of funda-
mental freedoms, the full alignment of civil-
military relations on EU standards as well as 
the improvement of the situation in the South 
East.  
We are pleased to hear that Turkey is commit-
ted to address its remaining shortcomings. I 
understand that your Assembly is currently 
dealing with very important draft legislation 
such as the penal code. The National Plan for 
the Adoption of the Acquis adopted by the 
government in July 2003 foresees a crowded 
agenda of legislative reforms in a wide range 
of areas related to the acquis communautaire. 
While of course I applaud the remarkable 
achievement of the Turkish governments and 
parliament in your unprecedented reforms, it is 
also clear that the task of ensuring their sys-
tematic and effective implementation presents 
an even greater challenge. I would neither like 
to discuss here the remaining reforms needed 
nor to elaborate on details about their imple-
mentation. Both aspects are fully described in 
the Accession Partnership and in the Novem-
ber Report that I have mentioned above.  4 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
 
What remains to be done is therefore clear to 
you and I can assure you that there will be no 
new conditions. What will matter is full and 
effective implementation. If the Turkish peo-
ple are to enjoy the principles and values 
largely shared by European citizens, it is es-
sential that the provisions and spirit of the leg-
islative reforms should be respected through-
out the country by different levels of govern-
ment and public administration, the judiciary 
and security forces. 
October 2004 report and recommendation 
The Copenhagen European Council in De-
cember 2002 gave a clear political roadmap for 
Turkey. In October this year, my Commission 
will present its recommendation on whether 
Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political crite-
ria. This will be one of the most important de-
cisions to be taken by the Commission. Let me 
assure you that our recommendation will be 
based on an objective assessment. We will use 
the same criteria and methodology that so suc-
cessfully has been used for all the other candi-
date countries. Our track record in this context 
is excellent. No one has ever contested the ob-
jectivity in our assessment. There should be no 
doubts that our assessment of Turkey and our 
recommendation will maintain the same stan-
dard. Credit will be given where credit is due, 
but at the same time there will be no room for 
complacency. The European Council has made 
it clear that, if at the end of this year it decides 
that Turkey meets the Copenhagen political 
criteria, accession negotiations will be opened 
without delay. 
If the European Council decides to open nego-
tiations with Turkey, I should remind you that 
accession is not a formality, and not for the 
immediate future. The negotiations will take 
time, reflecting the scale of the difficulties in 
many sectors faced by such a large and com-
plex country. I should also recall that the task 
of adopting and implementing the acquis 
communautaire is enormous, and has impor-
tant implications for the legislature of Member 
States. Community legislation takes prece-
dence over national legislation. The European 
integration process, which incorporates a 
growing number of common policies, involves 
a loss of national autonomy for Member 
States. But the process of joint decision- and 
law-making, and the sharing of sovereignty 
that this implies, brings considerable benefits 
to Member States by participating in policy 
fields such as economic integration, foreign 
and security policy, justice and home affairs. 
Cyprus 
Let me now turn to Cyprus. Let there be no 
doubt that the European Union is aware of the 
significance that this island represents for Tur-
key and its people. Many in Turkey still re-
member bitter historical events causing suffer-
ing and grievance. The awareness of history 
allows us to move ahead.  It was precisely the 
strength of the Franco-German reconciliation, 
which made fifty years of European integra-
tion possible.  
Why should the people of Cyprus not benefit 
from the same experience and pursue an irre-
versible process of reconciliation which would 
lead them to live a future of peace and prosper-
ity?  
It is high time to end the outdated division of 
Cyprus and its capital city. The spontaneous, 
emotional and brotherly reunions of Turkish 
and Greek Cypriots after the opening of the 
divide between north and south have erased 
the myth that peaceful coexistence between the 
communities in Cyprus is not possible.  
Cyprus will join the EU on 1 May 2004. It 
would be a source of inspiration for us all if 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots were able to enter 
the EU together. We therefore call upon all 
parties to reengage in the UN led talks without 
delay. The objective should be to reach a set-
tlement on the basis of the Annan plan in time 
for a united Cyprus to accede to the European 
Union on 1 May 2004. Let me assure you that 
we on our part are ready to assist in finding a 
speedy settlement.   
I am convinced that securing a comprehensive 
settlement by 1 May would be in the best in-
terest not only of all Cypriots but for all of the 
Eastern Mediterranean. A settlement would 
also greatly facilitate Turkey’s membership 
aspirations and will clearly influence decisions 
to be taken in the second half of this year.  Let 
me be clear, this is not a formal condition, but 
a political reality. This Assembly and Your 
Government have since the last elections 
shown an impressive sense of recognition of 
Turkey’s historic responsibilities. I am confi-NO. 1 / JANUARY 2004 | 5 
 
dent that the same degree of wisdom will 
guide you on this particularly sensitive issue.  
Conclusion 
Turkey now has a unique opportunity to 
achieve its goal, and to consolidate its position 
as a free and democratic society in the com-
munity of European nations.  
Let me stress that the European Union is, 
above all, a community of shared values based 
on the principles of liberty, democracy, human 
rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of 
law. All these values are enshrined in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union.  
In November of last year, the Commission 
noted that Turkey has made further impressive 
efforts, which constitute significant progress 
towards achieving compliance with the Co-
penhagen political criteria. The European 
Council in Brussels on 12-13 December last 
has confirmed that this progress has brought 
Turkey closer to the Union. 
Turkey's prospects for moving even closer to 
the EU depend, above all, on its own capacity 
to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria, not 
only in law, but also in practice. These criteria 
were not invented for Turkey, but apply 
equally to all candidates. For our report next 
October, as in previous years, the Commission 
will apply the same principles to Turkey as to 
all other candidate countries. There should be 
no doubts that the report will be fair and objec-
tive. 
We are moving closer to our goal, the goal of 
Turkey taking up its rightful place among the 
peoples of Europe, with shared principles, 
practices and ideals and a common future 
 
 
STRATEGY PAPER AND REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON THE 
PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION BY BULGARIA, ROMANIA AND TURKEY 
November 2003 
 
TURKEY IN THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS – PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES 
  
1. Progress made by Turkey in meeting the 
membership criteria 
 
The European Council in Copenhagen in De-
cember 2002 recalled its decision in 1999 in 
Helsinki that Turkey is a “candidate state des-
tined to join the Union on the basis of the same 
criteria as applied to the other candidate 
States”. It strongly welcomed “the important 
steps taken by Turkey towards meeting the 
Copenhagen criteria” and encouraged it to pur-
sue the reform process energetically. It con-
cluded that “if the European Council in De-
cember 2004, on the basis of a report and a 
recommendation from the Commission, de-
cides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen po-
litical criteria, the European Union will open 
accession negotiations with Turkey without 
delay”. 
 
At its meeting in Thessaloniki in June 2003, 
the European Council welcomed “the com-
mitment of the Turkish government to carry 
forward the reform process, in particular the 
remaining legislative work by the end of 
2003”, and supported its “on-going efforts 
made in order to fulfil the Copenhagen politi-
cal criteria for opening accession negotiations 
with the Union”.  
 
Over the past year the Turkish government has 
shown great determination in accelerating the 
pace of legislative reforms in the areas covered 
by the political criteria. It has also taken im-
portant steps to ensure their effective imple-
mentation, in order to allow Turkish citizens to 
enjoy fundamental freedoms and human rights 
in line with European standards. These efforts 
constitute significant progress towards achiev-
ing compliance with the Copenhagen political 
criteria.  
 
Some of the reforms impinge upon sensitive 
issues, such as freedom of expression, freedom 
of peaceful assembly, cultural rights and civil-
ian control of the military, and demonstrate the 6 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
 
determination of the Turkish government to 
move ahead. Turkey has ratified two major 
UN Covenants on Civil and Political rights as 
well as on Social and economic rights. Several 
prisoners sentenced for non violent expression 
of opinion have been released. The legislation 
on combating torture has been considerably 
strengthened and incommunicado detention 
has been abolished. Many priorities under the 
political criteria in the revised Accession Part-
nership have been addressed. 
 
However, in spite of the determination of the 
government, the Commission considers that 
Turkey does not yet fully meet the Copenha-
gen political criteria. A clear framework for 
guaranteeing political, civil, economic, social 
and cultural rights is not yet fully established, 
and more efforts are needed to enhance the 
coherence of legal provisions and practice. 
 
As regards the legislative and regulatory 
framework, particular attention should be 
given to the strengthening of the independence 
and the functioning of the judiciary, the overall 
framework for the exercise of fundamental 
freedoms (association, expression and relig-
ion), further alignment of civil-military rela-
tions with European practice and the situation 
in the Southeast. Cultural rights should be 
guaranteed for all Turkish citizens regardless 
of their origin.  
 
Implementation of the reforms has to be 
strengthened, which requires that all institu-
tions and persons involved accept the spirit of 
the reforms. Responsibility for enforcing re-
formed legislation related to fundamental free-
doms, provisions for e-trial, respect of Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights judgements, and 
measures to combat torture, lies largely with 
judges and prosecutors. On the other hand, 
executive bodies at all levels are also respon-
sible for implementation of the political re-
forms. In a number of cases, for example in 
relation to cultural rights and freedom of relig-
ion, such bodies have narrowed the scope of 
the reforms by establishing restrictive condi-
tions, hindering the objectives initially pur-
sued. The setting up by the government of a 
Reform Monitoring Group in order to ensure 
the effective implementation of the reforms 
and to overcome bureaucratic resistance is en-
couraging in this respect. 
 
The far-reaching changes to the Turkish politi-
cal and legal system over the past year are part 
of a longer-term historical process, and the full 
benefit of these reforms will accrue to the 
Turkish people over a number of years. It will 
take time before the spirit of the reforms is 
fully reflected in the attitudes of executive and 
judicial bodies, at all levels and throughout the 
country, ensuring a track record of effective 
implementation. Nonetheless, there are already 
clear signs of improvement in terms of enjoy-
ment of human rights and basic freedoms. It is, 
however, of great concern that Turkey has not 
executed many judgements of the ECtHR, by 
means of ensuring payment of just satisfaction 
or reversing decisions made in contravention 
of the ECHR.  
 
The Commission also recalls the Helsinki 
European Council conclusions urging candi-
date countries to make every effort to resolve 
any outstanding border dispute and other re-
lated issues on the basis of the principle of 
peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance 
with the United Nations Charter. 
 
As regards the economic criteria, Turkey has 
significantly improved the functioning of its 
market economy, while macroeconomic im-
balances remain. Further decisive steps to-
wards macroeconomic stability and structural 
reforms will also enhance the Turkish capacity 
to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the Union. 
 
Economic stability has increased with the con-
tinuation of the disinflation process, and struc-
tural reforms and the modernisation of Tur-
key’s market regulations and institutions have 
advanced. The disinflation and reform process 
should be maintained, in particular by main-
taining fiscal discipline, by restructuring and 
further privatising the banking sector and by 
deregulating markets. In order to enhance the 
growth potential of the economy, the inflow of 
foreign direct investment should be encour-
aged by removing remaining barriers. A selec-
tion of statistical indicators can be found in 
Annex 6: Main statistical indicators (2002). 
 
Turkey’s alignment with the acquis has pro-
gressed in most areas but remains at an early 
stage for many chapters. It is most advanced in 
chapters related to the EC-Turkey Customs 
Union but in this respect Turkey is not fully NO. 1 / JANUARY 2004 | 7 
 
meeting its obligations. Alignment is also 
more advanced in areas where other interna-
tional obligations exist which are similar to the 
acquis. Further legislative work is required in 
all areas, and Turkey should focus on imple-
menting its National Programme for the Adop-
tion of the Acquis, in line with the Accession 
partnership priorities, more consistently across 
all chapters. Also, new legislation should not 
move away from the acquis. Details on pro-
gress in the different chapters of the acquis can 
be found in the conclusions of the Regular Re-
port on Turkey.   
 
In many fields implementation is weak. Ad-
ministrative capacity in different areas needs 
to be strengthened to ensure that the acquis is 
implemented and enforced effectively. In some 
cases, administrative reform should entail the 
establishment of new structures, for example 
in the field of state aid and regional develop-
ment. Where new regulatory bodies have been 
set up, their autonomy should be assured and 
they should be provided with sufficient staff 
and financial resources.  
 
The full conclusions of the Regular Report on 
Turkey can be found in Annex 2: Conclusions 




2. Pre-accession strategy for Turkey 
 
Over the past twelve months the European Un-
ion has significantly strengthened the pre-
accession strategy for Turkey. The Commission 
will continue to implement this strategy in its 
different areas, particularly in view of the report 
and recommendation that it will present next 
year on Turkey. 
 
A revised Accession Partnership was adopted 
by the Council on 19 May 2003. Its purpose is 
to assist the Turkish authorities in their efforts 
to meet the accession criteria with particular 
emphasis on the political criteria. It also forms 
the basis for programming pre-accession assis-
tance from Community funds.  
 
The enhanced political dialogue has continued 
intensively under the Danish, Greek and Italian 
Presidencies. Among the items discussed are 
the political reforms in Turkey, human rights, 
Cyprus, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, 
as well as wider international issues. As from 
2003 the Commission is supplementing the en-
hanced political dialogue with regular detailed 
consultations with the Turkish authorities on 
Turkey’s progress in complying with the politi-
cal criteria. This approach will be further devel-
oped in order to ensure a better mutual under-
standing of the issues involved. The enhanced 
economic dialogue between the EU and Turkey 
covering issues of macroeconomic performance  
and stability and economic reforms is being 
pursued intensively.  
 
The process of legislative scrutiny, carried out 
in the sub-committees of the Association 
Agreement, is being supplemented by TAIEX 
seminars and technical meetings or workshops 
on specific subjects. 
 
The negotiations for the extension of the EC-
Turkey Customs Union to services, and the mu-
tual opening of public procurement markets, are 
continuing with a view to their finalisation in 
2004. 
 
In 2003 Turkey has started to participate in the 
European Environment Agency and the follow-
ing Community programmes: Enterprise and 
Entrepreneurship, Gender Equality, Combating 
Discrimination, Combating Social Exclusion, 
Incentive Measures in the field of Employment, 
and the Sixth Framework Programme on Re-
search. Preparations for participation in a num-
ber of other programmes, including full partici-
pation in the educational programmes in 2004, 
are under way.  
 
In April 2003 agreement was reached between 
the European Parliament, Council and Commis-
sion to include Turkey in the pre-accession 
heading of the financial perspectives and to 
provide substantially increased financial assis-
tance for the period 2004-2006, amounting to 
€1 050 million over the three years. Particular 
attention will be paid to providing assistance to 
both government and non-governmental bodies 
in areas related to the political criteria. 
 
Overall the impact of Community assistance to 
Turkey is increasingly positive. As from Octo-
ber 2003 implementation of pre-accession fi-
nancial assistance programmes has been de-
volved to the Turkish authorities under the 
“Decentralised Implementation System” (DIS). 
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responsibility for a large number of on-going 
projects. The backlog in commitments of EU 
finance for Turkey has been further reduced in 
2003. The Commission will verify whether 
Turkey is meeting its obligations under DIS and 
continue to strengthen its Representation in 
Turkey to ensure the continued success of its 





Over the past year, by accelerating the pace of 
reforms, Turkey has made determined efforts 
and significant progress towards achieving 
compliance with the Copenhagen political crite-
ria and has made considerable progress towards 
meeting the economic criteria. Turkey has also 
continued progress towards meeting the acquis 
criteria, although much remains to be done in 
many areas. Many priorities under the political 
criteria in the revised Accession Partnership 
have been addressed. However, further efforts 
are needed. This concerns in particular the 
strengthening of the independence and the func-
tioning of the judiciary, the overall framework 
for the exercise of fundamental freedoms (asso-
ciation, expression and religion), the further 
alignment of civil-military relations with Euro-
pean practice, the situation in the Southeast and 
cultural rights. Turkey should ensure full and 
effective implementation of reforms to ensure 
that Turkish citizens can enjoy human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in line with Euro-
pean standards. 
 
The Commission will next year assess the pro-
gress made by Turkey towards meeting the ac-
cession criteria as requested by the Copenhagen 
European Council. The Commission will issue 
a report and a recommendation before the end 
of October 2004 on whether Turkey fulfils the 
Copenhagen political criteria. This should allow 
the European Council to decide, at its meeting 
in December 2004, on the possible opening of 
accession negotiations with Turkey. 
 
As regards Cyprus the European Council has 
repeatedly underlined its strong preference for 
accession by a united Cyprus. The Commission 
considers that there are favourable conditions 
for the two communities to reach a comprehen-
sive settlement of the Cyprus problem before 
Cyprus’ accession to the EU on 1 May 2004. To 
this end the EU should reiterate its call to all 
parties concerned, in particular Turkey and the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership, to resume the talks 
on the basis of the UN Secretary General’s pro-
posal. The absence of a settlement could be-
come a serious obstacle to Turkey’s EU aspira-
tions. The Thessaloniki European Council 
stated the Union’s willingness to accommodate 
the terms of a settlement in line with the princi-
ples on which the EU is founded. The Commis-




 NO. 1 / JANUARY 2004 | 9 
 
 
TURKISH BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES 
 
Speech by Tuncay Ozilhan (President of 
TÜSIAD Jan. 2001-Jan. 2004) 
 
“EU Membership is our Society Project” 
 
Tuncay Ozilhan President of TÜSIAD (Jan. 
2001-Jan. 2004), made a speech at the Euro-
pean Academy in Berlin on 9
th January on the 
occasion of the “TÜSIAD Bosphorus Prize for 
European Understanding” ceremony which 
gathered together the prominent European 
business and political circles. This year’s prize 
was given to Dr. von Kyaw, former Ambassa-
dor and Permanent Representative of Ger-
many to the EU. 
 
Mr. Ozilhan reiterated the support of TÜSIAD 
to the efforts of the government towards EU 
membership, including the democratic reform 
process undertaken and the commitment to 
resolve the Cyprus problem soonest possible in 
a beneficial way to all parties. The main mes-
sages delivered by Mr. Ozilhan to EU deci-
sion-makers included: 
•  Rather than being constrained by 
fears, concerns, details and parame-
ters of today that will become mean-
ingless in ten years time, the per-
spective of tomorrow has to adopted 
in taking the decision to start nego-
tiations with Turkey at the end of the 
year; 
•  Turkey is far from being a burden 
to the EU budget with her economic 
dynamism, entrepreneurial popula-
tion and the economic opportunities  
that is offered by the region where 
she is situated; 
 
 
•  Turkey’s young, well educated and 
trained population provides an  op-
portunity for the EU to deal with 
demographic problems; 
•  Turkey’s relations with the EU, 
with her secular, democratic Muslim 
identity and with her functioning 
market economy, are of particular 
importance in a post-September 11 
world; 
•  Turkey offers to the EU the chance 
of extending its zone of peace from 
the Balkans, the Aegean Sea and the 
Black Sea to the Middle East, the 
Caucasus and Central Asia; 
•  Turkey works hard to reach EU 
standards and expects to be treated 
with the same understanding so gen-
erously extended to Central and 
Eastern European countries; 
•  When it is time to decide on start-
ing accession negotiations with Tur-
key, all the advantages of Turkey’s 
accession to the EU have to be bal-
anced against the losses that the ex-
clusion of Turkey would incur. 
 
The full text of the speech can be accessed at    
www.tusiad.org/english.nsf 
 
TÜSIAD IS A MEMBER OF THE UNION OF 
INDUSTRIAL AND EMPLOYERS’ 




Turkey in Europe Monitor 
No. 2, February 2004 
 
 
Introductory Note from CEPS 
 
This issue of CEPS Turkey in Europe Monitor 
provides the full text of Recep Tayyıp Er-
doğan’s speech delivered on 26 January 2004 
to the Council on Foreign Relations on his 
recent visit to the USA. The speech is particu-
larly significant for its coverage of Turkish 
foreign policy and Turkey’s relations with the 
Western World. This speech is followed by an 
extract from the prime minister’s subsequent 
speech on 30 January 2004 to the Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University, 
which evaluates the impact of the EU and US 
on Turkish democracy and Turkey’s contribu-
tions to democratisation in the Middle East.  
 
These two speeches may be regarded as ‘locus 
classicus’ statements of Turkey’s position on 
these strategic issues. They may be read 
alongside the speech of Romano Prodi to the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly in January 
2004 and a key policy document from the 
European Commission that appeared in the 





This issue of the Monitor also introduces the 
joint project undertaken by CEPS and Eco-
nomics and Foreign Policy Forum (EFPF), 
Istanbul, entitled “Strategy for EU and Turkey 
in the Pre-Accession Period”. The aim of the 
project is to present the major problems and 
challenges posed in Turkey’s accession proc-
ess in eight  selected policy areas (agriculture, 
trade, services and banking, monetary and 
fiscal policy, energy, justice and home affairs, 
domestic governance and foreign and security 
policy), identify innovative EU policies to spe-
cifically tackle these problems, and to create a 
framework in which these EU policies can 
complement and further encourage the process 
of reform in Turkey, thereby adding to the 




Michael Emerson and Senem Aydın 
 
 
SPEECH OF RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĞAN, PRIME MINISTER OF TURKEY, AT THE 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 






It is a great pleasure for me to address this dis-
tinguished audience at this prominent institu-
tion recognized for its substantive contribu-
tions in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. 
I wish on this occasion to share with you, as 
the political leader of a country prepared to 
assume a pivotal role in its region as well as in 
the realm of interest of the transatlantic com-
munity, our foreign policy objectives and vi-
sion for the 21st century. 
One of the most characteristic features of the 
21st century in these initial years is the process 
of transformation that is being experienced at 
the global, regional, and national levels. The 
process of change is almost always accompa-
nied by uncertainties and makes it difficult for NO. 2 / FEBRUARY 2004 | 11 
 
nations to predict what lies ahead. However, 
the common interests and shared values that 
are being cultivated by our alliance with the 
United States of America over the course of 50 
years, along with our mutual resolve to secure 
peace, prosperity, and freedom in the world, 
will be our guide to deliver us through this 
unpredictable period. 
Despite all possible adverse developments on 
a regional as well as global scale, Turkey's 
principal objective will not be altered. The 
main objective of Turkish foreign and domes-
tic policy is to provide the Turkish nation with 
the highest political, economic, and social 
standards of our age, and to render, as we pro-
ceed on our path towards this goal, peace as 
the norm in international relations. Turkey, 
with the strength that it derives from historical 
experience, its human resources, its culture, its 
administration's common sense, its democratic 
and secular regime, regards this as an attain-
able objective, and seeks to join forces with 
countries that share a similar vision. 
Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, the geog-
raphy in which Turkey is located is one of 
great potential. However, it is also a region 
where the full benefits of this potential cannot 
be reaped due to the instability and conflicts 
that prevail. Turkey is therefore compelled to 
be vigilant in its foreign policy. It must also 
try to prevent, to the extent possible, the ad-
verse ramifications of instability and conflicts 
that arise in its region from negatively impact-
ing on its peace, stability, and development. 
However, Turkey believes that the notion of 
geographical determinism--in other words, the 
concept that geography entirely dictates for-
eign policy--is somewhat obsolete in this day 
and age. In this sense, it is not possible to de-
fine the world's geopolitics of the 21st century 
in terms of conventional power politics. One 
also has to take into consideration such ele-
ments as political and social values, interaction 
between societies, identity, and cultural har-
mony. Turkey does not confine itself in this 
respect in a strict sense to the framework of 
national interest alone, but rather pursues a 
proactive foreign policy aimed at contributing 
to regional and global peace and security, and 
encourages as well as activates regional coop-
eration initiatives. From this perspective, 
Turkish foreign policy aims at formulating a 
new collective vision for the period that lies 
ahead on the basis of this trend, that it rose 
from its past historical experience and the 
normative transformation required by the age 
we live in. Turkey's contribution to this proc-
ess will be facilitated by the approach in our 
foreign policy that I will now proceed to out-
line. 
Throughout the 20th century, Turkish foreign 
policy has rationally reconciled the Turkish 
state tradition and Ottoman diplomatic heri-
tage with the realities of the world. Currently, 
it is undergoing the process of meeting the 
requirements of the 21st century. The princi-
ples of realism and integration with the West 
inherent in this heritage continue to maintain 
their importance in our current foreign policy 
objectives. 
Realism necessitates a rational analysis of the 
process of globalization and interdependence 
which are the prevalent themes of our times. 
We perceive international and regional coop-
eration as a force which, in addition to its eco-
nomic benefits, enables countries and their 
peoples to become better acquainted and to 
establish relations that serve their common 
interests, whereby peace is also served. Turkey 
has, in fact, established a cooperation mecha-
nism with port-linked regions, such as the 
Balkans, the Black Sea Basin, the Caucasus, 
Central Asia, and the Middle East. We seek to 
make these regional initiatives increasingly 
more effective in the period ahead. 
From a realistic point of view, in addition to 
the opportunities that globalization has to of-
fer, it also harbours a dynamic that can lead to 
new imbalances and inequalities. It would be 
misleading to interpret globalization as either a 
positive or a negative process. What is crucial 
is to be able to pursue policies from which op-
timal benefits can be created from globaliza-
tion for both our own nations and humankind 
at large. 
In this connection, those who benefit the most 
from globalization will surely be open, democ-
ratic, and free societies governed by the rule of 
law. Regimes, on the other hand, that are 
closed to the outside world, that do not appre-
ciate the value of the information society, and 
that perceive globalization as a threat, will be 
hard- pressed in ensuring the prosperity that 
their citizens demand and in preserving the 
peace and security that the international com-
munity desires. Through peaceful foreign pol-12 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
 
icy in favour of cooperation and collaboration 
that it perceives, Turkey helps the countries in 
its region to feel secure and encourages them 
to open up to the world at large and to remain 
within the scope of international law in their 
actions. 
Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, one of the 
main points of departure of Turkish foreign 
policy is its place and membership within the 
structures of the Western World. This is an 
expression of the Turkish Republic's historical 
location and of the nation's quest for contem-
porary modernization and democratic devel-
opment. Turkey's candidacy to the European 
Union is also the end result of this location. 
Our advanced integration with Europe, which 
we regard as an integral system of values 
through our membership in the European Un-
ion, will represent far more than merely a ba-
sic partnership. The Muslim identity of the 
Turkish population has not prevented it from 
interacting intensely with the West in general, 
and Europe in particular, or from becoming an 
effective member of European institutions and 
organizations. In this context, Turkey has al-
ways been a strong advocate of the transatlan-
tic partnership. 
The successful conclusion of Turkey's acces-
sion process to the European Union will repre-
sent the harmonization of a Muslim society 
with the peoples of Europe on the basis of 
common, universal, and democratic values. 
One of the chief benefits of this harmonization 
is the positive effect that it will have towards 
the adoption of these values we consider to be 
universal in nature by the countries that sur-
round Turkey. We continue to voice our opin-
ion that the Islamic world needs to address 
these problems in a realistic manner and to 
assume responsibility rather than blame others. 
In this connection, we also place emphasis on 
such concepts as democratization, human 
rights, the rule of law, good governance, ac-
countability, transparency, and gender equal-
ity. 
In order for the achievements of Turkey in 
these areas to serve as a source of inspiration 
for the countries in our periphery, we must 
demonstrate that the West and Europe are in-
clusive concepts. We must explain to countries 
that question the universality of these values 
that they are indeed the product of harmony 
and civilizations and the collectivism of all 
humankind. We welcome the point made on 
this score by President Bush in his State of the 
Union Address last week. In this sense, foreign 
policy in the 21st century, over and above the 
promotion of national interests, will be one of 
the avenues for sharing humankind's intellec-
tual development among different societies. 
One of the main obstacles for humanity to live 
together in peace and freedom in the 21st cen-
tury could emanate from the lack of under-
standing among societies. We should not per-
mit this to happen. We must allow collectiv-
ism to foster in a genuine manner that does not 
raise mutual suspicions among societies. We 
must demonstrate our goodwill with our ac-
tions. We must not disregard the global bene-
fits that idealism based on rational realism has 
to offer. 
Turkey, located in a difficult geography, per-
ceives our own security as our No. 1 priority, 
but we also realize that our security will be 
threatened if our neighbours are not safe and at 
peace. This is precisely why we believe that 
our search for security must, above all, be a 
collective effort. We believe that cooperation 
and a determined and realistic stance is the 
most effective way to combat common threats. 
This is an equally valid means to combat such 
global problems as terrorism and the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction, and to 
address poverty, famine, contagious diseases, 
and climate change. The fight itself is far more 
important than the differences in approach that 
may arise, even among allies, at times in re-
spect to the modalities of foreign policy. 
As the problems we face are common to us all, 
we must elaborate common solutions. In de-
termining the objectives and methods of this 
fight, we must act on the grounds where the 
international community is strong, not where it 
is weak. We must develop the means to make 
international structures more effective so that 
the solutions we find to our common problems 
are lasting. 
The United States, as a superpower, has a rare 
opportunity in that regard. The United States, 
as a global power, must use this responsibility 
well to help the developed world be better un-
derstood by the developing one. We stand 
ready to assist in this task in any way that we 
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The close cooperation and solidarity between 
our two countries that spans a half century 
constitutes a solid foundation for our future 
common endeavours. Our collaboration with 
the United States in pursuit of peace and jus-
tice during the Cold War era was effectively 
continued in the first major conflagration of 
the post-Cold War era, namely the Gulf War. 
Despite the heavy economic toll of the sanc-
tions regime it had to foot, Turkey's crucial 
support for the international coalition contin-
ued with Operations Provide Comfort and 
Northern Watch. 
We have coordinated our efforts to peacefully 
resolve disputes and remove sources of con-
flict that threaten international peace in a wide 
geography. We have worked together from 
Somalia, Bosnia- Herzegovina, and Kosovo to 
Afghanistan. We have pursued common inter-
ests to bring peace and stability to the Middle 
East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. And to-
day we continue our efforts to bring peace and 
stability to Iraq. We seek the same objectives 
in consolidating the independence of, and 
promoting democracy and stability in, the 
Central Asian republics. 
We have vested interests in the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline venture that will tap the vast 
oil reserves of the Caspian Basin. The trans-
portation of this energy resource to world 
markets via Turkey by early 2005 will have 
important implications for economic develop-
ment and, consequently, regional stability. 
Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, closing 
the gap between the developed and developing 
worlds, in both economic and political terms, 
will be the greatest guarantee of world peace. 
To attain this long-term goal, the first steps to 
be taken must include a means to a better un-
derstanding of and dialogue between different 
civilizations. For Muslim countries to be better 
understood in the West, a more objective ap-
proach towards Islam should be adopted. It 
should be clearly seen that those who commit 
violence in the name of Islam do not represent 
this faith in any way. The allegation that there 
is an antagonism between the Islamic world 
and the West emanates from a misleading re-
ductionism. There are people on both sides 
that are deceived by this fallacy. Intellectuals, 
politicians, and public opinion-makers in soci-
ety must assume responsibility in preventing 
such misunderstandings. 
The United States of America has the greatest 
resources to overcome this misleading percep-
tion on a global scale, with its wealth of 
knowledge, its prominent universities, and ad-
vanced level in social sciences. In this sense, 
American think tanks also have an important 
role to play. 
We believe that the following can be realized 
in what we see as a realistic scenario, based on 
what we view as attainable and what we wish 
to achieve in terms of what Turkey can ac-
complish. 
In the coming years, Turkey will achieve an 
exemplary level of success in its efforts to 
strengthen its economy, pursued with a sus-
tainable development approach. In addition to 
maintaining the economic relations it enjoys 
with the West, it will effectively develop its 
economic potential with its neighbours in 
close vicinity. The Turkish government will 
set an example for good governance. 
To this end, it will reinforce the notion of a 
transparent, compassionate, effective, and ac-
countable system of government. It will facili-
tate, through such means as e-government, the 
creation of a healthy information society. It 
will open the gates for government, civil soci-
ety, and private enterprise, yet at the same time 
take the necessary measures to protect vulner-
able social groups from the ill effects of glob-
alization. 
Turkey will most likely become a member of 
the European Union within a reasonable time. 
The position that Turkey occupies in the wider 
sense, at the heart of the Eurasian geography, 
will assume greater importance on the East-
West and North-South axis in line with the 
common interests of the whole region. With 
the help of ongoing projects in the field of en-
ergy, which is of vital importance for its de-
velopment strategies, Turkey will not only be 
able to meet the ever- increasing domestic de-
mands, but will also become a hub in the 
transportation of the Middle East and Caspian 
energy resources to international markets. In 
other words, with the investments made in the 
energy sector, Turkey will act with a strategic 
vision that not only prepares for, but shapes 
the future. 
Turkey, being aware of the importance of re-
gional cooperation and interdependence in all 
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field as well. To this end, it will contribute to 
the defence and security policies of the Euro-
pean Union on one hand, and assist the main-
tenance of transatlantic links on a realistic and 
sound basis on the other. 
As I am nearing the end of my speech, as a 
stable country with a successful development 
model, its place within the Western world, its 
rich historical heritage and identity, Turkey 
will become a symbol of harmony of cultures 
and civilizations in the 21st century. Turkey 
will achieve this not only through its economic 
and military power, but with its capability to 
contribute to universal values and to facilitate 
the interaction of these values among different 
regions. In this regard, Turkey will be a reli-
able power for the maintenance of security, a 
partner for economic development, and an ally 
in overcoming existing instabilities in its vi-
cinity, primarily in the Middle East. Thus, 
Turkey will become a source of inspiration for 
the countries in its region in taking steps 






SPEECH OF RECEP TAYYIP ERDOĞAN, PRIME MINISTER OF TURKEY, AT 
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT 
 
Massachusetts, 30 January 2004 
 
… 




If the countries of the Middle East perceive the 
advice to democratise and the emphasis on re-
gional processes as ill-intentioned foreign inter-
vention, they would be mistaken. For the devel-
opment of some of the most advanced democ-
racies of today third countries and international 
institutions have made essential contributions. 
In fact, the democratic community is constantly 
monitoring democratic standards. One of the 
positive sides of globalisation has been the pro-
tection accorded by the democratic community 
to the democratic ideal.  
 
As I consider Turkey’s own democratization 
process I clearly see the benefits of our interac-
tion with the outside world, notably with the US 
and the EU. Even if we take for granted Robert 
Kagan’s thesis that “Europeans come from 
Mars and Americans from Venus” we should 
nonetheless underscore that both are part of the 
same Solar system. Europe and the US are part 
of the same value system. This community of 
shared values stands tall not on the foundations 
of any religion. It’s built on adherence to de-
mocratic values. 
 
The Turkish people have entered a historic 
transformation process with the founder of Re-
public, Kemal Atatürk. In the course of this 
transformation process that has been premised 
on the principle that “sovereignty belongs to the 
people”, a pluralist democracy has been estab-
lished step by step since 1946. At the core of 
this process lies, of course, the determined dis-
position of the Turkish people towards moder-
nity. This vocation facilitated Turkey’s choice 
of taking part in the Free World led by the US 
after World War II. 
 
Once that choice had been made, our member-
ship to NATO and the process of our accession 
to the EU have been elements of encourage-
ment and confidence on our path to modern 
civilization and government. Not having ex-
perienced the particular democratisation history 
of Western Europe which straddles centuries 
and in numerous wars, Turkey has found the 
opportunity to develop her democracy in a rela-
tively smooth transition process thanks to 
NATO and the EU.  
 
As we stand today, Turkey has successfully 
travelled great distances in her efforts to 
achieve most advanced democratic standards.   
My Government has also taken very significant 
steps to realize this vocation of the Turkish 
people, and carried the Turkish democracy to 
highest norms through radical and historic re-
forms. We have instituted not a self-styled de-









Turkey is ready to do its fair share to promote 
democratization in the Middle East and to fa-
cilitate such a momentous transformation. Tur-
key can make valuable contributions to that 
effect. 
Foremost, Turkey is an established democracy 
at the intersection of Europe and the Middle 
East. In the development of her democracy 
Turkey has drawn positive strength from Euro-
pean and Euro-Atlantic processes. Currently, 
she is making historic strides to establish an 
environment of cooperation in her neighbour-
hood. These steps are conducive to the birth of 
a new culture of positive relations in our region 
based on cooperation and interdependence. 
Turkey has a valuable partnership with the 
United States built on strong ties of alliance and 
friendship as well as harmony of a strategic 
world view. With the EU, more than forging 
cooperation, Turkey is on the path of integra-
tion. Decision by the EU to launch accession 
talks with Turkey will be the victory of the 
message that democratization is the starting 
point of the project of harmony of civilizations. 
 
Our region and the Muslim world is closely and 
carefully observing Turkey’s membership proc-
ess to the EU. Our membership to the EU is 
desired by all our neighbours. Both the Syrian 
President whom we have hosted recently and 
the new President of Georgia have indicated 
that thanks to Turkey they expect to become 
neighbours of Europe. It is necessary to see that 
if accession negotiations do not start despite the 
political will we have shown and all the far 
reaching reforms we have realized, the negative 
message would not be lost on others. Our de-
mocracy and modernity as well as the network 
of external relations I have outlined have been 
inevitably making Turkey an example, a model 
as well as a partner. 
 
As Turkey proceeds in the direction of mem-
bership to the EU, also the modern democratic 
values which she represents create greater at-
traction in the Middle East. This attraction will 
enable the Euro-Atlantic community to act as a 
catalyst for positive change in peace and inter-
action with the outside world. The web of co-
operative relationships that Turkey has woven 
helps harmonize the strategic interests of the 




STRATEGY FOR THE EU AND TURKEY IN THE PRE-ACCESSION PERIOD 
 
A joint project of the 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels 
and 
Economics and Foreign Policy Forum (EFPF), Istanbul 
 
CEPS is undertaking a joint project with the 
Economics and Foreign Policy Forum, entitled 
“Strategy for the EU and Turkey in the Pre-
Accession Period” which is operational from 
December 2003 until December 2004. The aim 
of the project is to identify the major problems 
and challenges posed to Turkey’s accession 
process in eight selected policy areas (agricul-
ture, trade, services and banking, monetary 
and fiscal policy, energy, justice and home 
affairs, domestic governance and foreign and 
security policy), identify innovative EU poli-
cies to specifically tackle these problems and 
create a framework in which these EU policies 
can complement and further encourage the 
process of reform in Turkey, thereby adding to 
the momentum of integration. The project will 
thus focus on areas of cooperation and possi-
ble integration that would be developed in par-
allel and complementary to the accession 
process. The general supervision and coordi-
nation of the project is provided by Daniel 
Gros and Michael Emerson (CEPS), and by 
Kemal Derviş and Sinan Ülgen (EFPF). 
Part of the reticence that is widespread in the 
EU to analyse the specific consequences of 
Turkey’s membership stems from the fact that 
it is usually assumed that this would be ‘yet 
another enlargement’, involving essentially the 
same problems as the current one, only on an 
even larger scale.  The basis for this apprehen-
sion is that Turkey is, like many of the Central 
and East European countries (CEECs), a rela-
tively poor country with a large agricultural 16 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
 
sector and deep seated problems of govern-
ance. However, we see a number of important 
policy areas in which the issues raised by the 
accession of Turkey will be quite different 
from those experienced with the CEECs, re-
quiring a different approach on the part of the 
EU in preparing Turkey for full membership. 
Hence, the standard EU ‘strategy’ during pre-
accession, where the EU helps candidates in 
the task of adopting the acquis with modest 
financial aid and generous doses of technical 
assistance, but without involving the candi-
dates in current EU policy initiatives, is likely 
to be insufficient in the case of Turkey. Turkey 
does not have to overcome a legacy of central 
planning. The key challenge in this case is 
rather to overcome the potential points of fric-
tion in a pro-active manner by starting con-
crete forms of cooperation already during the 
pre-accession phase. This needs to be worked 
out by the EU and Turkey together within the 
framework of various policy areas, taking into 
account the different challenges and opportu-
nities posed by Turkey compared to those 
brought by the CEECs. 
 
The eight policy areas that will be covered in 
the project will be structured as follows: 
 
1. Agriculture by Jo Swinnen (CEPS) and Erol 
Hasan Çakmak (Middle East Technical Uni-
versity-EFPF): Many CEECs specialize in 
products (wheat, meat, milk) that are most 
heavily subsidized by the CAP. Hence their 
participation is expected to be very costly and 
even until now the EU market is not open for 
these products (and the EU runs a surplus in 
agricultural goods with the CEECs).  By con-
trast, Turkey specializes in products that are 
not subsidized by the CAP (fresh fruits, nuts, 
etc.) and face much lower barriers for its ex-
ports to the EC (3% on nuts, and 0% on dried 
sultanas, figs and apricots). As a consequence 
Turkey has a significant trade surplus with the 
EU in agriculture (exports Euro 1,953 million, 
imports Euro 707 million in 1998-99). It is 
thus likely that Turkey’s accession to the CAP 
would involve quite different issues, although 
nonetheless formidable ones, since Turkey has 
more farmers than all of the EU-15 combined. 
 
2. Trade by Yiannis Zahariadis (Department 
for International Development, UK), David 
Kernohan (CEPS) and Sinan Ülgen (EFPF) : 
During the negotiation process with the 
CEECs, the EU reduced its trade barriers 
asymmetrically, but retained contingent pro-
tection (although anti-dumping facilities were 
never invoked).  By contrast Turkey is already 
in a customs union with the EU, and hence 
already much more integrated with the EU 
than the CEECs on the eve of their accession. 
Hence trade liberalization is not an issue.   
However, the operation of the customs union 
is far from perfect. The issues to be dealt with 
includes the extension of validity of the pref-
erential trade agreements that EU negotiates 
with various countries to Turkey, the distribu-
tion of customs revenues and the treatment of 
re-exports and triangular trade with, in particu-
lar, the Mediterranean. 
 
3. Services, and banking in particular, by 
Daniel Gros (CEPS) and Murat Üçer (Koç 
University-EFPF): Turkey here presents some 
of the problems of the CEECs in the early 
1990s with an inefficient banking system that 
was for some time used as a conduit for hidden 
(and sometimes not so hidden) subsidies.  The 
recent currency crisis in Turkey might have 
served (as in some CEECs) as a catharsis, but 
numerous problems in implementing and en-
forcing a new regime of modern banking su-
pervision remain.  Moreover, Turkey has so 
far not followed the CEECs in opening radi-
cally its banking system to foreign take-overs. 
In addition the weight of the state banks in the 
banking system and macroeconomic instability 
remain as important bottlenecks in the devel-
opment of the financial system in general and 
the banking system in particular. 
 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy by Marco Air-
audo (LUISS fellow at CEPS), Daniel Gros 
(CEPS) and Kemal Derviş (EFPF): Turkey is 
a case apart from any of the CEECs in having 
very large unresolved problems of public fi-
nance and monetary instability, as witnessed in 
recurrent financial crises of the last decade. In 
particular Turkey’s very high public debt-to-
GDP ratio and poor credibility in financial 
markets makes for a huge debt service burden 
on the budget. Moreover intermittent financial 
crises make for huge swings in the effective 
interest rate on Turkish borrowing, such that 
the interest burden has at times been in the 
range of 15-20% of GDP. However the Turk-
ish situation has features in common with Italy 
before the Euro. The almost miraculous, and at 
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Italian interest burden as the credibility of its 
accession to the euro zone advanced, is an ex-
perience worth recalling when thinking about 
Turkey’s monetary future with the EU. How-
ever this hypothesis of early association or 
accession to the euro zone would mean much 
new thinking at the EU/ECB end, and an open-
ing of the banking system to foreign owner-
ship. 
 
5. Energy by John Roberts (Platts energy 
group), Christian Egenhofer (CEPS) and 
Necdet Pamir (EFPF): Turkey is a transit cor-
ridor increasingly for Russian, Caspian and 
Iranian oil and /or gas. Current investments are 
being made in pipelines and networks that add 
up to a matter of strategic importance for the 
EU’s security of energy supply: the Blue 
Stream gas pipeline from Russia, the Baku-
Ceyhan oil pipeline, a possible Baku-Erzurum 
gas pipeline, the gas pipeline connecting with 
Iran and the gas network linkage now being 
constructed between Turkey and Greece. The 
EU has a strategic interest in diversity of en-
ergy supplies, and how Turkey manages the 
above and other options will be a significant 
factor. Therefore an EU-Turkish energy dia-
logue could be valuable, leading to EU and 
European Investment Bank (EIB) contribu-
tions to the financing of important projects. 
The electricity sector will be examined, in 
view of the potential from growing Turkish 
demand for imports from neighbours, espe-
cially the Balkans.  
 
6. Justice and home affairs by Joanna Apap 
(CEPS) and Kemal Kirişçi (Boğaziçi Univer-
sity-EFPF): Accession of the CEECs relieves 
some member countries (essentially Germany 
and Austria) from direct responsibility for con-
trolling the EU’s Eastern borders.  The length 
of the EU’s external border does not change a 
lot. The main issue in this area with the 
CEECs is that the latter would like to keep 
somewhat open borders with their Eastern 
neighbours.  By contrast, in the case of Turkey 
there is little relief on the Eastern border of 
(present and future) EU members, the length 
of the external border of the EU increases 
dramatically and this border will be with a 
completely different group of countries (Syria, 
Iraq, Iran and the Caucasus), thus posing dif-
ferent policy challenges. 
 
7. Domestic governance by Senem Aydın 
(CEPS) and Fuat Keyman (Koç University-
EFPF): Turkey has made important progress 
towards the fulfilment of the political aspects 
of the Copenhagen criteria. There are nonethe-
less areas where further progress is still needed 
especially in terms of the implementation of 
these reforms. The issues will include the 
ways in which the EU can help in this respect, 
with programs and instruments that can be 
made available to Turkey to accelerate this 
process of adjustment. 
 
8. Foreign and security policy by Michael Em-
erson and Nathalie Tocci (CEPS), Can Bu-
haralı (EFPF): The Copenhagen European 
Council concluded the two year dispute con-
cerning Turkey’s participation in the EU’s se-
curity and defence policy (ESDP). The agree-
ment ensured that Cyprus and Malta as coun-
tries that were not included in NATO’s Part-
nership for Peace would not be included as 
possible locations of ESDP activities and op-
erations. However, while an agreement was 
reached it remains unclear what Turkey’s sub-
stantive input in ESDP will be. More specifi-
cally, this project would assess the possible 
cooperation between Turkey and the EU in 
specific regions in the Wider Europe and its 
neighbourhood where Turkey has special in-
terests: namely the Caucasus, the Middle East 
and Central Asia.  
 
In each of these policy fields, joint or separate 
working papers by CEPS and EFPF authors 
will be prepared. The output of the project will 
include a general report and a short paperback 
book publication by CEPS, a number of work-
ing papers on sectoral topics to be published 
electronically and a collection of the most 
relevant contributions in an edited book to be 
published by an academic publisher. The re-
sults will also be disseminated via two final 
conferences in September and October which 
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TURKISH ECONOMY 2004: MORE 
REFORM, MORE GROWTH 
 
While the external risks for Turkish economy 
gradually decrease, the decisiveness of the 
government in implementing the economic 
program will determine the course of Turkish 
economy in 2004. 
 
Three interrelated factors will be crucial for 
economic prospects in 2004. These are:  
•  the success of the government in main-
taining  political stability;  
•  the implementation of the IMF sup-
ported economic program and; 
•  EU membership perspectives.  
 
The first and the second factors seem to be less 
problematic as the government has so far ab-
stained from creating tensions in internal poli-
tics and contributed to political stability in the 
country. With respect to the implementation of 
the economic program, the forthcoming local 
elections will be a significant test. Recalling 
the rapid increases in spending by coalition 
parties prior to the last national elections, a 
similar inclination is expected to occur in the 
upcoming local elections. Enhancing this 
trend through expanding expenditures or other 
populist policies creates the most important 
risk for the maintenance of fiscal discipline.  
 
As for the EU membership perspective, the 
government has demonstrated significant ef-
forts, especially in the field of political re-
forms, with a view for the opening of accession 
negotiations with the EU. We expect the gov-
ernment’s will to complete the remaining leg-
islative work to persist.  
 
In our macroeconomic scenario, the decision 
of the government will be in favour of perma-
nent economic stability, rather than populist 
tendencies resulting in an increase in wages 
and pensions. Another issue that concerns the 
implementation of the economic program, 
namely the remaining structural reforms due 
in 2004, seems to be less challenging com-
pared to the previous agenda. However, the 
cost of inaction regarding the structural re-
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Introductory note from CEPS  
 
This issue of CEPS Turkey in Europe Monitor 
focuses on the settlement of the Cyprus con-
flict, which has reached the most decisive turn 
in its history with the final (fifth) Annan Plan 
and the upcoming referenda scheduled to take 
place on 24 April. The monitor provides first a 
short political assessment of the choices be-
fore the referendum. Second, it contains a de- 
 
 
tailed chronology of the UN sponsored nego-
tiations in the last three months, starting with 
the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan’s idea to 
mandate Kofi Annan ‘to fill in the blanks’, and 
culminating with the presentation on 31st 
March of the 5th and final version of the Annan 
Plan, now to be submitted to the referendum. 
  






The Cyprus Endgame  
Michael Emerson  
 
So Kofi Annan has ‘filled in the blanks’, and 
the final revised Annan Plan for re-unifying 
the island will be put to referenda on both 
sides of the island on 24 April, exactly one 
week before EU accession day on 1 May.  
Whatever now the outcome, the Annan plan 
for Cyprus will go down in the annals of con-
flict resolution as an outstanding performance 
by the UN mediation team. This has combined 
the respected role of Kofi Annan himself, 
complementing the painstaking professional 
work of Alvaro de Soto, his Special Represen-
tative. While the EU itself could not be a neu-
tral mediator with Greece as member state, the 
EU enlargement dynamics were crucial in de-
blocking the frozen conflict, yet also in signal-
ling confusing and contradictory incentives.  
However, the endgame now reveals an unex-
pected scenario for the referenda results: yes in 
the Turkish north and no in the Greek south 
(yes-no). At least that is what the opinion polls 
have been saying in recent days and weeks. 
This presents a radically different set of advan-
tages and risks for the two principal parties.  
The yes-yes outcome is the only one that EU 
has wanted to discuss. There is no Plan B, they 
say. A no-no outcome, or a no in the north and 
yes in the south (no-yes) would also be rela-
tively predictable in their consequences. In 
both cases Greek Cyprus would accede alone, 
the status quo would continue for the north, 
and there would be some cloud over Ankara’s 
priority to get a positive decision in December 
for the opening of accession negotiations for 
Turkey itself. The cloud would be darkest in 
the event of a no-yes outcome, but this sce-
nario seems the least probable.  
The principal parties are now surely consider-
ing the implications of a yes-no outcome, and 
how to campaign in the next three weeks.  
Prime Ministers Erdoğan for Turkey and Talat 
for Northern Cyprus have already effectively 
signalled that they campaign for a yes. Presi-
dent Denktas is campaigning for a no, but his 
credibility as actor in the drama has been go-
ing down fast. His recent remarks, mentioning 
the words Verheugen and Nazi in the same 
sentence, have relegated him to the theatre of 
the absurd in European political circles.  
The  yes-no  scenario now presents an unex-
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ship. Up until recently it had been a relatively 
credible discourse to blame the difficulties on 
the Denktas problem. But now Denktas is vir-
tually marginalized, and the Erdoğan-Talat 
partnership is making a highly credible push to 
be perceived as the positive party. For exam-
ple it was Erdoğan’s admirable initiative to 
mandate Kofi Annan to ‘fill in the blanks’.  
By contrast President Papadopoulos for his 
part has been equivocal. He accepted giving 
the mandate to Kofi Annan, but has left it am-
biguous whether he would campaign for a yes 
vote in the referendum. Returning from the 
talks in Switzerland on 1 April he declared 
“unfortunately our effort was not successful”, 
arguing that too many of his concerns had not 
been met. European public opinion appreciates 
well that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot de-
mands have naturally been contradictory. Who 
gets the benefit of the doubt? At this stage 
European leaders are unlikely to deviate from 
the judgment made by Kofi Annan. He who 
challenges the Anna Plan loses. On 1 April 
Papadopoulos still reserved his position on the 
referendum, promising only to set this out “in 
a few days”.  
What if it is a yes-no  outcome? The Greek 
Cypriots would still get accession on 1 May, 
but under a cloud, perceived as having become 
the unreasonable party. The precise conse-
quences of this cannot be forecast, but the least 
that can be said is that when complex bargain-
ing develops as usual in the EU Councils over 
a mass of issues, the Greek Cypriot positions 
would indeed have a cloud over them for some 
time to come.  
What then for Northern Cyprus? Most of the 
EU would probably want to do something 
friendly to help them, if they vote yes. The 
most natural development would be to find 
way to allow northern Cyprus to export. 
Northern Cyprus might unilaterally align itself 
on elements of EU law, for example for tech-
nical standards and certification of goods. The 
Republic of Cyprus as member state might try 
to block any concessions, and there would be 
complicated legal discussions what decision-
making rules would apply (simple decision of 
the Commission, or qualified majority in the 
Council, or unanimity). This would not be a 
pleasant dossier for the new EU-25 to have to 
confront. In the medium term Northern Cyprus 
could not be just left to rot away. At some 
stage some kind of informal association ar-
rangement with the EU for this non-sovereign 
territory might be devised. But in the mean-
time there would have been no return of land 
to the Greek community, nor return of dis-
placed per-sons to their former homes. What 
then for Turkey? The politics of the EU’s De-
cember decision are still highly uncertain, but 
at least in this scenario Turkey would be re-
leased from blame for not trying hard enough 
to get a solution over Cyprus. For Denktas it 
might even become the dream scenario (with 
no credit to him), as Turkish Cyprus would not 
cede any land or property, yet gain in interna-
tional goodwill. For Greek Cypriots it would 
become closer to a night-mare, losing any 
hope of regaining land and property, or with-
drawal of Turkish troops, and entering into the 
EU under a cloud at the same time. Finally, 
what conclusions might be drawn by the two 
parties as they define their referendum cam-
paign strategies? For the Turkish Cypriot and 
Turkish sides the answer seems self-evident: 
to campaign even more clearly and strongly 
for a yes outcome, since if the Greeks Cypriots 
vote no they will still have won political 
goodwill, to be translated into some-thing con-
crete later. For the Greek Cypriots and Greece 
itself, there must be now a serious assessment 
of the risks for them of a yes-no  outcome. 
Maybe the Greek Cypriot and Greek leader-
ships will develop an increasingly positive 
campaign fast, maybe to rescue still a yes-yes 
vote for what the rest of Europe regards as a 
win-win solution.  
 
The Cyprus Chronicle  
Senem Aydın  
 
Cankaya Meeting, 8 December 2003: An-
kara made its first move towards the re-
launching of negotiations over Cyprus at a 
summit meeting at Cankaya (the Presidency’s 
residence), attended by Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyıp Erdoğan, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Abdullah Gul, the Chief of Staff and top-level 
civilian and military representatives. The 
summit conclusions stated that ‘Turkey will 
continue to contribute to the negotiation proc-
ess of the UN, in close cooperation with Presi-
dent Denktas and the new government’.  
Elections in Northern Cyprus, 14 Decem-
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first major turning point in Cyprus itself, 
where the opposition parties (Republican 
Party-CTP led by Mehmet Ali Talat, and 
Peace and Democracy Movement-BDH led by 
Mustafa Akinci) together gained the same 
number of seats as the two parties on the na-
tionalist side (National Unity Party-UBP led 
by the former Prime Minister Derviş Eroglu, 
and Democrat Party-DP led by Serdar Denk-
tas). The outcome was a coalition government 
formed on 11 January 2004 by the pro-Annan 
Plan CTP and the more sceptical DP. As it was 
a very fragile coalition agreement, the policy 
of the new government on the Cyprus question 
was going inevitably to be highly sensitive to 
Ankara’s position, which had already shown 
signs of movement. The elections were fol-
lowed by a letter from George Bush to the 
Greek and Turkish prime ministers, urging 
them to take the necessary steps for a solution 
on the island. However the letter created re-
sentment in Cyprus, particularly among the 
Greek Cypriots.  
National Security Council, 23 January 
2004: After the elections, the National Secu-
rity Council (NSC) of Turkey convened to dis-
cuss Cyprus. The declaration released at the 
end of the meeting stated that ‘Turkey contin-
ues to support the initiatives of the UN Secre-
tary General and restates its political will in 
reaching a solution on the island through nego-
tiations while taking the Annan Plan as a point 
of reference’.  
Erdoğan meets Annan in Davos, 24 Janu-
ary: Following the NSC meeting, Prime Min-
ister Erdoğan met UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan in Davos, and went a step further than 
the position emerging from the NSC. He 
called for the re-launch of negotiations on the 
basis of the Annan Plan, and, even more im-
portantly, accepted that the Secretary General 
could ‘fill in the blanks’ if the parties them-
selves failed to mutually agree on changes in 
the Plan. He also asked Annan to appoint an 
impartial mediator and prepare a shorter text 
on the basis of which the negotiations would 
be conducted. Annan was not receptive to ei-
ther of these latter ideas, but stated that he was 
encouraged by the shift in Turkey’s attitude.  
Erdoğan’s visit to the US, 25 to 31 January: 
During this visit Erdoğan reiterated his state-
ments in Davos. The State Department subse-
quently increased pressure on Greece and 
Greek Cypriots to support the re-launching of 
negotiations. Erdoğan also intensified his con-
tacts with the UN Secretary General.  
Cyprus summit in Ankara, 4 February: On 
Erdoğan’s return from the US, a Cyprus sum-
mit was convened with Rauf Denktas, Mehmet 
Ali Talat (now Turkish Cypriot Prime Minis-
ter), Serdar Denktas (now Turkish Cypriot 
Deputy Prime Minister) and Abdullah Gul. 
The summit concluded that ‘Turkey and 
KKTC (Turkish Cypriot State) affirm their 
aim to reach a just and sustainable settlement 
on the island and will undertake the necessary 
measures to support the efforts of the UN Sec-
retary General’.  
Rauf Denktas, Papadopoulos and Annan 
meet in New York, 10 February: As a result 
of these developments, Annan invited Denktas 
and Papadopoulos to New York. The Turkish 
government exerted considerable pressure on 
the reluctant Rauf Denktas to go to New York. 
He eventually accepted to attend the talks in 
New York. Initially both Cypriot leaderships 
rejected Annan’s proposal to ‘fill in the 
blanks’ in the case of a disagreement. Annan 
convened another meeting the next day at 
which he expected suggestions from the par-
ties. On 11 February, the Turkish side intro-
duced a surprise time-table, which aimed to 
facilitate an agreement before the EU acces-
sion day on 1 May. The Turkish proposal en-
visioned a three-step process, whereby:  
•  First the two sides attempt to reach an 
agreement between themselves.  
•  Second, in the event of failure, Turkey and 
Greece would join in the negotiations.  
•  Third, and again in the event of failure to 
reach an agreement, the Plan would be 
completed by the Secretary General, put to 
separate referenda on both sides of the 
green line, which would then need to be 
ratified by the parliaments of Greece and 
Turkey.  
This proposal was welcomed warmly by An-
nan. The Greek Cypriots asked for the inclu-
sion of the EU in negotiations, but this propo-
sition was rejected by the Commission itself. 
An agreement was finally reached on the 
Turkish proposal, and negotiations were re-
launched on 19 February.  
Proposals and major issues: During the en-
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proposals for changes to be made to the Annan 
Plan, which were refused by the opposite par-
ties.  
Greek Cypriot proposals included:  
•  Harmonisation of the founding Constitution 
with the EU acquis and international law. 
This entailed eliminating the restrictions on 
the freedoms of settlement and property 
acquisitions included in the Plan.  
•  Increase in the number of members of the 
Presidential Council from 6 to 9 (4 Greek 
Cypriots and 2 Turkish Cypriots to be in-
creased to 6 Greek Cypriots and 3 Turkish 
Cypriots)  
•  Increase in the Presidency term. (The ear-
lier versions of the Annan Plan provides for 
a ten-month rotation between the President 
and the Vice-President).  
•  The referendum to take place after the rati-
fication of the agreement in the Turkish 
Parliament (which would be against the 
provisions of the Turkish Constitution, as 
an incomplete agreement cannot be brought 
to ratification before the Parliament).  
•  Finalisation of all common state laws be-
fore the end of negotiations.  
•  Increase in the amount of land to be re-
turned.  
•  Immediate UN control over the land to be 
returned by the Turkish Cypriots.  
•  An increase in the proportion of Turkish 
immigrants in northern Cyprus to return to 
Turkey.  
Turkish Cypriots proposals include:  
•  The Swiss model regarding the status and 
equality of both sides.  
•  The Belgian model with respect to Cyprus’ 
relations with the EU.  
•  Establishment of a commission responsible 
for the compensation of Turkish Cypriots 
for the incidents of 1963-1974.  
•  Limitation of Greek influence on the is-
land after Cyprus’ accession to the EU.  
•  Further restrictions on the proportion of 
Greek Cypriots allowed to settle in the 
North at the end of a transitional period of 
15 years.  
•  (Or) voting rights based on ethnicity that 
would prevent Greek Cypriot residents in 
Northern Cyprus to vote for the Turkish 
Cypriot constituent state and represented in 
the Senate.  
•  A reduction in the Annan Plan’s upper limit 
of 10% in the land ownership of Greek 
Cypriots in the North.  
•  Continued military presence by Turkey, 
and special relations with Turkey.  
•  Rehabilitation provisions for those dis-
placed as a result of territorial readjust-
ments (regarding homes and employment).  
Greek Cypriots declared that they reject all the 
Turkish proposals a couple of days after they 
were submitted. The Turkish Cypriots also 
rejected most of the Greek Cypriot proposals 
after they were discussed in the negotiations.  
The derogations question: One of the most 
important issues for the Turkish side concerns 
the ‘derogations to the EU acquis’. The Annan 
Plan introduces important derogations to the 
acquis in its Annex V, which mostly safeguard 
the interests of Turkish Cypriots. The initial 
version of the Plan would restrict the right of 
return if the properties of displaced persons 
were occupied by other displaced persons or 
had been significantly improved, or if their 
return would result in their community repre-
senting over 20% of the population of that vil-
lage and over 10% of the residencies and land 
ownership of that constituent state.  
In terms of the ‘three freedoms’, while the 
freedom of movement would be immediately 
liberalized, there would be restrictions to the 
freedoms of settlement and property acquisi-
tion, which would be phased over time. Ac-
cording to the initial plan, after an initial mora-
torium period (of six years), there would be 
0% of Greek Cypriots living in the north, (ex-
cept for those over 65 and residents of 4 vil-
lages in Karpaz, who could return after two 
years). In years 7-10 this figure would rise to 
7%, in years 10-14 to 14%, and in years 14-21 
Greek Cypriots would not exceed 21% of the 
population of northern Cyprus. After 21 years 
the parties would review whether these dero-
gations were still necessary.  
The initial Plan also restricted the rights of 
Greek (or Turkish) nationals to reside in Cy-
prus, if their numbers reached 10% of the 
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state. In addition, the Turkish Cypriot con-
stituent state could take temporary economic 
‘safeguard measures’ during the first three 
years of EU membership, if EU laws threat-
ened the economic development of northern 
Cyprus. The figures regarding the limits to the 
right of return, restrictions on property owner-
ship in the North and limitations on the rights 
of Greek (Turkish) nationals to reside in Cy-
prus were revised further with the 4th and 5th 
Annan Plans, which are described in further 
detail below.  
The Accession Treaty already been signed by 
the Republic of Cyprus, and later approved in 
EU member state parliaments, states only 
loosely in Protocol 10 that, in the event of an 
agreement, account would be taken of the 
terms of a settlement. The Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriot sides were concerned that unless the 
specific provisions of the Plan regarding tem-
porary and permanent restrictions would be 
included in EU primary law (i.e., through an 
amendment of the Treaty of Accession), the 
provisions of the Plan safeguarding Turkish 
Cypriots could be challenged in the European 
Court of Justice and could well be denied. The 
Greek Cypriots had already displayed inten-
tions to erode the safeguards to the Turkish 
Cypriots by emphasising that they would con-
duct the negotiations within the framework of 
the “Annan Plan and the EU acquis”.  
On 13 February, Annan declared that the EU 
had committed itself to align the agreement 
with EU acquis.  This was followed by the 
work of a commission composed of EU legal 
experts, which decided that approval of the 
agreement at the IGC would be sufficient and 
that there would be no need for Parliamentary 
ratification. A meeting of Turkish legal experts 
with EU officials also failed to bring a solution 
to the problem. Subsequently, Erdoğan sent a 
letter to Kofi Annan on 15 March, requesting 
him to intensify his efforts to resolve this is-
sue. (Although it would be impossible for an 
agreement to be approved by all EU member 
state parliaments before 1 May, one could ar-
gue that if the Commission were to be man-
dated to propose an amendment of the Treaty 
of Accession, that could then be sent for par-
liamentary ratification thereafter, taking for 
example up to 24 months after which the 
agreement becomes part of EU primary law, 
which could be sufficient to ease Turkish Cyp-
riot concerns). 
De Soto paper, 16 March: The ‘give and 
take’ part of negotiations was scheduled to 
start on 12 March. Due to the substantial dis-
agreements between the two sides, this could 
only start on 17 March on the basis of a paper 
submitted by the UN Special Representative 
Alvaro de Soto the day before. The two sides 
could only negotiate on the points included in 
this paper. 
De Soto’s paper included the following issues 
brought forward by the Turkish Cypriots: 
•  Turkish/Greek voting rights based on eth-
nicity or the refusal of the right to vote to 
Greek Cypriots residing in Northern Cy-
prus to protect the 24/24 balance in the 
Senate. 
•  Redrawing the borders separating the two 
sides to make them straighter, so to avoid 
Greek Cypriot settlements cutting through 
the Turkish Cypriot lands. 
•  Reduction of the ratio of Greek Cypriots to 
return to Northern Cyprus (which was fore-
seen to reach 21% in the third version of 
the Plan). 
•  Continued Turkish military presence. 
•  Inclusion of the agreement as EU primary 
law to resolve the problem of derogations. 
•  A requirement to provide jobs and housing 
for the Turkish Cypriots who will be dis-
placed after the agreement. 
Greek Cypriot demands included in the De 
Soto paper were: 
•  Ratification of the agreement by the Turk-
ish Parliament before the referendum. 
•  Increase in the number of members of the 
Presidency Council. 
•  Greater territorial readjustments.  
•  The territorial readjustments in the shortest 
time possible and the immediate control of 
UN over these lands.  
•  Specification of the exact number of Turk-
ish Cypriot citizens that migrated from 
Turkey and those with residence permits as 
well as a reduction in their numbers.  
•  Specification of the federal ministries and 
the introduction of a system where the dep-
uty minister needs to be from the opposite 
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The Greek Cypriots reacted to the De Soto 
paper, claiming that it placed too much em-
phasis on the Turkish demands.  
The Four meet at Burgenstock, Switzer-
land: Negotiations between Greek and Turk-
ish Cypriots continued on the basis of the De 
Soto document, but the two sides have failed 
to reach an agreement. It became evident that 
in accordance with the three stage-plan, Tur-
key and Greece were going to be included in 
the negotiations from 24 March onwards. In 
the meanwhile, on 17 March, Rauf Denktas 
declared that he would not attend the Switzer-
land four-party talks. He stated that attending 
the talks would mean giving false hopes to his 
people as he expected no progress in negotia-
tions. Turkish Cypriots were to be represented 
by Mehmet Ali Talat and Serdar Denktas.  
The meeting of the Four did not proceed as 
planned. Talks between the Turkish Foreign 
Minister Abdullah Gul, the Greek Foreign 
Minister Petros Molviyatis, the Turkish Cypri-
ots and the Greek Cypriots could only start 
with a dinner on 27 March. In the meantime, 
meetings were held between EU officials and 
Turkish representatives on resolving the prob-
lem of derogations. However the EU proposal 
to accept the plan as an ‘act of adaptation’ ap-
proved by the Council was refused by the 
Turkish officials on the grounds that this failed 
to place the Annan Plan in EU primary law. 
The Turkish side insisted that this should also 
be ratified by EU member state parliaments. 
Erdoğan made a statement hinting that the 
failure to make the plan a part of EU primary 
law could lead the Turkish side to withdraw 
from the commitment to submit the Plan to 
referenda.  
Annan presents the 4th Plan, 29 March: 
Erdoğan and Karamanlis arrived at Burgen-
stock on 29 March and Annan has presented 
the amended plan to the four parties, instead of 
waiting for them to reach an agreement by 31 
March. In a press conference, De Soto stated 
that the Plan addressed Turkish Cypriot con-
cerns regarding freedom of movement and 
settlement, returned properties and the voting 
for the Senate, whereas it incorporated Greek 
Cypriot concerns with respect to efficiency 
and applicability of the provisions of the plan.  
More precisely, in response to Greek Cypriot 
demands, the 4th Plan incorporated the follow-
ing provisions: 
•  Land:  The Plan did not introduce any 
changes to the amount of land to be re-
turned to the Greek Cypriots. Approxi-
mately 7% of land in the North (65 vil-
lages) were to be returned to the Greek 
Cypriots. However mechanisms and phases 
of territorial readjustments were further 
clarified. Land would be returned in 6 
phases over a 42 month period under the 
interim administration of Turkish Cypriots 
and the supervision of UN. 
•  Presidential Council: The members of the 
Presidential Council were increased from 6 
to 9 to improve functionality. 3 of the 
members will not have voting rights while 
the other 6 will comprise 4 Greek Cypriot 
nationals and 2 Turkish Cypriot nationals. 
•  Presidential Terms: The President and the 
Vice-President of the Council shall rotate 
every twenty months instead of the ten 
months envisaged initially. The first Presi-
dent in each term shall be the member hail-
ing from the more populous constituent 
state (Greek Cypriot state). 
•  Federal Legislation: Federal laws were 
further specified and attached to the Foun-
dation Agreement. 
•  Return of Affected Property: The mecha-
nisms for the return of affected properties, 
an issue with a large impact on the Greek 
Cypriots, have been clarified further with 
the fourth version of the Plan. Any citizen 
with a claim to affected property has a right 
to reinstatement or compensation, except 
those that are occupied by other displaced 
persons (in which case the two properties 
may be exchanged), and those where sig-
nificant improvements have been made. 
•  Limits to Greek and Turkish Nationals: 
Until Turkey’s accession to the EU, Cyprus 
may limit the right of Turkish (or Greek) 
nationals to reside in Cyprus if their num-
ber has reached 5% of the number of resi-
dent Cypriots citizens holding Turkish (or 
Greek) Cypriot internal constituent state 
citizenship status. Thus, the 10% upper 
limit regarding the settlement rights of the 
Greek (or Turkish) nationals in the initial 
plan was reduced.  
•  Shorter Transition Period: General elec-
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Union level would be held on 13 June, after 
which the constituent state and federal gov-
ernments shall operate regularly.  
In response to Turkish Cypriot demands, the 
4th Plan incorporated the following provi-
sions:  
•  Political Equality: The Plan more strongly 
emphasises that the relationship between 
both sides is one of ‘political equality 
where neither side may claim authority or 
jurisdiction over the other’.  
•  Restrictions on Settlement: The numbers 
of Greek Cypriots (or Turkish Cypriots) to 
return to the North (or South) have been 
reduced from 21% to 18%. After an initial 
moratorium of 5 years (6 in the initial ver-
sion of the Plan), 6% were to return be-
tween 6th and 9th years, 12% between the 
10th and 14th years and 18% thereafter. It 
was added that these restrictions were to be 
lifted after 19 years or on Turkey’s ac-
cession to the EU, whichever one is earlier. 
Thereafter, each constituent state may take 
safeguard measures to ensure that no less 
than two-thirds of its Cypriots permanent 
residents speak its official language as their 
mother tongue is not substantially altered, 
indicating a 33% upper limit on the Greek 
Cypriots returning to the North.
1 
•  Continued Military Presence: Greek and 
Turkish contingents would be permitted to 
stay on the island under the conditions that 
each contingent does not exceed 6,000 until 
2011, and 3,000 thereafter until 2018 or 
Turkey’s accession to the EU, whichever is 
sooner. The Greek contingent, not exceed-
ing 950 and the Turkish contingent, not ex-
ceeding 650 could re-main thereafter, sub-
ject to five-yearly re-view with the objec-
tive of total withdrawal  
•  Affected Property (property which was 
lost by the owners due to inter-communal 
strife, military action or the unresolved di-
vision of the island): The Plan provides a 
domestic remedy for the solution of all 
matters related to affected property. It re-
quires the new Republic to request the 
European Court of Human Rights to with-
                                                                                                 
1 Exceptions were retained for those over 65 and 4 
villages of Karpaz. A fifth village, Kormakiti was 
also included among the areas where these restric-
tions would not apply. 
draw any proceedings currently before it 
concerning affected property.  
•  Restrictions on the Acquisition of Prop-
erty:  Those persons who have not been 
permanent residents for at least 3 years in 
the Turkish constituent state (mainly imply-
ing Greek Cypriots) cannot purchase im-
movable property in the North for as long 
as the GDP per capita in the North does not 
reach the level of 85% of the GDP per cap-
ita of the South. This provision aimed to re-
lieve concerns regarding ‘large scale buy-
out of land’ in the North by the Greek Cyp-
riots.  
•  Voting for the Senate: Senators will be 
elected not on the basis of constituent state 
citizenship status, but by Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish Cypriots separately. This re-
lieves the Turkish Cypriot concerns that 
with increasing Greek Cypriot settlement in 
the North, balances in the Senate would 
change in favour of the Greek Cypriots.  
•  Economic Safeguards: Turkish Cypriot 
constituent state can take appropriate safe-
guard measures for up to 6 years to combat 
difficulties posed to its economy by the 
EU’s internal market.  
Annan presents the 5th (Final) Plan, 31 
March: The two parties presented their opin-
ions and suggestions regarding the 4th revised 
version of the Plan by the morning of 30 
March. On this basis Annan presented the final 
5th version of the Plan on 31 March. The final 
Plan did not differ much from the 4th version.  
The most significant changes made upon the 
demands of Greek Cypriots included the fol-
lowing:  
•  Continued Military Presence: The five-
year review of the continuation of the Turk-
ish and Greek military presence on the is-
land, which would begin in 2018 or upon 
Turkey’s accession to the EU was reduced 
to three years. 
•  Restrictions on the Acquisition of Prop-
erty: It was added that restrictions on the 
acquisition of property in the North by the 
Greek Cypriots could also be lifted after 15 
years while retaining the provision of the 
4th Plan that these could also be lifted 
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the GDP of the South, in case this happens 
earlier.  
•  Return of Affected Property: Property 
return regimes were further clarified for 
those living outside the areas of territorial 
adjustment. All dispossessed owners have 
the right to reinstatement of one-third of the 
value and one-third of the area of their total 
property ownership, and to receive full and 
effective compensation for the remaining 
two-thirds. They have the right to rein-
statement of a dwelling they have built, or 
in which they lived for at least 10 years, 
and up to one donum of adjacent land, even 
if this is more than one-third of the total 
value and area of their properties.  
The most significant change made upon the 
demands of the Turkish Cypriots was:  
•  Request for Adaptation of Primary Law: 
The attached letter to the President of the 
European Council was amended to request 
the European Union to endorse the Founda-
tion Agreement and to accommodate its 
terms by adapting the terms of ac-cession 
before 1 May 2004 in a way that “results in 
the adaptation of primary law” and ensures 
the “legal certainty and security” of the 
Foundation Agreement within “European 
Union’s legal system for all concerned”. 
This amendment is intended to facilitate an 
agreement between the Turkish side and 
the EU over the issue of derogations.  
Beyond the details. From the first to final ver-
sions of the Annan Plan, the essence of the 
proposal has been for a United Cyprus Repub-
lic, as a single state in international law, with a 
federal government and two equal constituent 
states of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish 
Cypriots. The status and relationship of the 
United Cyprus Republic, its federal govern-
ment and its constituent states is modelled on 
the status and relationship of Switzerland, its 
federal government, and its cantons. The main 
functions of the federal government would be 
external relations, relations with the EU, Cen-
tral Bank functions, federal finances, commu-
nications, aviation, citizenship, and natural 
resources including water. The essential com-
petences of the two constituent states would be 
tourism, protection of the environment, the use 
and conservation of energy, fisheries and agri-
culture, industry and commerce, zoning and 
planning, education and sports, health, and 
social security. Constituent states participate in 
the formulation and implementation of policy 
in external relations and EU affairs, in accor-
dance with Cooperation Agreements modelled 
on the Belgian example. The Federal Parlia-
ment is composed of two Chambers: the 
Chamber of Deputies (with 36 Greek Cypriot 
and 12 Turkish Cypriot members) and the 
Senate (24 members from each sides). The 
executive power will be vested in the Presi-
dential Council with 6 (4 Greek Cypriot and 2 
Turkish Cypriot) voting members. The Plan 
strives to ensure workability, thus no vetoes 
are included, as with the 1960 Constitution. 
Decisions of Parliament require the approval 
of both Chambers by simple majority, includ-
ing one quarter of voting Senators from each 
constituent state. However for specified mat-
ters such as ratification of international agree-
ments on matters which fall within the legisla-
tive competence of the constituent states (rati-
fication of treaties and adoption of laws and 
regulations concerning airspace, continental 
shelf and territorial waters; adoption of laws 
and regulations concerning citizenship, immi-
gration, water resources and taxation; approval 
of the federal budget and the election of the 
Presidential Council), a special majority com-
prising at least two fifths of sitting senators 
from each constituent state is required, in addi-
tion to a simple majority of deputies. The deci-
sions of the Presidential Council require a 
simple majority of members, but including in 
all cases at least one member from each con-
stituent state. Regarding security matters, the 
objective is of demilitarisation of the island 
where there would be both a federal police 
force and forces in the two component states. 
There would be a Supreme Court to uphold the 
constitution. The Court would comprise of an 
equal number of judges from each constituent 
state and three non-Cypriot judges. The Su-
preme Court would inter alia resolve disputes 
between the constituent states or between the 
states and the federal government.  
Talks over derogations: The issue of deroga-
tions remains unresolved. Despite the requests 
of the Turkish side and the UN itself, the EU is 
insisting on adopting the plan as an “act of 
adaptation”, where there will only be Council 
approval and no parliamentary ratification by 
the EU member states. One may argue that the 
possibility of non-ratification by EU (espe-
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for the EU to take this decision. Talks between 
EU officials and Turkish representatives are 
continuing. Although the Turkish side is 
strongly opposing the present EU position, it 
does not seem to have a detrimental effect on 
their commitment to holding the referenda. In 
the absence of any unforeseen and outstanding 
development, this last 5th version of the Plan 
will be put to referenda on the two sides on 24 
April.  
The Referenda, 24 April: However the re-
sults of the referenda may be mixed. Recent 
opinion polls suggest that a majority of Greek 
Cypriots oppose the Annan Plan, with the ‘no’ 
vote according to three opinion polls estimated 
at 54%, 53% and 62%. The final version of the 
Plan seems even to have increased these nega-
tive perceptions. According to an opinion poll 
by Antenna, a Greek Cypriot TV station, more 
than 70% of Greek Cypriots would vote 
against the latest version of the Annan Plan. 
Another poll conducted on 1-2 April by VPRC 
suggest that 84.7% of the Greek Cypriots op-
pose the Plan. The international community 
strongly encourages the Greek Cypriots to 
push for a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum. The 
Commission has declared that approval of the 
Annan Plan would be an important factor in 
the negotiations over the EU’s financial per-
spectives in 2005.  
The prospects of a ‘yes’ vote in the North look 
more promising. In a press conference held 
after the submission of the Plan, Erdoğan re-
plied to a question on the referenda by stating 
that ‘he wishes to see the results of their ef-
forts’, indicating the Turkish government’s 
expectations of a ‘yes’ vote for both sides. 
Turkish Cypriots are also more positive about 
the plan. In the recent elections the pro-Annan 
Plan parties received 51.24% of the votes. A 
recent opinion poll confirms this result with 
51.1% of the Turkish Cypriots in favour of the 
Annan Plan. However, this is a narrow margin, 
and a ‘yes’ vote on the Turkish side should 
also not be taken for granted. Although the 
reactions to the final version of the Plan have 
generally been positive, there still remain seri-
ous concerns among many regarding the 
amount of Greek Cypriots to return to North 
and those that will be dispossessed after terri-
torial adjustments. It is evident that there will 
also be negative campaigning in the North, 
based mainly on these issues and led by Rauf 
Denktas himself.  
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TURKISH BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES 
by  
TÜSIAD  
TURKISH INDUSTRY & BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATION  
www.tusiad.org  
TRACK RECORD ON THE PROGRESS 
TOWARDS THE EU  
 
 
TÜSIAD inaugurated its Paris office with a 
ceremony opened by the speeches by State 
Minister, Ali Babacan, France's Economy and 
Finance Minister, Francis Mer, and the Presi-
dent of the Confederation of French Enter-
prises (MEDEF), Antoine Seillière.  
In the opening ceremony, TÜSIAD President 
Ömer Sabancý addressed the public with a 
speech. The main messages conveyed by Mr. 
Sabancý to the participants included the fol-
lowing points:  
•  As of March 2004, the rate of inflation 
dropped to single digit levels, a feast for-
gotten for over a generation. Growth has 
been restored to the economy even if em-
ployment figures have not yet caught up 
with the rebound. Interest rates are at the 
lowest since a quarter century ago and 
budgetary discipline has been mostly re-
stored. From now on, the Maastricht crite-
ria and the Lisbon Strategy of the Euro-
pean Union are also our main guidelines.  
•  Turkish companies are emerging as world-
class competitors in sophisticated indus-
trial products. We are committed to bring 
Turkey’s economy to the standards of most 
competitive countries in terms of techno-
logical sophistication.  
•  Our economic dynamism  is helping the 
economies of neighbouring countries. We 
expect Armenia to soon join Syria, Iraq, 
Georgia, Russia, Iran and other regional 
countries as a viable trade partner of Tur-
key when the border is opened.  
•  By the beginning of the next decade Turkey 
will be an energy corridor as gas and oil 
pipelines will cross the country from north 
to south and east to west. The European 
Union will be one of the beneficiaries of 
such a development since these multiple 
pipelines will enable it to diversify its en-
ergy sources.  
•  We are the watchdogs of the reform proc-
ess. We will not let it fail. Moreover we 
have no doubts in our minds that our cur-
rent government is committed to the mem-
bership agenda. This agenda includes the 
supremacy of civilian authority as well.  
•  Turkey will have done its part in securing a 
Cyprus resolution. We hope that our Greek 
counterparts will do the same.  
•  We are all more appreciative of a world 
order where secular thinking prevails. We 
all have a common interest in not allowing 
a so-called clash of civilizations. Just as 
much we have a common interest in stabi-
lizing the Middle East and assure the 
emergence of a secular, representative po-
litical order in that critical region.  
•  What we ask from our partners in the EU is 
encouragement and a fair assessment when 
December arrives. Turkey is ready for the 
process of negotiations, which we know 
will take several years to successfully con-
clude.  
•  The decision to start accession negotiations 
will propel Turkey towards the final stage 
of its political, economic and social trans-
formations. We then hope to contribute to 
the shaping of Europe that is being 
launched as the continent unifies.  
 
The full text of the speech can be accessed at: 
www.tusiad.org/english.nsf  
TÜSIAD IS A MEMBER OF UNICE 
(UNION OF INDUSTRIAL AND EMPLOYERS’ 
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Introductory Note from CEPS 
 
This issue of CEPS Turkey in Europe Monitor 
focuses on the views of the European Parlia-
ment on Turkish accession to the European 
Union. The monitor provides first a brief over-
view of the views of Parliamentary groups on 
Turkish membership and the Oostlander Re-
port on Turkey which was approved by the 






Second, it contains the positions of national 
delegations within Parliamentary Groups and 
the national debates surrounding the issue 
prior to the EP Elections to be held in June. 
The monitor also provides the distribution of 
votes on the Oostlander Report.   
 




Views of the European Parliament 




The debates over Turkey’s accession to the 
European Union are becoming more intense 
with the European Parliament elections draw-
ing closer. On 1 April, the Parliament voted to 
adopt the Oostlander Report which decided 
that Turkey does not yet meet the Copenhagen 
political criteria required for EU membership 
and that more progress is needed before An-
kara can expect a date from the EU for the 
opening of accession talks. While recognising 
the legislative reforms already enacted in the 
country, the Report criticised Turkey for lag-
ging behind in implementation especially with 
respect to the fight against torture, discrimina-
tion of religious and ethnic minorities, con-
tinuing influence of the army in politics and 
the judicial system. During the debate that 
preceded the voting, the MEPs rejected an 
amendment proposed by the German Christian  
 
Democrat members of the conservative PPE-
DE Group which would have offered Turkey a 
‘privileged partnership’ status rather than full  
 
 
EU membership. Many commentators argued 
as a result that the report was more positive 
than the previous ones, specifically in the way 
that it acknowledged Turkey’s candidacy and 
emphasised full membership as a goal to be 
attained. 
 
The Report was adopted with 211 votes in fa-
vour, 84 against and 46 abstentions. The most 
striking pattern in the votes was the over-
whelming support of the PSE (Party of 
European Socialists) and ELDR (European 
Liberal Democrat and Reform Party) to the 
Report, with only one against vote in ELDR 
and two against and two abstentions in the 
case of PSE. The conservative PPE-DE 
(European People’s Party and European 
Democrats) was divided over its stance. After 
their proposal to insert the ‘privileged partner-
ship’ clause in the Report was turned down, 
the German CDU/CSU delegation to the PPE-
DE voted against the Report in a bloc, with 
only a few exceptions, and was supported by 
the French and Austrian members of the PPE-
DE. A majority of MEPs from the GUE/NGL 
Group (Group of the European United 
Left/Nordic Green Left) and Verts/ALE 
(Group of the Greens/European Free Alli-
ance) have also voted in favour of the Oost-
lander Report. These voting patterns give 
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liamentary groups on Turkish accession to the 
EU.  As the socialist, liberal, extreme left and 
green groups seem to broadly favour eventual 
Turkish accession, the majority of the conser-
vative centre-right seems to oppose it. It would 
however be misleading to treat these groups as 
monolithic entities and considerable attention 
needs to be given to the differences in the 
opinions of national party delegations within 
parliamentary groups to understand where 
Turkish accession stands in the national de-
bates prior to EP elections to be held in June. 
 
1. PPE-DE-Majority against Eventual 
Turkish Accession 
 
The biggest parliamentary group in the EP, 
PPE-DE, despite the strong opposition of 
most of its national delegations to the Turkish 
accession, is still not a united front in this is-
sue. Hans-Gert Poettering, the Chairman of the 
EPP-ED Group speaking to the European Par-
liament has declared that as far as Turkish 
membership is concerned, they are not of one 
opinion. He added that the one point they 
agree on is that Turkey is an important, strate-
gic partner with which they need to foster 
close relations.  
 
The most prominent campaigner in the PPE-
DE Group against Turkish accession is the 
CDU/CSU delegation from Germany. They 
were actually the first in Germany to take up 
this issue as a major element of their cam-
paigning strategy against the SPD and the 
Greens that have a favourable attitude towards 
Turkey’s entry into the EU. Back in May 
2003, the head of the German delegation of the 
PPE-DE Group in the EP stated that the EU 
‘owes clarity to its neighbours, whose hopes 
should not be raised if they can’t be fulfilled’ 
and continued to argue that ‘that is one of the 
problems with Turkey, which is an important 
ally and partner.’ Michael Glos, the head of 
the CSU faction in the German Parliament has 
announced back in September 2003 that the 
‘rejection of Turkish EU membership due to 
its different culture and poor economy would 
be an issue in European Elections’. Thus, 
CDU leader Angela Merkel’s proposal to offer 
Turkey a ‘privileged partnership’ on her visit 
to Turkey in February this year did not come 
as a surprise to many observers. Following 
Merkel’s proposal which was strongly rejected 
by Turkey, the CDU/CSU group in the EP has 
adopted and published a declaration titled ‘For 
a new Turkey Policy: Privileged Partnership 
vs. EU Accession’ (Für eine Türkei-Politik: 
Privilegierte Partnerschaft statt EU-
Mitgliedschaft).  
 
This document attempts to justify the estab-
lishment of a ‘privileged partnership’ which 
would be an extended version of the customs 
union agreement with increased financial aid, 
youth and cultural programmes, on the 
grounds that full accession of Turkey to the 
Union would hamper the efficient functioning 
of the EU with the country’s large population 
and the problems related to its market econ-
omy. The document also draws attention to 
‘defining the borders of Europe’ by arguing 
that countries such as Ukraine would also have 
a legitimate claim to join the EU after a possi-
ble Turkish accession, where membership of 
both would have detrimental effects on the 
already troubled German economy.  
 
More recent objections to Turkey’s accession 
have also been raised by the French centre-
right in the PPE-DE Group. Some prominent 
UMP MEPs such as Alain Lamassoure, after 
voting against the Oostlander Report of the 
Parliament, declared that ‘the vote was an op-
portunity for the UMP to express their opposi-
tion to Turkey’s entry into the EU’ and that 
‘this would likely be UMP’s position during 
the European elections’. Following the recent 
statements of the new foreign minister, Michel 
Barnier, on 7 April that France would oppose 
Turkey’s entry into the EU ‘under current cir-
cumstances’ as ‘Turkey does not respect the 
conditions, even if it is preparing to do so’, 
Alain Juppé, the leader of the ruling centre-
right UMP and a close associate of French 
President Jacques Chirac, decided to publicly 
oppose Turkey’s candidacy to the EU. He ar-
gued that the countries on the periphery of the 
growing EU, such as Turkey, ‘have no busi-
ness joining (the bloc), otherwise it will be 
diluted’. He has concluded that ‘the UMP does 
not want to see negotiations with Turkey at the 
end of the year’. In the same line with the 
German Christian Democrats, he proposed a 
‘privileged partnership’ with Turkey.  
 
In response to the uproar that the two conse-
quent statements caused in Turkish media, 
Barnier made another statement on 18 April, 
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signalling a softening of his previous stance. 
He argued that in the case of rejection, ‘there 
is a risk that Turkey will return to another 
model’ and added to repeat his previous claim 
that ‘there is no question of Turkey’s acces-
sion in the current circumstances or in the 
short term’. President Chirac has recently 
made parallel statements, supporting Turkish 
accession in the long run while reminding that 
the country is not currently ready for full ac-
cession. Regarding the opening of accession 
negotiations, the French President has stuck to 
his neutral position by emphasising the impor-
tance of the Commission’s Report to be deliv-
ered in October. According to many observers, 
while the official French position represented 
by Chirac and Barnier focus on the impossibil-
ity of Turkish accession in the short term 
while keeping the option of granting the coun-
try the opening of accession negotiations and 
thus not negating their previous policy, the 
upcoming elections to the EP require the UMP 
to take a tougher stance on the issue. UMP 
faces serious competition from the extreme-
right who has made this issue one of its central 
themes in the EP elections as well as from 
other prominent parties of the centre-right 
such as the UDF who has traditionally op-
posed Turkey’s membership to the EU.  Hop-
ing to avoid a repeat of the defeat the party 
received in March’s elections to France’s re-
gional councils, the UMP is put under im-
mense pressure to not to lose ground on this 
front.  
 
Another national party group in the PPE-DE 
that is strongly opposed to Turkish accession 
is the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) that 
mainly competes against Haider’s FPÖ which 
is constructing its whole EP election campaign 
around this issue. Their position was well 
demonstrated in their rejection of the Oost-
lander Report on grounds that Turkey was ac-
knowledged as a candidate country. The Dan-
ish members of the PPE-DE, Danish People’s 
Party, have also recently announced a cam-
paign against Turkish membership on mainly 
the grounds of identity. The Belgian (Flem-
ish) Christian Democrats seem to have a softer 
but a more ambiguous stance on this matter. 
CD&V has recently published its EP election 
manifesto in which there is an emphasis on the 
urgent need for a debate on the borders of 
Europe and the conservation of European 
identity, followed by the statement that ‘it is 
too soon to take definite decisions regarding 
accession talks.’ as ‘Turkey is too far away 
from meeting the agreed accession criteria’. 
The Dutch national delegation in the PPE-DE 
group also lacks a clear cut position on the 
topic. One of the influential figures of the 
Dutch CDA in the PPE-DE group and the rap-
porteur of the most recent EP Report on Tur-
key, Arie Oostlander, has declared that ‘Tur-
key is in fact not ready to start accession nego-
tiations’, but that negotiations could still start 
after the Commission’s assessment with the 
political criteria being the first chapter in the 
talks. The party spokesman has also recently 
argued for the conservation of Turkey’s candi-
dacy while pointing to the non-negotiable cri-
teria of Copenhagen.  
 
Other PPE-DE delegations, most notably the 
British Conservative Party, Spanish Popular 
Party, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and the Swed-
ish Moderate Party seem to have a more fa-
vourable attitude towards Turkish member-
ship. The British Conservatives have tradi-
tionally been supportive of Turkish entry 
which was driven, according to many, by their 
hope that this would lead to a looser commu-
nity of nation states and thus prevent further 
political integration. The Conservative MEP 
Van Orden who is also a member of the dele-
gation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary 
Committee has recently criticised the Oost-
lander Report for ‘sending a lukewarm mes-
sage’ to Turkey and has affirmed that Turkey’s 
destiny as a full member needs to be acknowl-
edged. However, in the same debate, another 
conservative MEP, James Elles, adopted the 
opposite stance by emphasising EU’s absorp-
tion capacity and by arguing that ‘the most 
sensible thing would be to say that there is real 
uncertainty in the Union’s current political 
situation, and to be extremely cautious before 
giving Turkey the green light at this stage’ 
which suggest that individual differences exist 
within the party. Both have abstained from 
voting on the Report like the majority of Brit-
ish conservative MEPs.   
 
The Spanish Popular Party has been an ardent 
supporter of Turkey’s integration to the EU, 
seen by many as a consequence of Aznar’s 
Atlanticism. In a speech delivered on February 
2004, the former foreign affairs minister, Ana 
Palacio, has stated that Europe needs to be 
ready for its next challenge which is ‘Europe-32 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
 
twenty-five countries plus Bulgaria, Romania 
and Turkey’. The major Italian party of the 
centre-right, Forza Italia, has also been advo-
cating Turkish membership as clearly demon-
strated in Berlusconi’s statements that ‘Italy 
will do all it can to help advance Turkey’s bid 
to join the European Union’ and that the sup-
port that they have been giving to Turkey ‘will 
continue to increase’. The chairman of the 
Swedish Moderate Party, Bo Lundgren, has 
often warned the EU against ‘moving the 
goalposts as Turkey advances’ while citing the 
Copenhagen political criteria as a ‘very strict’ 
condition.  The conservative New Democracy 
Party in Greece that recently overthrew the 
Socialists from power also seems to support 
the Turkish aspirations. After coming to 
power, Prime Minister Karamanlis said they 
supported Turkey’s European Union bid as 
long as Turkey complies with EU regulations. 
Despite Karamanlis’ pledge for continued 
good relations with Turkey during his election 
campaign and afterwards, many are still scep-
tical as to whether he will sustain the friendly 
atmosphere initiated by his rival, Papandreou. 
 
2. PSE-Majority in Favour of Eventual 
Turkish Accession, Negotiations Depending 
on the Commission Report 
 
The second biggest Parliamentary Group in 
the EP, PSE, has in general a more favourable 
approach towards the matter than the conser-
vatives. In their recent review of the plenary 
session where the Turkish and Croatian appli-
cations were discussed, the Group has af-
firmed its opinion than ‘an enlarged EU leads 
to increased stability and prosperity for all 
Europe’ and that therefore, the Group ‘sup-
ports the applications for membership of coun-
tries with European vocation and willing to 
take over the acquis communautaire.’ After 
voting largely in favour of the Oostlander Re-
port, the Group declared that it has ‘success-
fully defeated an attempt by leading members 
of the EPP to firmly close the door on Turkey’ 
as ‘the amendments tabled by EPP Members 
would have meant an end to any hopes for 
Turkish accession even at this early stage of 
negotiations’. They added that ‘taking a more 
constructive approach, PSE Group Members 
want to work with Turkey to ensure that a 
range of basic criteria are met and to not take 
any definitive decisions at this point in time’.  
 
Among the PSE Group, some of the most 
prominent supporters of the Turkish bid seem 
to be the German social democrats, the SPD. 
Many observers believe that SPD’s strong 
stance stems from the need to establish itself at 
the opposite end in the face of increasing 
competition from CDU/CSU that has a clear 
policy line on this matter and to capture the 
votes of the Turkish immigrants in both the 
European and the national elections. This was 
best reflected in the way Schroeder visited 
Turkey on 23 February, immediately a week 
after Merkel had arrived to propose the ‘privi-
leged partnership’ scenario. On his visit, he 
announced that ‘Turkey can always count on 
Germany for support’ and that their vote ‘will 
be for the start of accession negotiations in the 
shortest time if Turkey has fulfilled all the cri-
teria’. Regarding the political reforms in the 
country, he declared that Turkey was on ‘the 
right path to get a green light to open acces-
sion talks at the end of the year’ and that ‘there 
are good chances to see that at the end of the 
year’.  
 
An even stronger advocate in the PSE Group 
is the British Labour Party. The Labour dis-
course regarding Turkish accession is mainly 
based on security considerations. The foreign 
minister, Jack Straw has recently defined 
Turkish accession as an ‘acid test of Europe’s 
ability to counter the myth that it is doomed to 
conflict with Islam’ and asserted that Europe-
ans need to be clear that ‘Turkey will be 
treated as any other EU candidate, without fear 
or favour’. These concerns are also frequently 
voiced by Tony Blair who argues that ‘the EU 
should allow mainly Muslim Turkey to be-
come a member of the bloc to demonstrate its 
commitment to the creation of a tolerant and 
diverse Europe’.  
 
This unequivocal support seems to be shared 
also by the Dutch  Social Democrat Party 
(PvdA) who came to the conclusion in a na-
tional parliamentary debate in February that 
the decision to start negotiations with Turkey 
should be taken in December. Although the 
Spanish Social Democrats have been quite 
silent on the issue so far, the Turkish Ambas-
sador to Spain has recently made a statement 
that his contacts with Zapatero’s party suggest 
that Spain’s support for Turkey’s EU bid will 
continue. The Swedish social democrats con-
tinue their support with their sustained empha-NO. 4 / APRIL 2004 | 33 
 
sis on the fulfilment of the Copenhagen politi-
cal criteria. The Greek PASOK with Papan-
dreou, credited as the architect of the recent 
rapprochement between Turkey and Greece, is 
also among the pro-Turkish accession group in 
the PES. The French Socialist Party has also 
been broadly favourable to Turkey’s acces-
sion, with some extra demands regarding the 
Armenian issue. Socialist Party Foreign Af-
fairs Secretary-General, Pierre Moscovici re-
cently blamed the UMP for ‘their extreme op-
portunism’ in their stance on Turkish acces-
sion. He stated that their Turkish policy has 
not changed and that they want negotiations to 
start if Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen criteria. 
He defined the three main problems facing 
Turkey as ‘securing secularism, the army’s 
role in politics and the Armenian genocide 
issue’.  
 
There is also a minority faction of the PSE 
Group that opposes or has rather ambiguous 
views on Turkish accession. The Austrian 
Social Democrats, while not opposing Tur-
key’s candidacy believe that it is not ready for 
accession negotiations. The Italian  Left is 
keeping so silent on the issue that they have 
not mentioned Turkey in their election mani-
festo which expresses their detailed views on 
enlargement and the future of Europe. The 
Danish Social Democrat Party, on the other 
hand, is strongly against it. While there is al-
most a ‘negative’ consensus building up in 
Austria, the position of the Danish Social De-
mocrats is considered more as a strategic move 
to capture the liberal votes from the electorate 
as a sudden shift of policy is observed. The 
former Danish Prime Minister and Social De-
mocrat top candidate for the June European 
Elections, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen was one of 
the ardent supporters of Turkey’s candidacy in 
1999, now suggesting that he ‘is not certain 
that Turkish EU membership would be a good 
idea’. 
 
3. ELDR-Majority in Favour of Eventual 
Turkish Accession, Negotiations Depending 
on the Commission Report 
 
The third biggest Parliamentary Group in the 
EP,  ELDR, is most probably the strongest 
supporter of Turkish accession. Their official 
line is that ‘accession can accelerate reform in 
Turkey and secure stable democratic govern-
ment there in the future’ and ‘ if the European 
Council approves the opening of accession 
negotiations in December 2004, the ELDR 
will continue to offer its support for Turkey’s 
eventual place in the European Union’. This 
stance is mostly shared by the British, Swed-
ish and Belgian Liberal Democrats. The Dan-
ish Liberal Party of Fogh Rasmussen seems to 
be more ambivalent on the issue, mostly due to 
the fierce opposition from the Social Democ-
rats and Conservatives who oppose Turkish 
accession. The liberal prime minister has cho-
sen to remain silent for the time being, making 
general and vague statements such as ‘it can 
not be a surprise that candidates on a list have 
different opinions on Turkey’. The Dutch Lib-
erals (VVD) on the other hand are explicitly 
against Turkish membership. Jules Maaten, the 
leader of the VVD fraction in the EU has re-
cently argued that for countries such as Croatia 
and Turkey, negotiations can only start upon 
the reform of European institutions which is 
perceived by them as a distant possibility.  
 
4. GUE-NGL and Verts/ALE-Majority in 
Favour of Eventual Accession with Strict 
Application of the Copenhagen Political 
Criteria 
 
The fourth and fifth biggest Parliamentary 
Groups in the EP, GUE-NGL and 
Verts/ALE, are generally supportive of Turk-
ish accession. They both favour a serious EU 
accession offer to Turkey, linked to demands 
on the Kurdish issue and respect for human 
rights. In the case of the GUE-NGL, specifi-
cally due to the weight of the French extreme-
left, the Armenian issue is also strongly tied to 
Turkey’s accession demands. Most argue that 
‘recognition of the Armenian genocide’ should 
be one of the preconditions of Turkey’s mem-
bership. 
 
The Turkey in Europe Monitor, after the Euro-
pean Parliament elections, will also evaluate 
the positions of the national party delegations 









Distribution of Votes in the European Parliament on the Oostlander Report 
 




PPE-DE: European People’s Party and European Democrats (centre-right, conservative, biggest national group 
being the CDU/CSU from Germany. Largely against Turkish accession, voted against in a bloc upon the rejec-
tion of their proposal for a privileged partnership with Turkey.)   
PSE: Party of European Socialists (centre-left, largely supportive of eventual Turkish accession, voted in favour 
of the Report with overwhelming majority) 
ELDR: European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (liberals, largely in favour of eventual Turkish accession, 
voted in favour of the Report with overwhelming majority) 
GUE/NGL: Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (largely in favour of eventual Turkish acces-
sion, voted in favour of the Report with overwhelming majority) 
Verts/ALE: Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (largely in favour of eventual Turkish accession, 
voted in favour of the Report with overwhelming majority) 
UEN: Union for a Europe of Nations  
EDD: Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities 
NI: Non-attached 
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GERMAN BUSINESS  
SUPPORTS  
TURKEY’S MEMBERSHIP TO THE EU 
 
 
A high-level meeting between the Federation 
of German Industries (BDI) and the Turkish 
Industry and Business Association (TÜSIAD) 
was held on 21 April 2004 in Istanbul.  
 
The competitiveness of Europe, Turkey’s 
status as a candidate for EU membership and 
bilateral economic relations were at the heart 
of this meeting.  
 
On this occasion, Dr. Michael Rogowski, the 
President of BDI and Mr. Omer Sabanci, the 
President of TÜSIAD issued BDI-TÜSIAD 
joint declaration that contains the following 
main messages: 
 
•  TÜSIAD and BDI call on the European 
Union to accelerate the implementation of 
Lisbon Strategy as well as the institutional 
reforms and to secure its ability to act as a 
global political and economic power.  
 
•  The early adoption of a constitutional 
treaty will facilitate the decision making proc-
ess in an enlarged European Union. Structural 
and agricultural policies must be adjusted to 
the budget restraints in Member Countries and 
to the challenges of the future. 
 
BDI and TÜSIAD emphasise the importance of 
a clear European perspective for Turkey. The 
business communities in both countries need a 
reliable framework to develop their operations 
both on a bilateral level and in Europe. 
 
•  The Presidents of TÜSIAD and BDI note 
with satisfaction the progressive development 
of bilateral trade relations and investment. 
The Customs Union with the EU and recent 
steps to enforce stable economic and monetary 
policies in Turkey will contribute to the further 
expansion of the Turkish economy and eco-
nomic relations with Germany.  
 
•  The Presidents of BDI and TÜSIAD share 
the view that business could benefit greatly 
from the further European integration of 
Turkey. 
 
•  BDI and TÜSIAD point to the decisions of 
the European Council in Helsinki and Copen-
hagen granting Turkey the status of candidate 
for EU membership and offering negotiations 
in 2005 if the conditions are met. 
 
•  TÜSIAD and BDI are concerned that it 
could be very detrimental for the political and 
economic stability in Turkey and in Europe as 
a whole if efforts to facilitate Turkey’s acces-
sion to the EU guided by the Accession Part-
nership document of the European Commis-




The full text of the declaration can be accessed at: 
 www.tusiad.org/english.nsf 
 
TÜSIAD IS A MEMBER OF UNICE 
(UNION OF INDUSTRIAL AND EMPLOYERS’ 
CONFEDERATIONS OF  EUROPE)  
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Introductory Note from CEPS 
 
This issue of the CEPS Turkey in Europe 
Monitor presents an article by Dr. Ayhan 
Kaya from Bilgi University, Istanbul, on the 
Turkish origin migrants living in Germany and 
France. The article comprises some of the 
findings of a major research project conducted 
by Dr. Ayhan Kaya and Dr. Ferhat Kentel, 
aiming to investigate the question of whether 
the Euro-Turks living in Germany and France 
can be a driving force for Turkey in its process 






this objective in mind, the article seeks to dis-
cover the perspectives of Euro-Turks on the 
EU and ‘Europeanness’; the political culture 
that they have created in the West; the kinds of 
incorporation strategies they have constructed 
vis-à-vis their countries of settlement and their 
thoughts on key issues such as citizenship, de-
mocratisation, political participation, global-
isation, human rights, equality, rule of law, 
justice, religion, multiculturalism, intercul-
turalism, co-existence and political institu-
tions. 
 
Michael Emerson and Senem Aydın 
 
Euro-Turks: 
A Bridge, or a Breach, between 





There is a common belief in western European 
countries that the Turkish origin migrants and 
their children do not integrate into social, po-
litical, economic and cultural life of their set-
tlement countries. According to the same 
common belief, Turks’ political motivations in 
their countries of settlement are primarily 
shaped by their homeland. However, there are 
recently many indications and academic works 
displaying an alternative picture. Contempo-
rary Turkish origin migrants and their descen-
dants in the west can no longer be simply con-
sidered temporary migrant communities who 
live with the ‘myth of return’, or passive vic-
tims of global capitalism who are alienated by 
the system and swept up in a destiny dominated 
by the capitalist west. They have rather become 
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permanent settlers, active social agents and 
decision-makers. Lately, there is an emerging 
middle class group of Euro-Turks who are in-
volved in many different sectors such as ser-
vice, tourism, catering, telecommunication, 
construction, etc.  
 
There is also a lack of awareness in both home-
land and ‘hostland’ concerning the characteris-
tics of migrants and their children. Euro-Turks 
have been stereotypically represented as Al-
mancı (German-like) in Turkey and ‘foreigner’ 
in the west. It is still commonly believed in 
Turkey that Turkish origin migrants and their 
descendants in the west are Gurbetci
1  who 
have a great orientation towards the homeland 
and will someday return home. On the other 
hand, they are also called Almancı, a term 
which depicts such people as being rich, eating 
pork, having a very comfortable life in the 
west, losing their Turkishness, and becoming 
                                                                                                 
1 The term ‘gurbetci’ refers to someone in ‘gurbet’ 
(diaspora), which is an Arabic word deriving from 
garaba, to go away, to depart, to be absent, to go to 
a foreign country, to emigrate, to be away from ga-
raba, to go away, to depart, to be absent, to go to a 
foreign country, to emigrate, to be away from one’s 
homeland, to live as a foreigner in another country. 38 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
   
increasingly Germanized, Anglicized, and 
Frankified etc. They are also stereotypically 
called as ‘foreigner’ in their own countries of 
settlement. The common stereotypical labelling 
of ‘Turk’ in the west strongly indicates that 
Turks are conservative, religious, veiling, poor, 
nationalist, longing for homeland, un-
integrating, and violent. This research aims to 
reveal that Euro-Turks are highly diversified 
and have very little in common with the ‘Al-
manci’, ‘guestworker’ or ‘foreigner’ stereo-
types of the past. It uncovers invisible Euro-
Turks who also identify themselves as Turkish 
origin migrants and their children originating 
from Turkey like those who somehow fit into 
the category of stereotypical ‘Turks’ visible in 
the public space with their outer looks and 
clothing styles. The work also challenges the 
common belief in the west that Turks do not 
integrate in their country of settlement and that 
Turkish-Islam does not comply with the west-
ern way of life. 
 
The project titled ‘Euro-Turks: A Bridge, or a 
Breach, between Turkey and the European Un-
ion” was conducted by Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat 
Kentel in the period between September 2003 
and March 2004. The research was held in 
Germany and France, and included both quali-
tative (in-depth interviews and focus group 
discussions) and quantitative methods (1065 
structured interviews with 90 questions in 
German, and 600 in France). The structured 
interviews were conducted in November 2003 
by two local public poll companies in Germany 
and France with the involvement of Turkish 
speaking university students fluent in either 
German or French. The interviews were made 
in three languages (Turkish, German and 
French) depending upon the choice of the in-
terviewees. It should be noted here that 21 per-
cent of the interviews held among the German-
Turks were conducted in German, and 31 per-
cent among the French-Turks in French.  
 
Euro-Turks: A Bridge, or a Breach, between 
Turkey and the European Union? 
 
The ongoing research aims to investigate the 
question of whether the Euro-Turks living in 
Germany and France can be a driving force for 
Turkey in its process of integration into the 
European Union. Social, political, and cultural 
discourses of Turkish diasporic subjects con-
cerning Turkey-EU relations in the two Euro-
pean countries are being mapped out in the re-
search. Turkish origin migrants and their de-
scendants constitute a rather heterogeneous 
group of people in Europe in respect to their 
recent economic, political, cultural, ethnic and 
religious dispositions. Thus, one of the prem-
ises of this work was that these separate groups 
would pose both strong support and reservation 
to Turkey’s EU membership. Analyzing the 
public opinion among the Turkish diaspora 
groups in Western Europe may help us find out 
if diasporic Turkish communities may provide 
the Turkish society with new opportunities and 
prospects in the formation of a more open and 
democratic society in Turkey. Another premise 
of this work is that boundaries between Turkey 
and the diaspora are no longer that strict, they 
are rather blurred. For instance, it has lately 
been realized that the Islamic resurgence in the 
diaspora has resulted in the reinforcement of 
religious organisations in the homeland. The 
same process is also applicable to the Kurdish 
and Alevi revival in Turkey, because both so-
cial movements are to some extent constrained 
by modern diasporic formations. Hence, these 
phenomena make it clear that diasporic forma-
tions may have a strong impact on the home-
land formations. 
 
This research aims to understand whether the 
Euro-Turks have developed certain commit-
ments vis-à-vis the European Union and Euro-
peanness; what sort of a political culture they 
generated in the west; what kind of incorpora-
tion strategies they constructed vis-à-vis their 
countries of settlement; and their contempla-
tion about some essential issues such as citi-
zenship, democratization, political participa-
tion, globalization, human rights, equality, rule 
of law, justice, religion, multiculturalism, in-
terculturalism, coexistence and political institu-
tions. These questions are all addressed in a 
way that could make us compare their views 
about the homeland and ‘hostland’. This re-
search is essential in a conjuncture character-
ized by intensive discussions in Turkey and 
abroad concerning the EU integration process, 
the European Constitution, the European 
enlargement process, the Cyprus question, the 
secularism debate, and religious fundamental-
ism. The conjuncture is also unique in the 
sense that there is a shift in the west from mul-
ticulturalist discourse to interculturalist dis-
course. However, the scope of this work will 
only be limited with the claim that Euro-Turks NO. 5 / MAY 2004 | 39 
   
do not pose a threat to their countries of settle-
ment, but rather aim to incorporate themselves 
into the western democracies and European 
identity. 
The research reveals that Euro-Turks do not 
pose a threat to the political and social system 
of their countries of settlement, but rather have 
the willingness to incorporate themselves into 
the system. It is commonly known that Western 
European states, generally speaking, have the 
tendency to regard Islam as a threat to their 
national security. Instead, the research uncov-
ers that orientation to Islam among the Euro-
Turks could also be regarded as a quest for jus-
tice and fairness. Accordingly, this work shall 
present some of the relevant qualitative and 
quantitative data gathered during the research. 
In the end it will be proposed that the EU states 
should give in the security discourse, and get 
engaged in justice discourse in their responds 
to minority claims.
2  
Europeanness: A Constant Process of Being 
and Becoming 
 
Both the qualitative and quantitative data gath-
ered in our research, point out that concrete 
understanding of Europeanness does not exist 
among the Euro-Turks. However, the same 
observation corresponds to the receiving socie-
ties. There is actually no doubt that a deep-
rooted sense of Europeanness does not also 
exist among the majority of the public; and 
actually an identity is ideologically being con-
structed by the political elite of the European 
Union gradually through education, European 
citizenship, and common history and future. 
European Union has evidently displayed a 
stronger political unity since the Tindemans 
Report (Leo Tindemans was then the Belgian 
Prime Minister) submitted to the European 
Council at the end of December 1975, which 
prompted the member states to form a unified 
political entity with her own flag, anthem, 
                                                                                                 
2 This classification is made by Will Kymlicka 
(2002) to refer to the ways in which the demands of 
minority groups have been identified in western and 
eastern European countries. He claims that western 
European democracies usually define minority 
claims as a quest for justice and fairness, while 
eastern European states name such claims as a 
threat to their national security. 
myths, memories, peoples, regions, and rights 
and duties granted to the EU citizens.
3 
 
There are at least two definitions of Europe and 
Europeanness. The first is the one proposed by 
the Conservatives in a way that defines Euro-
peanness as a static, holistic and prescribed 
cultural entity. The second is the one proposed 
by the Social Democrats, Liberals, Socialists 
and Greens underlining the understanding that 
‘Europeanness’ refers to a fluid, ongoing, dy-
namic, syncretic and non-essentialist process of 
being and becoming. While the first definition 
highlights a cultural project, the latter defini-
tion welcomes a political project embracing 
cultural and religious differences including Is-
lam. The inclusive and responsible acts of the 
Social Democrats and Greens in Germany and 
France, for instance, are very well received by 
the German-Turks.  
 
Q. Which political view are you affiliated with 
in your country of settlement? 
Germany  France   
Count %  Count  % 
Liberal parties  35  3,3  9  1,5 
Conservative parties  28  2,6  4  ,7 
Social democratic parties  288  27,0  169  28,2 
Greens and  
environmentalist parties 
91 8,5 31 5,2 
Radical right and  
nationalist 
9 ,8  10  1,7 
Radical left and 
 communist parties 
13 1,2 23 3,8 
In equal distance to all  44  4,1  32  5,3 
None of those above  557  52,3  322  53,7 
Total  1065  100 600 100 
 
The table above indicates that German-Turks 
have recently become more affiliated with the 
left wing political parties such as the Social 
Democrats (27 %) and the Greens (8.5 %). The 
same trend is also visible among the French-
Turks (28%for the Social Democrats and 
5%for the Greens). It should be mentioned here 
that previously in the early stages of the migra-
tory process Euro-Turks were more oriented 
towards the conservative parties due to their 
scepticism towards the left wing parties back in 
the homeland. The recent shift also implies that 
Euro-Turks are becoming more involved and 
reflexive in daily politics of their countries of 
settlement in a way that displays that they are 
actually very well integrated. However there is 
still a great amount of people who are not 
                                                                                                 
3 For a detailed account of the Tindemans Report 
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really engaged in domestic politics. The quali-
tative research also shows that the German-
Turks, for instance are very reflexive to the 
latest manoeuvres of the Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU), which tries to use Turkey’s can-
didature as an election campaign instrument to 
attract the nationalist votes. Furthermore, the 
CDU is not considered to be a European entity 
as it reduces the Europeanness to cultural and 
religious homogeneity in an essentialist way. 
What is also quite striking for both countries is 
that almost the same percentage of Euro-Turks 
is not affiliated with any German or French 
political party (around 53%in each country). 
However, cross-tabulations clearly point out 
that there is a growing tendency among the 
younger generations towards political integra-
tion, and also that the indifference to domestic 
politics is highly a common phenomenon 
among those of lower social status.  
 
Euro-Turks’ Perspectives on the European 
Union 
 
Focus group discussions, in-depth interviews 
and structured interviews display that the Euro-
Turks are in favour of Turkey’s membership to 
the European Union although there is also a 
remarkable amount of people who seem to be 
against it.  
 
Q. What Does European Union mean to you? 
Germany France   
Count % Count % 
Economic cooperation  513  48,2  382  63,7 
Common cultural policy  61  5,7  34  5,7 
Democracy project  69  6,5  38  6,3 
Christian  Club  227  21,3 67 11,2 
Exploitation, Imperialism  74  6,9  24  4,0 
Political and military 
 super power  
51 4,8 44 7,3 
Bureaucratic community  
detached from public 
70 6,6 11 1,8 
Total  1065  100 600 100 
 
While around 48%of the German-Turks and 64 
of the French-Turks regard the EU as an Eco-
nomic Cooperation, 21%of the German-Turks 
and 11%of the French-Turks regard it as a 
Christian Club.  
Q. To which extent are you either positive or 
negative about the EU? 
Germany France   
Count % Count % 
Very  negative 59 5,5 25 4,2 
Negative 237  22,3  74  12,3 
Both positive  
and negative 
312 29,3 137 22,8 
Positive  313 29,4 285 47,5 
Very  positive 29 2,7 39 6,5 
No idea  115  10,8  40  6,7 
Total 1065  100  600  100 
 
Generally speaking the Euro-Turks are positive 
about the European Union. Approximately 
32%of the German-Turks and 54%of the 
French-Turks are in favour of the EU idea, 
around 28%of the German-Turks and 17%of 
the French-Turks are not in favour. 29%of the 
German-Turks and 23%of the French-Turks 
have mixed thoughts about it. Those German-
Turks who are negative about the EU are likely 
to think that the EU has gained a lot from Ger-
many’s prosperity, in other words from their 
prosperity. On the other hand, those French-
Turks who are positive about the EU are likely 
to think that the EU has given them more pros-
perity. This observation is also confirmed by 
the fact that 6%of the German-Turks are sup-
portive of the EURO, while 25%of the French-
Turks support it. 
 
Q. To which extent do you support Turkey’s 
membership in the European Union?  
Germany France   
Count % Count % 
She definitely should  157  14,7  49  8,2 
She’d  better  313 29,4 222 37,0 
It  doesn’t  matter  251 23,6 115 19,2 
She’d better not  165  15,5  76  12,7 
She definitely 
shouldn’t 
110 10,3 122 20,3 
No  idea  69 6,5 16 2,7 
Total  1065  100 600 100 
 
General tendency is that the Euro-Turks are in 
favour of Turkey’s entry into the Union. How-
ever, this tendency is sharper in France (57 %) 
than in Germany (31 %).  
 
Q. What does the EU membership of Turkey 
mean to you? 
  Germany  France 
More human rights  69,3  78,8 
More democracy  62,7  66,7 
More job opportunities  61,4  83,0 
Moral breakdown  52,0  36,3 
Exploitation 37,2  34,2 
End of independence  23,9  24,0 
Division of the country  23,8  22,5 NO. 5 / MAY 2004 | 41 
   
The interviewees were asked what the EU 
meant to them, and they were given various 
items to comment on. Both German-Turks and 
French-Turks gave similar answers to the fol-
lowing questions: Turkey’s entrance into the 
EU does not really result in the division of the 
country (53%German-Turks, 58%French-
Turks); it won’t result with the end of inde-
pendence (52%German-Turks; and 
58%French-Turks); membership will bring 
more democracy to Turkey (63%German-
Turks; and 67%French-Turks); and member-
ship will improve the implementation of human 
rights (70%German-Turks; and 79%French-
Turks). On the other hand, there is a big dis-
crepancy between the German-Turks and the 
French-Turks in answering the following ques-
tions: membership will cause moral breakdown 
in Turkey (52%German-Turks; and 36%French 
- Turks); membership will bring about exploi-
tation in the expense of Turkey (52%German-
Turks; and 34%French-Turks); and member-
ship will enlarge job opportunities 
(61%German-Turks; and 83%French-Turks). 
These figures expose that French-Turks seem 
to be more in favour of Turkey’s membership 
to the Union, and that they have less cultural, 
moral and communal concerns than the Ger-
man-Turks.  
 
Q. To which extent are you positive or nega-
tive about the common currency, EURO? 
Germany France   
Count % Count % 
Very  negative 537 50,4 166 27,7 
Negative  371 34,8 175 29,2 
Both positive  
and negative 
71 6,7 97  16,2 
Positive 46  4,3  127  21,2 
Very  positive 17 1,6 25 4,2 
No  idea  23 2,2 10 1,7 
Total 1065  100  600  100 
 
The tables below also indicate the perceptions 
of the interlocutors about the positive and 
negative impacts of the Euro-Turks on the 
‘hostland’. While a great proportion of the 
people in Germany think that Turks stand for 
cultural richness and labour force, a relatively 
lower proportion believe that Turks have nega-
tive impact with their incapability of obeying 
rules, closed community formations and dis-
tinct values. The interviewees commonly be-
lieve that the Euro-Turks primarily provide the 
European countries with labour force. “Cultural 
richness”, “job opportunities”, and “familial 
and moral values” are the following items that 
are stated. What is remarkably different be-
tween the German-Turks and the French-Turks 
is that the German-Turks put emphasis on 
symbolic contributions such as cultural (53 %) 
and moral (32 %), and the French-Turks give 
priority to the material contributions like labour 
force (73 %) and job opportunities (42 %). 
Those who do believe that Turks do not bring 
any contribution to the EU are relatively low 
(4-5 %).  
 
Q. What kind of positive impacts do the Turks 
have on the receiving society? (multi-response) 
Germany France   
Count % Count % 
Cultural diversity and 
richness 
568 53,3 252 42,0 
Labour  force  688 64,6 440 73,3 
Creating new job op-
portunities 
405 38,0 242 40,3 
Bringing new familial  
and ethnical values 
341 32,0 121 20,2 
Bringing humanitarian 
quality 
286 26,9 111 18,5 
Others 11  1,0  4  ,4 
I Don’t think that  
they have a positive 
impact 
41 3,8 29 4,8 
Total  1065  100 600 100 
 
Q. What kind of negative impacts do the 
Turks have on the receiving society? (multi-
response) 
Germany France   
Count % Count  % 
Abusing the social  
security system 
268 25,2 109  18,2 
Not adapting 
 with local values 




282 26,5 195  32,5 
Being lazy  252  23,7  92  15,3 
Not obeying rules  387  36,3  141  23,5 
Others 17  1,6  9  ,1,5 
I Don’t think that  
they have a negative 
impact 
262 24,6 191  31,8 
Total 1065  100  600  100 
 
Combining the two tables above, the Euro-
Turks believe that their positive impact is big-
ger than their negative impact. Approximately 
32%of the French-Turks and 25%of the Ger-
man-Turks believe that Turks have no negative 
impact on the receiving societies. 36%of the 
German-Turks state that Turks generally do not 
obey the rules, and 25%believe that Turks mis-42 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
   
use the social security system. The misuse of 
the social security system was one of the 
mostly debated issues by the young generation 
German-Turks in the in-depth interviews and 
focus group discussions. In parallel with the 
misuse of the social security system, 24%of the 
German-Turks report that Turks are inclined to 
be lazy. On the other hand, the disability to 
adopt to the local values (33 %), the tendency 
of constructing ethnic enclaves (33 %) are the 
mostly raised issues by the French-Turks in 
explicating the negative impacts of the Turks. 
The ways in which different issues have been 
phrased by both German-Turks and French-
Turks are also subject to the separate incorpo-
ration regimes applied by Germany and France 
vis-à-vis the migrants. The issue of construct-
ing ethnic enclaves and communities raised by 
the French-Turks seems to be highly linked 
with the fact that the Republican state tradition 
is very sensitive about homogeneity and differ-
ence-blindness. However, the liberal democ-
ratic regime in contemporary Germany does 
recognise the differences in a way that doesn’t 
problematise ethnic and cultural enclaves as 
much as the French state does.  
 
Apparently, Euro-Turks have gained strong 
merits in terms of developing a democratic po-
litical culture highlighting human rights, de-
mocratization, participation, reflexivity, rule of 
law, rights, equality and trust. What is different 
in this picture compared to the picture in Tur-
key is that they have generated a rights-
specific-political culture rather than a duty-
specific-one. The answers given to the ques-
tions comparing the rights, educational system, 
police, democracy, human rights, social secu-
rity system, job opportunities, legal system, the 
respect for rules and regulations, value human 
capital, equality, freedom of faith, and cultural 
dialogue indicate that Germany and France are 
considered to be much more democratic than 
Turkey. All these answers depicting the drastic 
difference between Germany/France and Tur-
key, clearly indicate the deep-rooted democ-
ratic institutions and the high level of democ-
racy in Germany/France. Turkey comes to the 
fore when the interviewees were asked ques-
tions about mutual tolerance, and moral values.  
 
EU Membership and Migration Prospects 
for Turks in Turkey 
 
One of the commonly expressed concerns re-
garding Turkey’s membership to the Union is 
the possibility of immense immigration from 
Turkey into the EU countries. However, our 
qualitative and quantitative research exhibits 
the contrary. In the first place, those interlocu-
tors we interviewed in the in-depth interviews, 
focus group discussions and structured inter-
views expressed that they would not recom-
mend the Turks in Turkey to migrate to the EU 
countries if Turkey gets into the Union (79 %). 
The reason for them to raise such a recommen-
dation is the difficulties they face in the EU: 
rising unemployment, longing, law wages, dis-
ciplined working conditions, lack of tolerance, 
and depreciation of moral values. However, 
they generally have a strong belief that there 
would be an immense migration to the EU 
countries. This belief is in parallel with the 
common belief in the EU countries. Hence, the 
experiences of the Euro-Turks should be 
clearly transmitted to the Turks in Turkey. On 
the other hand, the previous experiences in the 
integration of Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece 
to the Union did not result in immense migra-
tion. In these cases even reverse migration was 
experienced. It seems that the same could apply 
to the Turkish case. The proportion of those 
people who would consider going back to the 
homeland in the case of Turkey’s membership 
to the Union is more than 30%in both coun-
tries.  
 
Q. Would you recommend those from Turkey 
to immigrate to Germany/France? 
Germany France   
Count % Count  % 
I would recommend  220  20,7  227  37,8 
I wouldn’t recommend  845  79,3  364  60,7 
It depends      9  1,5 
Total 1065  100  600  100 
 
Q. Do you expect an immense migration to the 
EU countries if Turkey joins the Union? 
Germany France   
Count % Count % 
Yes  758 71,2 412 68,7 
No  180 16,9 125 20,8 
No  idea 127  11,9 63 10,5 
Total  1065  100 600 100 
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Q. Would you consider returning back to 
Turkey if Turkey joins the EU?  
Germany France   
Count % Count  % 
Yes, I would certainly 
return. 
91 8,5 58  9,7 
Yes, I would.  204  19,2  126  21,0 
I don’t know.  405  38,0  173  28,8 
No, I wouldn’t.  253  23,8  166  27,7 
No, I wouldn’t cer-
tainly return. 
112 10,5  77  12,8 
Total 1065  100  600  100 
 
 
Building New Identities and Bridges 
 
While on the one hand, Euro-Turks are offi-
cially defined in Turkey as either ‘gurbetci’, or 
‘Yurtdisindaki vatandaslarimiz’ (our citizens 
abroad), on the other hand, they are stereotypi-
cally defined by the Turkish people in Turkey 
as either ‘Almanyali or ‘Almanci’  (German-
like). Both terms (Almanyali and Almanci) 
carry rather negative connotations in Turkey. 
The major Turkish stereotypes about the Euro-
Turks are those of their being rich, eating pork, 
having a very comfortable life in Ger-
many/France, losing their Turkishness, and 
becoming more and more German/French.
4 In 
recent years, Euro-Turks began to raise their 
voices to complain about the paternalist ap-
proach of the Turkish state towards themselves. 
They no longer want to be perceived as passive 
and obedient persons in need for support, and 
cash machines making foreign currency for the 
homeland. Constituting around 4 million in-
habitants in the West, they rather want to be 
more active in the Turkish – EU relations and 
to be supportive for Turkey in adapting herself 
with the new EU regimes. The rise in their 
willingness to acquire German/French citizen-
ship is a sign in this respect, addressing their 
potential and reflexivity in generative politics.
5 
 
The number of German-Turks who either have 
EU citizenship or are planning to apply is 
around 59%in Germany and 74%in France. 
These high numbers indicate that Euro-Turks 
are prone to integration and political participa-
tion. The latest statistics indicate that the num-
ber of German-Turks naturalized doubled since 
                                                                                                 
4 For a detailed analysis of these labelings see Kaya 
(2001). 
5 The term ‘generative politics’ was first coined by 
Anthony Giddens (1994) to underline one of the 
essential elements of radical politics addressing the 
centrality of reflexive individual agency. 
the year 2000, when the new citizenship law 
was put into force. The number of the German-
Turkish population having German citizenship 
was around 350 thousand, and now this figured 
increased up to 700 thousand people. The latest 
statistics we acquired in our research then cor-
responds to 59%who either have German citi-
zenship or plan to have it soon. And this per-
centage equals to around 1.5 million people 
from among the total of 2.5 million German-
Turks. The new German citizenship law actu-
ally signifies that migrants can be quite recep-
tive and incorporatist vis-à-vis democratic and 
inclusive political and legal changes. 
 
Q. Do you have German / French citizenship? 
Germany France    
Count % Count % 
Yes,  I  have  it  279 26,2 213 35,5 
I have 
already applied. 
74 6,9 44 7,3 
I am planning  
to apply. 
277 26,0 188 31,4 
I am not plan-
ning to apply. 
435 40,8 155 25,8 
Total  1065  100 600 100 
 
On the other hand the fact that there are 1 mil-
lion people (41 %) who are not willing to ac-
quire German citizenship does not necessarily 
mean that they are not integrationist, national-
ist, Islamist or whatever it may be. This per-
centage is around 26%in France, corresponding 
to almost 100 thousand French-Turks. It may 
be that some of the both German-Turks and 
French-Turks are already pleased with the 
denizenship
6 status, which gives them civil, 
social, and cultural rights, but not political 
rights. Another reason in the German context 
may be that German-Turks had expected a 
more democratic citizenship law to be put into 
effect without any limitation for dual citizen-
ship. But perhaps their expectations dimin-
ished, and they did not see any further benefit 
in acquiring German citizenship. A third possi-
ble reason in the German context may be that 
Turks, who are mostly residents in the urban 
space, preferred to ignore the new nationality 
law, which relatively required more bureau-
cratic workload in city-states such as Berlin. 
This may have had a discouraging impact on 
the German-Turks in the process of naturalisa-
                                                                                                 
6 Denizen literally refers to those who reside in cer-
tain geography. The term is introduced by Thomas 
Hammar (1990) in the migrancy context. 44 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
   
tion. A fourth justification in both German and 
French context may be that there is already a 
decline in the voting habits of Euro-Turks, who 
are restricted with the law to vote in the Turk-
ish general elections. The right to vote in their 
own residential areas is a great issue for Turk-
ish citizens living abroad. 
 
Q. Which identifications suit you most? 
Germany France   
Count % Count % 
Only  Turkish  390 36,6 145 24,2 
First Turkish and 
then European 
531 49,9 351 58,5 
First European 
and  
then Turkish  
98 9,2 68  11,3 
Only  European  40 3,8 21 3,5 
Others 6  ,5  17  2,5 
Total  1065  100 600 100 
 
The table shows that Euro-Turks themselves 
confirm their hyphenated identities (Euro-
Turks): 60%in Germany and 70%in France. 
Around 60%of the German-Turks define them-
selves as either Turkish/European or (50 %) 
European/Turkish (10 %). This ratio is 
59%(Turkish-European) and 10%(European-
Turkish) in France. On the other hand, 37%of 
the German-Turks and 24%of the French-
Turks define themselves as “Turkish”. These 
figures differ from the findings of Hakan Yil-
maz (Bosphorus University, November 2003) 
that is displayed in his work on “Euroscepti-
cism in Turkey”. In his research 54%of the 
Turks define themselves as “Turkish”, 30,5%as 
Turkish-European and 4,7%as  European-
Turkish. Further analysis of the cross-
tabulations also show that younger generations 
and middle and upper-middle class Euro-Turks 
are more inclined with using hyphenated iden-
tities such as European-Turkish. 
 
Q. Do you feel yourself affiliated closer with 
Germany/France or Turkey? 
   Germany, %  France, % 
Turkey 48,5%  35,7% 
Germany/France 22,0%  25,3% 
Equal affiliation to both  26,9%  35,8% 
Equal detachment from both  2,6%  3,2% 
Total 100%  100% 
 
The table above indicates that most of the 
Euro-Turks do not feel themselves closer with 
their homeland. The cross-tabulations also re-
veal that younger generations have a growing 
tendency in affiliating themselves more with 
both homeland and receiving country. It should 
also be stated here that most of the Euro-Turks 
who have closer affiliation with the homeland 
come from the lower social status. 
 
Q. Which one of those below defines you 
most? (multi-response) 
Germany France   
Count % Count % 
Turkish  citizen  256 24,0 213 35,5 
Turkish  240 22,5 145 24,2 
Kurdish  45 4,2 23 3,8 
Muslim  348  32,7 96 16,0 
Muslim-Türkish  424 39,8 244 40,7 
Alevi  35 3,3 22 3,7 
German (French) citi-
zen 
74 6,9 54 9,0 
German (French)-Turk  77  7,2  106  17,7 
Euro-Turk  60 5,6 36 6,0 
World citizen  56  5,3  64  10,7 
EU  Citizen  22 2,1 25 4,2 
Others 10  1,0  1  ,2 
Total  1065  100 600 100 
 
The sum of those defining themselves as Ger-
man citizen, German-Turk, world citizen and 
EU citizen is actually quite high (27 %). This 
goes up to 47%among the French-Turks. The 
difference between those defining themselves 
as either German-Turks or French-Turks is 
worth mentioning here. 7%define themselves 
as German-Turk, and 18%define themselves as 
French-Turks. This is probably because of the 
definition of Germanhood and Frenchhood. 
While Germanhood is considered to be an eth-
nic nomination, Frenchhood is defined as a 
civic nomination letting those outsiders be in-
cluded in. Among the French-Turks civic iden-
tities are more phrased as in their defining 
themselves Turkish citizen (36 %). This is 
around 24%for the German-Turks. This table 
shows us again that such definitions are subject 
to the dominant regimes of representation by 
the majority society. 
 
German-Turks generally define themselves as 
‘religious’ (33 %), ‘patriot’ (22 %), ‘national-
ist’ (17 %), ‘democrat’ (17 %) and ‘conserva-
tive’ (17 %). On the other hand, the French-
Turks use the following identifications to de-
fine themselves ‘nationalist’ (27 %), ‘Atatürk-
ist’ (21 %), ‘religious’ (21 %), ‘laicist’ (19 %) 
and ‘patriot’ (19 %). This shows that the 
French-Turks are rather republican and unitary, 
while the German-Turks are communitarian. 
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Q. How do you define yourself with regard to 
the identifications below? (multi-response) 
Germany France   
Count % Count % 
Nationalist  188 17,7 160 26,7 
Leftist  37 3,5 35 5,8 
Democrat  183  17,2 98 16,3 
Religious  349 32,8 127 21,2 
Conservative 180  16,9  27  4,5 
Rightist  36 3,4 12 2,0 
Atatürkist 93  8,7  127  21,2 
Laicist 39  3,7  112  18,7 




42 3,9 48 8,0 
Revolutionary 10 ,9 18  3,0 
Patriot  238 22,3 115 19,2 
Islamic 146  13,7  50  8,3 
No  response  3 ,3 3 ,5 
None of those 
above 
2 ,2 4 ,7 
Total  1065  100 600 100 
 
It has been reported that 7,5%of the German-
Turks and 10%of the French-Turks define 
themselves as quite religious, a similar pattern 
with the Turks in Turkey. 89%of the German-
Turks and 80%of the French-Turks are re-
ported to be relatively faithful. On the other 
hand, 2, 4%of the German-Turks and 10%of 
the French-Turks seem to be either atheist or 
faithless. Cross-tabulations clearly explain that 
religiosity among the Euro-Turks is far from 
being essentialist and fundamentalist, and also 
that religiosity increases among those of lower 
social status. 
 
Q. How do you define yourself with the follow-
ing statements regarding your faith? 
Germany France   
Count % Count % 
Quite a religious 
person fulfilling  
all the require-
ments of my faith  
80 7,5 58 9,7 
Someone trying  
to fulfil his reli-
gious requirements  
571 53,6 279 46,5 
Faithful, but not  
fulfilling the reli-
gious requirements  
377 35,4 197 32,8 
Someone who 
doesn’t  
really believe in 
faith  
26 2,4 28 4,7 
Someone who does  
not have faith  
11 1,0 35 5,8 
No response     3  ,5 
Total 




The data gathered by the structured interviews 
indicate that German-Turks, generally speak-
ing, are more communitarian, religious and 
conservative than the French-Turks. Compared 
to the French-Turks, the German-Turks seem 
to be less in favour of integration as they are 
content with their ethnic enclaves, religious 
archipelagos and traditional solidarity net-
works. However, other findings in the research 
indicate the other way around. Although com-
pared to the German-Turks, the French-Turks 
seem to get engaged more in a modern way of 
life orientating themselves to integration, 
French language, secularism, laicism, and 
French media on the one hand, they are en-
gaged less in French domestic politics, political 
parties, internet, theatres, and cinemas. How-
ever, German-Turks seem to generate more 
cosmopolitan, hybrid, global, and reflexive 
identities in a way that redefines Europeanness, 
which is actually subject to a constant change. 
Thus, the experiences of the German-Turks 
actually seem to indicate that Islam does not 
necessarily contradict with Europeanness, 
cosmopolitanism, modernity, and globalism. 
 
Western democracies and citizenship regimes 
seem to fail in treating minority claims as a 
quest for justice. As Kymlicka and Norman 
stated “immigrant groups that feel alienated 
from the larger national and [religious] identity 
are likely to be alienated from the political 
arena as well” (2000: p. 39). Traditional citi-
zenship rhetoric is inclined to aggravate the 
advance of the interests of the dominant na-
tional group at the expense of migrants. Hence, 
it is unlikely that the classical understanding of 
citizenship can resolve issues of co-existence 
of ‘culturally discrete’ entities. In order to 
avoid the potentiality of conflict and alienation, 
there is an essential task to be undertaken: citi-
zenship laws should not be based on prescribed 
cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic quali-
ties. Moderate and democratic citizenship laws 
that should be formulated in line with the task 
stated above can be anticipated to resolve the 
emphasis made on ethnicity, religiosity and 
nationality by migrants groups.  
 
This research has also revealed that there are 
not only those Turkish origin migrants in the 
west who fit into the category of stereotypical 
‘Turk’. It has been displayed that the propor-46 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
   
tion of Euro-Turks in this category is around 40 
percent. However, it was also concluded that 
the majority of the Euro-Turks have become 
politically, socially, economically and cultur-
ally integrated active agents in their countries 
of settlement. Around 20 percent of them have 
actually assimilated into the receiving society. 
On the other hand, 40 percent have generated a 
form of life embracing both homeland and 
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INITIATIVES ON THE ROAD TO THE 
EU 
 
During the first five months of 2004, Turkish 
business community has intensified initiatives 
in view of strengthening Turkey’s EU member-
ship process. In this context, TÜSIAD’s work-
ing groups have focused their agenda on the 
related chapters of negotiations with the EU.  
 
TÜSIAD organised also a number of seminars 
and expressed opinions in order to promote 
the alignment of Turkish economic and so-
cial policies with the EU  acquis: 
 
•  New orientations in the field of high edu-
cation, science and technology within the 
framework of the EU’s Lisbon Strategy 
and the Bologna Process.  
 
•  Further and better involvement of women 
in education, work force, politics and con-
sequently widespread women participation 
in the decision-making mechanisms. 
 
•  Current stage of Turkey’s alignment with 
the EU’s customs and internal market leg-
islation and the shortcomings both in 
adoption and the implementation of the 
relevant legislation. 
 
•  Enterprise policy and entrepreneurship, 
as the main driving force for economic 
growth and employment, are addressed 
alongside with the increased importance 
of knowledge and innovation in the global 
economy. TÜSIAD triggered a debate on 
how entrepreneurship in Turkey could be 
improved, considering that it is a key fac-
tor in increasing European economy’s 
global economic competitiveness. 
 
•  In the context of Intellectual Property 
Rights, TÜSIAD underlined the impor-
tance of guaranteeing IP rights as a cru-
cial factor for promoting creativeness, for 
achieving sustainable development and for 
increasing competitiveness. 
 
•  Regarding the latest constitutional 
amendments in Turkey, TÜSIAD declared 
that in order to ensure the implementation 
of the gender equality law, it is required 
to provide constitutional protection for 
positive discrimination. 
 
•  At the occasion of
  the  Europe Day, on 
May 9
th, TÜSIAD hosted in the Southeast-
ern town of Diyarbakir activities aimed at 
providing information on EU history and 
policies to high school and university stu-
dents coming from different regions of 
Turkey.  This event was organised in co-
operation with the regional business or-
ganisations and the EU Information Office 
in Diyarbakir. 
 
•  A report that analyses the negotiations 
process of some of the candidate countries 
with the EU is drafted. It aims to prepare 
Turkey’s institutional structure to the ne-
gotiations process, following the expected 
positive decision at the European Council 
in December 2004. 
 
•  In high-level meetings with the business 
federations from Germany (BDI), Den-
mark (DI) and the Netherlands (VND), is-
sues related to the competitiveness of the 
European industries are analysed.  In this 
regard, TÜSIAD’s counterparts from the 
EU’s business community acknowledged 
Turkey’s economic potential and impor-
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Introductory Note from CEPS 
 
This issue of the CEPS Turkey in Europe 
Monitor presents an executive summary of and 
provides a link to the full text of a ‘Friends of 
Europe’ working paper prepared by Kirsty 
Hughes on the political and economic impacts 
of Turkish membership for the European Un-
ion. The paper titled ‘Turkey and the Euro-
pean Union: Just Another Enlargement?’ 
analyses whether Turkish accession can be 
managed in a similar way to that of other 
enlargements. This month’s Monitor also pro-






Fabrizio Barbaso, Director General of DG 
Enlargement at the Middle East Technical 
University in Ankara on 25 May 2004. The 
speech titled ‘Turkey-EU Relations in the Per-
spective of the December European Council’ 
provides certain insights to the Commission’s 
views on Turkey before the preparation of the 
Progress Report due in October.     
   
 
Michael Emerson and Senem Aydın 
 
 
Turkey and the European Union:  
Just Another Enlargement? 
 





A Friends of Europe Working Paper on the 
occasion of the ‘Turkey’s EU end-game?’  





This paper analyses the likely political and 
economic impacts of Turkish membership of 
the EU for the Union itself. It asks whether 
Turkish accession can be managed in a similar  
way to that of other enlargements or whether 
critics are right that Turkey is too big, too 
poor, with too dangerous borders and insuffi-
ciently ‘European’ to join the Union. 
 
 
Political Dynamics in Turkey 
 
Turkey was officially recognised as an EU 
candidate in December 1999, and in December 
2002 the European Council announced that if 
Turkey met its political ‘Copenhagen’ criteria 
by the end of 2004 it would open negotiations 
without delay. Since 1999, and particularly 
since the election of the AKP government in 
November 2002, there has been radical and 
rapid political reform in Turkey.  Major politi-
cal reforms have promoted democratisation, 
and led to considerable steps forward in the 
area of human rights including minority rights 
and in the area of civilian control of the mili-
tary.  The EU goal has been a very important 
framework in underpinning these reforms and 
uniting disparate groups around reform. 
 
At the same time, reforms are not complete 
and there are particular problems in many ar-
eas of implementation of reform including in 
the human rights area. Judicial reform remains 
inadequate. The European Commission has 
made clear its expectation of further progress 
in a number of key areas before it draws up its 
vital report on progress and its recommenda-
tion in the autumn to the EU’s leaders on 
whether to open negotiations.  There is much 
agreement across different political groups and 
actors in Turkey, that opening EU negotiations 
is a vital step if the strong dynamic of political 
reform is to continue and become deeply NO. 6 / JUNE 2004 | 49 
 
rooted. There is also widespread pessimism in 
Turkey at the impact on political reform if the 
European Council does not decide to open ne-
gotiations in December. 
 
 
Turkey in the EU - Economic Impacts 
 
Turkey is a large country in population terms 
and a small one in economic terms.  If Turkey 
joins the Union in 2015 it will have a popula-
tion of 82.1 million, slightly smaller than that 
of Germany at 82.4 million, both accounting 
for just over 14% of EU28 population. By 
2025 at 87 million people, Turkey will be the 
largest EU member state and account for 
15.5% of the population.  Looking forward to 
2050, population is predicted to stabilise at 97 
million – 17.7% of EU28 million (slightly less 
than Germany’s 18.1% share today of the 
EU25 population). 
 
Today Turkey’s economy is just 1.9% of 
EU25 GDP. Assuming average annual growth 
of 5%, it would be 2.9% of GDP on accession 
in 2015.  Turkey’s GDP per head (at purchas-
ing power parity) is only 27% of the EU aver-
age.  Turkey’s economy is also characterised 
by major regional inequality.  Turkey’s mac-
roeconomic situation is stabilising after the 
2001 crisis – opening of negotiations is ex-
pected to impact strongly and positively on the 
sustainability of this recovery.  But many fur-
ther economic reforms are necessary.  Labour 
market – and education – reforms are vital if 
Turkey is to use its economic potential. Both 
youth unemployment and the exceptionally 
low employment rate of women at 25.5% need 
to be tackled. 
 
Given its small size, Turkish accession will 
have minimal impact on the EU economy. It 
might have a very small but positive impact on 
EU25 GDP of 0.1-0.3% of GDP, an impact 
which will increase if there are net migration 
flows from Turkey to the current EU mem-
bers.  The EU could benefit in particular from 
the different demographic profile of Turkey, 
with its much younger, growing population.     
If migration flows from Turkey are similar to 
those anticipated from the new EU member 
states from central and Eastern Europe, then 
flows of around 225,000 a year would be an-
ticipated, with a long run eventual stock of 
about 2.9 million migrants. This would be at a 
time when the EU is beginning to feel the 
negative impacts of its aging demographic 
profile. 
 
Foreign direct investment in Turkey is excep-
tionally low.  The prospect of EU membership 
together with increased political and economic 
stability at macro-level, and major reform of 
barriers at micro-economic level – including 
tackling corruption and problems in the judici-
ary – could results in FDI flows of €2-4 billion 
a year. 
 
As a large poor country, Turkey will be eligi-
ble for significant budget transfers from the 
Union – though these will depend both on pol-
icy reforms in regional and agricultural poli-
cies in the EU in the next ten years, and on the 
actual negotiations. Both the EU’s common 
agricultural policy, and agriculture in Turkey 
will need further reform.  Likely budget flows 
in the first 3 years of Turkish membership are 
estimated at a total of  €45.5 billion i.e. around 
€15 billion a year. Turkey’s own contributions 
to the budget will mean the net figure could be 
€30-35 billion (and negotiations may reduce 
this further).  In per capita terms, this is almost 




Turkey in the EU – Political Impacts 
 
The fact that Turkey will become the EU’s 
largest member state in population terms soon 
after accession is one of the biggest impacts of 
Turkish accession.  Turkey’s strategic geo-
graphical location and its large Muslim popu-
lation also have implications for the EU.   It is 
in the EU’s strategic interests that Turkey is 
democratic, stable and prosperous and a 
friendly ally. Turkish EU membership can – as 
with earlier enlargements – contribute to these 
strategic goals.  The impact of Turkish acces-
sion – and of opening accession negotiations – 
in demonstrating that the EU is a secular, mul-
ticultural body not a ‘Christian club’ – will 
also have important geopolitical ramifications. 
 
Institutionally, Turkey will have a large impact 
on the Council and the European Parliament 
but not on the European Commission.  Assum-
ing a double majority system of voting oper-
ates in the Council (of countries and popula-
tion), in an EU of 28 both Turkey and Ger-50 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
   
many will have around 14.5% of the vote 
each. They will be strong players but unable to 
block proposals even together but they will be 
able to block proposals with a third large 
country.  The large countries are not in a posi-
tion to push through proposals on their own 
due to the need for a majority of countries as 
well as population. 
 
The largest 5 countries in an EU of 28 will 
account for 60.3% of the vote by population. 
This is only 3.4 percentage points higher than 
the share of the ‘big 4’ countries in an EU of 
25  (where they have 56.9% of the vote).  So 
Turkey will be an important powerful player 
and will add to the already complex set of alli-
ances and blocking combinations that are pos-
sible.  But in an EU of 28, despite its size, it 
does not add strongly to the dominance of the 
larger countries (assuming in any event that 
the large countries could and would agree).  In 
terms of seats in the European Parliament, if 
seats are reallocated proportionately to take 
account of Turkish, as well as Bulgarian and 
Romanian accession, then Turkey – and Ger-
many – would both have 82 seats – 11.2%each 
of the total number. 
 
Turkey will have an important impact on EU 
foreign policy interests given its borders with 
the Middle East, Caucasus and the Black Sea. 
This will shift the Union’s borders to the 
South-East and increase the Union’s range of 
interests in these difficult regions.  Turkey will 
look to be a significant player in the develop-
ment of EU foreign policy but it will not be as 
important a ‘bridge’ to the Middle East as 
some expect. Turkey will impact more widely 
on the already complex political dynamics 
among member states, including among the 
larger member states, but Turkey alone will 
not determine the future political evolution of 
the Union.  And many issues around whether 
the enlarged Union can find strategic leader-
ship and direction, and whether it will aim for 
further political integration, will become clear 
in the next decade before Turkey joins. 
 
There is a risk that Turkey as a member state 
could resemble the UK and be a rather awk-
ward player – but it is more likely than the UK 
to understand the political nature of the Union. 
It will also resemble in some ways the new 
member states of central and Eastern Europe 
in some of its policy interests, and in other 
ways will have much in common with Medi-
terranean member states like Greece, Spain 
and Portugal. 
 
Overall, the paper concludes that Turkey will 
have significant impacts on the Union but 
these impacts can be managed as those of pre-
vious enlargements have been. Consequently, 
Turkey’s candidacy should be judged on the 
same terms as that of other candidates – 
through adoption of the acquis and through 
meeting the Copenhagen criteria. 
 






Turkey-EU Relations in the perspective of 
the December European Council 
Speech by Mr. Fabrizio Barbaso, Director 
General DG Enlargement 
Ankara, Middle East Technical University, 
25 May 2004 
Introduction 
I am pleased and honoured to be here today to 
address this distinguished audience of An-
kara's famous Middle Eastern Technical Uni-
versity. With its strong international back-
ground and its reputation which stretches well 
beyond Turkey, this university is well known 
for preparing outstanding young professionals 
of the coming generations. Many of them are 
already making their mark on Turkey's prepa-
rations for EU membership. The programme 
of the this Third Conference on International 
Relations offers an impressive number of in-
terventions from top scholars and specialists 
ranging on a wide number of issues related to 
Europe in a changing world.  
Europe is indeed changing. On 1 May, the 
European Union extended its membership 
from 15 to 25 countries. This is the fifth 
enlargement to take place since the beginning 
of the European Community 50 years ago. In a 
historical perspective, the recent enlargement 
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represents the application on a continental 
scale of a model of peaceful and voluntary 
integration among free peoples.  
 
It demonstrates once again the attraction of the 
European model of integration. But this 
enlargement is unlike those that preceded it. 
Never before had so many new Member States 
joined the EU at the same time. Never before 
have they been so thoroughly prepared, with a 
sweeping transformation of their economic, 
legislative and administrative systems.  
Turkey in the EU enlargement process 
While Turkey’s recent history is very different 
from that of the central and eastern European 
countries, a comparable process of transforma-
tion has begun in Turkey. The decision of the 
European Council in Helsinki in December 
1999 to give candidate status helped Turkey to 
embark upon a process of far-reaching consti-
tutional and legislative reforms in a very short 
period of time. Anyone visiting Turkey for the 
first time in 5 years is surprised about the pace 
of Turkey's change. Turkey today appears to 
be more open, more self-confident and self-
critical than it was before. People are eager to 
see more reforms. It is noteworthy that many 
of the reforms have been adopted unani-
mously, with bipartisan support from the ma-
jority and the opposition.   
 
And yet the debate about Turkey's EU aspira-
tions is one of the most prominent questions in 
our European agenda. There is hardly a day 
where Turkey is not a focus of the European 
media. Developments in Turkey attract an ever 
growing attention, in Europe and on a wider 
stage. The period we are living in is particu-
larly eventful.  
 
My purpose today is not to elaborate on these 
difficult albeit fascinating subjects. Rather, I 
would like to concentrate on giving you an 
assessment of current relations between the 
European Union and Turkey, which have 
evolved remarkably in recent years and in par-
ticular since the Helsinki decision. 
 
As I am sure you know, the European Council 
will have to decide in December, on the basis 
of a report and a recommendation of the 
Commission, whether Turkey complies with 
the Copenhagen political criteria. If Turkey is 
found to meet the Copenhagen political crite-
ria, then accession negotiations will start with-
out delay. This is the clear roadmap for Turkey 
which was decided by the Heads of State and 
Government in Copenhagen in December 
2002.  
In the Commission, considerable efforts are 
now being geared towards the preparation of 
the report. We are intensifying our efforts, in 
Brussels and in Turkey, in order to establish an 
accurate assessment of the situation. As al-
ways, this report will be based on an objective 
and thorough analysis. This will be one of the 
most important tasks of the Commission this 
year. We have an intensive work programme 
to monitor Turkey’s progress in meeting the 
Copenhagen criteria, accompanied by initia-
tives to assist it in this goal.  
My Directorate General for Enlargement is 
actively pursuing a busy agenda which in-
cludes a series of formal and informal consul-
tations with the Turkish authorities in the pe-
riod up to July 2004. We had this morning one 
of our regular sessions of the regular monitor-
ing of the political criteria. A seminar on cul-
tural rights with EU experts was held last 
week in Ankara. At technical level, a series of 
instruments have been worked out combining 
seminars, fact-finding and expert missions.  
We are not only monitoring progress in meet-
ing the political criteria, but also offering as-
sistance by means of expert seminars and leg-
islative advice. Under a joint project with the 
Council of Europe, for example, important 
draft pieces of legislation such as the penal 
code or the law on the press or on association 
are being reviewed. We are supporting training 
programmes in human rights for the judiciary 
and for members of the security forces. We 
also offer assistance by means of twinnings, 
involving experts from our Member States 
who provide advice to Turkish officials in 
their working environment.  
The significance of political reforms 
Turning to the political criteria, it is possible to 
say that reforms in this area have been particu-
larly impressive. Since the first reform pack-
age was adopted in October 2001, numerous 
initiatives have addressed some of the most 
sensitive issues in the Turkish context. This 
progress has been explicitly acknowledged by 52 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
   
the European Council at almost every meeting 
in the recent period. The Brussels European 
Council in December 2003 noted that the pro-
gress achieved has brought Turkey closer to 
the Union. The package of constitutional 
amendments adopted by the Turkish Parlia-
ment on 7 May constitutes another step to-
wards compliance with the Copenhagen politi-
cal criteria. It showed once again the strong 
commitment of Turkey to political reforms.   
The new provisions in the latest reform pack-
age touch upon a number of areas ranging 
from the judiciary, civil-military relations, 
freedom of the press and gender equality. 
Some of the changes, such as the abolition of 
the State Security Courts and the withdrawal 
of the representative of the National Security 
Council in the High Education Board, address 
specific issues mentioned in the Commission’s 
2003 Report and in the Conclusions of the 
Brussels European Council of December 2003.  
 
One of the most perceptible results of these 
reforms so far has been a noticeable change of 
climate. Taboos have been broken one after 
the other. Civil society is getting stronger and 
more organised. People are thirsty for free-
dom. The government appears to be deeply 
aware of this as Non Governmental Organiza-
tions are being consulted on the drafting of 
legislation such as the new Penal Code. New 
channels have been set up to allow people to 
report about cases of human rights violations 
and the population appears to be more aware 
of its rights.  
In short, the reform process has brought a new 
mood of openness and freedom in public de-
bate in Turkey. Issues whose mention could 
previously trigger criminal proceedings, such 
as the role of the military, the Kurdish lan-
guage, or cases of torture and ill-treatment, are 
now freely debated. There is public debate 
about equipping Turkey with a new and mod-
ern constitution enshrining the basic values on 
which the EU is based.  
There has also been a notable change in the 
climate of our bilateral relations. We have 
moved a long way in terms of how we ap-
proach and perceive each other. Whereas ear-
lier Turkish governments did not recognize the 
shortcomings under the Copenhagen political 
criteria, we now very largely share a common 
assessment of the situation, including in the 
area of human rights. We have deepened our 
dialogue on the political criteria and are dis-
cussing issues in detail, openly and without 
any limitation.  
Turkey’s compliance with the Copenhagen 
political criteria 
As I already mentioned, in a few months’ time 
it will be the Commission’s task to assess in its 
report whether Turkey meets the Copenhagen 
political criteria. In view of the substantial re-
forms already enacted, is Turkey close to 
meeting the Copenhagen political criteria? My 
reply would be that at this moment the process 
is not yet complete. Although further progress 
has been achieved under the last package of 
constitutional amendments, we understand that 
the Turkish government itself has further plans 
to address all the remaining issues under the 
Copenhagen political criteria by means of ad-
ditional legislative packages. Among the is-
sues to be addressed, in our view, are: 
 
-  the need to continue and possibly to com-
plete reviewing the basic legislation re-
lated to the exercise of fundamental free-
doms, such as the Penal Code, with a view 
to ensuring compliance with European 
standards.  
-  aligning the system of rights of defence 
with EU Standards; 
-  ensuring full Parliamentary control over 
military expenditures and in particular 
over public procurement. The two extra-
budgetary funds in the area of military ex-
penditures will only be phased out by the 
end of 2007; 
-  removing the representative of the Na-
tional Security Council in the High Audio 
Visual Board (RTÜK);  
-  adopting appropriate legislation to address 
the problems faced by non Moslem com-
munities.  
-  -Easing the existing restrictions on Ra-
dio/TV broadcasting and education in lan-
guages other than Turkish. 
 
The challenge of implementation 
We are also following the practical implemen-
tation on the ground It is clear that the task of 
ensuring systematic and effective implementa-
tion of the reforms presents a sizeable chal-
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should be felt by ordinary citizens in their 
daily life. However, according to our informa-
tion, the picture is still mixed.  
There have been some first signs of implemen-
tation on the ground such as the liberation of 
some political prisoners or the adoption of a 
more active attitude in fighting torture prac-
tices across the country. The Kurdish language 
is being increasingly used in the context of 
various cultural events in the Southeast and 
elsewhere. In this context, the starting of 
Kurdish language courses in three cities in 
Anatolia is welcome. After the lifting of the 
state of emergency in the South East, there 
appears to be some movement on adopting a 
more integrated approach towards the issue of 
internally displaced persons and the compen-
sation for damages incurred during the last two 
decades. 
But these positive developments are overshad-
owed by some negative events. There contin-
ues to be court cases against people expressing 
non violent opinion. There is evidence that 
human rights defenders are still subject to har-
assment and intimidation from the authorities. 
Although the scale of torture has been re-
duced, there are still reports of cases of ill-
treatment including torture, in particular in 
custody.  
In some areas, implementation faces consider-
able difficulties. This is the case for cultural 
rights where there is still no radio/TV broad-
casting in language other than Turkish. I 
would like to recall that this issue has been on 
the agenda since a number of years now and 
we cannot see any progress on the ground so 
far.  
In other areas, the situation does not seem to 
have moved much. As regards freedom of re-
ligion, apart from some positive developments 
in specific cases, there appears to be little pro-
gress towards systematic solution of the prob-
lems faced by non Moslem communities. An-
other concern is that the degree of awareness 
of the political reforms in the country appears 
to vary greatly according to the region. There 
are reports that, in some regions, local authori-
ties have no information about the implica-
tions of the new laws and regulations. 
If the Turkish people are to enjoy the values 
largely shared by European citizens, it is es-
sential that the provisions and spirit of the leg-
islative reforms should be respected through-
out the country by different levels of govern-
ment and public administration, the judiciary 
and security forces. In this context, the case of 
Leyla Zana can be mentioned as a negative 
example which casts a shadow on the imple-
mentation of the reforms.  We have also been 
informed of persisting cases of honour crimes 
and of incidents of disproportionate use of 
force against peaceful demonstrations.  
Of course we don’t under-estimate the scale of 
the challenge for a country of the size and 
complexity of Turkey. The difficulties wit-
nessed in Turkey would be faced by any coun-
try in a similar situation. But what matters is 
the steady determination to overcome hurdles 
and bureaucratic bottlenecks, and to establish a 
clear track record of progressive implementa-
tion of the reforms. We know that the task is 
considerable and we fully support the efforts 




The December 2004 decision 
If the European Council decides to open nego-
tiations with Turkey, as President Prodi said 
when he was in Turkey in January, accession 
is not a formality, and not for the immediate 
future. The negotiations will take time, reflect-
ing the scale of the difficulties in many sectors 
faced by such a large and complex country. I 
should also recall that the task of adopting and 
implementing the acquis communautaire is 
enormous, and has important implications for 
the legal system in Member States. Commu-
nity legislation takes precedence over national 
legislation. The European integration process, 
which incorporates a growing number of 
common policies, involves a loss of national 
autonomy for Member States. But the process 
of joint decision- and law-making, and the 
sharing of sovereignty that this implies, brings 
considerable benefits to Member States, par-
ticularly in policy fields such as economic in-
tegration, foreign and security policy, justice 
and home affairs.  
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What impact of Turkey EU accession? 
Turkey’s candidature for EU membership is a 
fascinating subject. As a matter of fact, it 
leaves nobody indifferent as suggested by the 
vigorous debate which takes place across the 
EU. As mentioned by President Prodi in his 
speech before the Grand Turkish National As-
sembly in January this year, contrary to the 
situation in Turkey, the public opinion in the 
EU is not unanimous in favouring a Turkish 
membership. There are those who are con-
cerned about the capacity of the Union to inte-
grate a country of the size and with the demog-
raphy of Turkey, the economic development of 
Turkey and Turkey’s geographical situation. 
Some see the issue in terms of the borders of 
the future European Union: where will the EU 
stop? Who will be next? Others are concerned, 
by the impact of Turkey’s EU accession on the 
nature of the European integration project. At 
the same time, everybody acknowledges that 
Turkey’s geopolitical position plays a very 
important role in regional stability in an area 
which sits at the cross roads of the Balkans, 
Caucasus, Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean 
and Central Asia. The Commission is very 
aware of such considerations and has recently 
proposed a strategy for relations with certain 
neighbouring countries, in order to ensure that 
the enlargement process does not lead to new 
divisions in Europe. 
We can see that there has been a certain evolu-
tion in public opinion as there appears to be an 
increasing understanding for Turkey’s EU as-
pirations and its potential assets for the EU. At 
the same time, the prospect of the European 
Parliament elections next months is prompting 
some political parties in certain Member States 
to campaign against Turkey’s possible acces-
sion to the EU and to propose a “special part-
nership” as an alternative. It is worth mention-
ing that this option was rejected by a large ma-
jority of members of the European Parliament 
during the recent debate about Turkey.   
On its side, the EU will also have to examine 
whether it is ready for Turkey's accession. It is 
clear that the accession of a country with the 
size and population of Turkey would have far-
reaching consequences on the functioning of 
the European Union. This would fundamen-
tally affect many policy areas and the func-
tioning of the EU institutions. We would have 
to reflect on how to best meet these chal-
lenges. We did the same when we embarked 
on negotiations with the member states that 
acceded on 1 May.  
Cyprus 
 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
At such a wide-ranging international confer-
ence, it would be inappropriate for me not to 
mention Cyprus. We worked very hard with 
the UN Secretary General in the efforts to 
achieve a comprehensive settlement of the 
Cyprus problem. Unfortunately, the outcome 
of the referendum in the island produced a re-
sult which did not allow a united Cyprus to 
join the EU on 1 May 2004. It is a matter of 
deep regret that the Greek Cypriot community 
did not approve the Annan plan which was 
supported not only by the EU but also by the 
international community at large. An unprece-
dented opportunity to bring about a solution to 
the long-lasting Cyprus issue was missed.  
At the same time, the Turkish Cypriots should 
be congratulated for their desire to resolve the 
island’s problem. Particularly in the latter 
stages of the process, Turkey played a very 
constructive role. Directly after the referenda, 
on 26 April, the European Union expressed its 
intention to put an end to the isolation of the 
Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate 
the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the 
economic development of the north. An 
amount of €259 millions is being made avail-
able to support projects aiming at promoting 
the economic development of the Turkish 
Cypriot community. The Commission has ini-
tiated the necessary planning to that end and 
intends to bring forward comprehensive pro-
posals within the coming weeks. A sustained 
spirit of cooperation between the two commu-
nities will be necessary for the implementation 




In conclusion, the process of modernization of 
the Turkish political system and its adaptation 
to the EU standards is underway. I am well 
aware that there is an impressive degree of 
consensus in Turkey in favour of joining the 
European Union. For reforms to be enjoyed by 
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sential that they permeate throughout Turkish 
society.  
 
In this respect the representatives of civil soci-
ety such as NGOs and the associations have a 
key role to play through their contribution to 
the public debate in a modern and pluralistic 
democracy.  
 
On its part, the Turkish government continues 
to show a steady and impressive degree of de-
termination to bring about political reforms, 
not only for the sake of complying with the 
Copenhagen political criteria but primarily for 
Turkey’s own sake. On the ground, there are 
already clear signs that implementation of the 
reforms has started. In the period ahead, the 
further development of EU-Turkey relations, 
including the decision to be taken in Decem-
ber, will depend on Turkey’s capacity to dem-
onstrate that it fulfils the Copenhagen political 
criteria, not only in legal provisions, but also 
in practice. I hope and believe that we will be 
able to reflect further progress in our upcom-
ing Regular Report. 
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TURKISH BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES 
by 
TÜSIAD 





DEMOCRATIC REFORM PROCESS  
IS SUCCESSFUL  
 
TURKEY IS READY TO START 
ACCESSION TALKS WITH THE EU 
 
TÜSIAD, starting from its first report on “De-
mocratisation in Turkey” in January 1997, has 
consistently promoted the reform process in Tur-
key that has been accelerated with the 1999 Hel-
sinki Summit decision declaring Turkey as a 
“candidate country destined to join the EU”. This 
challenging process included many stages:  
 
•  The DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government, 
introduced the National Program in March 2001, 
enacted two important constitutional reform 
packages in October 2001 and August 2002, 
changed numerous laws and regulations and re-
vised Turkey’s 75-year old Civil Code in Novem-
ber 2001. 
 
•  These legislative changes removed military 
officers as judges in the State Security Courts, 
amended political parties law to make judicial clo-
sure of parties more difficult, as well as introducing 
first steps in tackling crucial areas such as broad-
casting and education in mother tongues other than 
Turkish, reducing the political role and status of the 
National Security Council, eliminating death pen-
alty, and improving freedom of thought and ex-
pression. The packages expanded the right to asso-
ciation, and imposed stricter penalties on human 
traffickers. They also allowed non-Muslim minor-
ity communities greater rights over religious prop-
erties. 
 
•  The actual AK Party government passed five 
major political reform packages in the last one and 
half years. 
 
The fourth and fifth reform packages included 
changes strengthening the fight against torture, 
broadening the scope of freedoms of association, 
demonstration and peaceful assembly, expanding 
the freedom to use Kurdish in broadcasting and 
election campaign periods. They removed some 
anti-democratic elements in the Turkish Penal 
Code, introduced measures to improve police con-
duct, gave prisoners/detainees immediate access to 
lawyers, lifted some restrictions on press, and eased 
restrictions on the ownership rights of minority 
foundations. 
 
•   The sixth package abolished the Article 8 of 
Anti-Terrorism Law, and terminated its current 
proceedings, for which Turkey has been widely 
criticized by the Council of Europe and other inter-
national bodies. The package also revoked the au-
thority of the Secretary General of the National 
Security Council (NSC) to appoint one member to 
the supervision board for cinema and music works. 
The sixth package also amended the related provi-
sion of broadcasting law (named as RTUK) to 
guarantee the right to broadcast in languages other 
than Turkish. On the area of religious freedom, the 
new clauses in the package eased the rules and pro-
cedures for construction planning with regard to 
places of worship for faiths other than Islam. These 
changes also eased the registration of the real es-
tates of the foundations of religious communities 
by expanding the application period.  
 
•  The seventh package, adopted in August 
2003 emphasised the advisory status of the NSC, 
reduced the frequency of its meetings to once every 
two months, enabled the appointment of a civilian 
as its secretary-general and allowed greater parlia-
mentary scrutiny over military expenses. 
 
•  The May 2004 legislative package achieves 
most of the reform processes initiated and en-
hanced through previous packages dating back to 
October 2001. 
 
•  As a clear sign of implementation, the Turkish 
state radio and television (TRT) started broadcast-
ing in Bosnian, Arabic, Circassian, and two com-
mon Kurdish dialects. Moreover, the Court of Ap-
peals ordered the release of four former DEP 
deputies on June 9. Turkey, signed the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms' Protocol. It also created 
human rights committees for each province and 
district, as well as established the High Board of 




Turkey in Europe Monitor 
No. 7, July 2004
Introductory Note from CEPS 
 
This issue of CEPS Turkey in Europe Monitor 
presents an extract from a CEPS working pa-
per titled “Turkey as Bridgehead and Spear-
head - Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign 
Policy”, prepared by Michael Emerson and 
Nathalie Tocci within the scope of the joint 
CEPS-EFPF Project, “Strategy for EU and 
Turkey in the Pre-Accession Period”. The pa-
per takes as an assumption that the EU will 
decide to open accession negotiations with 
Turkey at the end of 2004, and explores in this 






Turkish foreign, security and defence policies 
already in the pre-accession period. After pub-
lication on the CEPS web-site of the full text of 
the working paper, the subscribers to this 
Monitor will receive an e-mail alert providing 
access to it (hyper-link). E-mail alerts will 
also be sent for the remaining working docu-
ments on democratic governance, justice and 
home affairs, trade, banking, monetary and 
fiscal policy, agriculture and energy. The re-
sults of the Project will be discussed at a one-
day conference at CEPS on 27 September 
2004.          
 
Michael Emerson and Senem Aydın
Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign 
Policy 
Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci
1 
 
Even if Turkey begins accession negotiations 
in 2005, full membership would occur proba-
bly only around a decade later. Turkey needs 
to pass and implement key reforms and nego-
tiate thirty-one chapters of the acquis. The EU 
needs to ratify and implement its Constitution 
and absorb at least twelve new member states. 
However none of this excludes that the EU 
and Turkey might begin to integrate their for-
eign policies in the pre-accession period. Such 
integration could both yield important benefits 
to Turkey and to the EU, and it could serve to 
                                                                                                 
1 Michael Emerson is Senior Research Fellow at 
the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 
Brussels.  Nathalie Tocci is Jean Monnet Fellow at 
the European University Institute, Florence. This 
note is an extract from a longer EU-Turkey Work-
ing Paper entitled ‘Turkey as Bridgehead and 
Spearhead – Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign 
Policy’,  forthcoming on CEPS website 
www.ceps.be.  
accelerate Turkey’s membership into the Un-
ion.  
 
This process has already begun with Turkey’s 
association with the EU’s nascent security and 
defence policy (ESDP). But this is only a 
small beginning compared to the conceivable 
agenda. The intuitive reasons for this idea are 
twofold. First, Turkey’s neighbourhood has 
become the main source of the EU’s security 
concerns, as stated in the EU Security Strat-
egy. EU-Turkey integration in the foreign pol-
icy realm would also allow an extended reach 
of the emerging European Neighbourhood Pol-
icy. Second, Turkey offers several specific 
assets for helping the EU address its concerns 
and objectives, ranging from the concrete re-
alities of location and logistics, through to 
matters of culture and ideology.  
 
In policy operational terms, Turkey has the 
role of geographic hub for regional coopera-
tion, it becomes a secure energy transport hub 
for Caspian, Middle Eastern and Russian oil 
and gas and it is well situated to become a 
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policies. Turkey also has valuable human re-
sources to complement those of the EU for 
cooperation programmes, ranging from busi-
ness know-how to language skills relevant for 
its wider neighbourhood. 
 
In normative terms, Turkey could enhance the 
credibility of the EU as a foreign policy actor. 
Turkey’s membership, like the current eastern 
enlargement, would constitute a key EU for-
eign policy act. The extent to which such an 
action would be successful would depend on 
the degree to which accession would have con-
tributed to a transformation of candidate Tur-
key, both in terms of its internal democracy 
and in terms of its foreign policy. This democ-
ratic transformation by a predominantly Mus-
lim country, would also send a striking mes-
sage about the compatibility of democracy and 
Islam, and of the multi-cultural inclusiveness 
of the EU, thus emphatically repudiating the 
spectre of the ‘clash of civilizations’. The suc-
cess of Turkey’s accession would also be 
measured with respect to its contribution to 
conflict resolution, by having facilitated state-
society reconciliation within Turkey (i.e., vis-
à-vis the Kurds) as well as state-to-state set-
tlement (i.e., between Greece and Turkey or 
between Turkey and Armenia). 
 
This paper explores these general arguments 
by going though a set of major theatres of op-
eration in the Turkish and EU neighbourhoods. 
The idea is to review this set of sub-regions 
and to consider whether and how EU and 
Turkish interests are convergent and their po-
tential policies complementary.  
Balkans  
With Bulgarian and Romanian accession ex-
pected in 2007, and Croatia also expected to 
join the accession process, EU interests in the 
Western Balkans are directed towards consoli-
dating the transformation of the remainder of 
the region. Turkey for its part also has a vital 
interest in the stability of this transit region, 
which separates it from Western Europe. The 
interests of the EU and of Turkey thus seem 
convergent. In terms of their policies, Turkey 
has already contributed to EU stabilization 
efforts by participating in EU and NATO op-
erations in Macedonia and Bosnia.  
 
However EU policy is confronted by an in-
creasingly pressing dilemma: how to include 
the region into its economic and security 
spaces, without premature accession. The di-
lemma is posed because the borders between 
member and non-member states in the Balkans 
will be virtually impossible to control at the 
frontiers. Turkey could contribute in three 
ways. First, during the pre-accession period 
there could be an expansion of the EU-Turkey 
customs union to include the whole Western 
Balkans. Second, Turkey’s experience in train-
ing police officers both from Turkey and from 
the Balkan and Black Sea regions represents a 
major asset. The Turkish International Acad-
emy against Drugs and Organised Crime 
(TADOC) is already a valuable professional 
institute for the entire region. Third, Turkey is 
well positioned to serve as a transit route for 
rising European energy needs. The Greek-
Turkish gas Interconnector project, linking to 
the Tabriz-Erzurum gas pipeline (connecting 
Turkmen and Iranian gas) is expected expand 
and connect on to the Western Balkans and 
into Western Europe. 
Black Sea  
In early 1990s Turkey was largely responsible 
for initiating what became the Black Sea Eco-
nomic Cooperation, an Organisation with a 
comprehensive institutional structure, which 
has suffered from the non-involvement of the 
EU and the scepticism of Russia. Forthcoming 
enlargements mean that the entire western and 
southern coastlines of the Black Sea will be-
come EU territory. As such, the obligations of 
Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey to comply with 
the acquis could provide a stronger foundation 
for regional cooperation on issues like the en-
vironment, transport, energy, fisheries and 
combating organised crime.  
 
Turkey, together with Bulgaria, Romania and 
the EU itself, might follow the model of 
Finland’s initiative in creating a ‘Northern 
Dimension’. This could either take the form of 
empowering BSEC with EU human and finan-
cial resources, and perhaps adding a role as a 
forum for political dialogue between the CIS 
and EU. Alternatively, there could be an EU-
Black Sea core group, based on the Black Sea 
states that are either EU members or candi-
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tively engaged in the European Neighbour-
hood Policy.  
South Caucasus 
The EU has refrained so far from playing a 
substantial role in the South Caucasus, al-
though it expresses the intention to do so. Tur-
key enjoys strong economic, political and mili-
tary links with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Tur-
key also plays an important role in the devel-
opment of Caspian energy, with the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline under construction, 
and the planned gas pipeline to run alongside 
it to Erzurum. Turkey also hosts important 
diaspora communities from the region, includ-
ing 450,000 Abkhaz and 2 million Georgians.  
 
Turkey’s potential role in the Caucasus and the 
EU’s recognition of the region’s importance 
but unwillingness to take an active lead could 
dovetail each other. Yet their interests at pre-
sent are not entirely convergent. Turkey’s role 
in the region has been limited by its relations 
with both Azerbaijan with whom it has close 
ethno-cultural ties, and Armenia with whom, 
due to historical legacies, relations have not 
been normalized yet. This partiality has been 
reinforced by the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, 
which led Turkey to close its frontier with 
Armenia in 1992. In the recent past, Turkey 
has attempted to contribute to progress in 
Karabakh by pursuing a trilateral forum with 
the participation of Azeri and Armenian offi-
cials. But due to its positions, it has not been 
an impartial mediating influence.  
 
What are the steps through which Turkey’s 
relations with Armenia could be normalised, 
allowing Turkey to play a constructive role in 
conflict resolution? In a first stage, Turkey 
could open its eastern border for trade with 
Armenia, and Armenia for its part could 
amend its constitution to remove political am-
biguities over its frontier with Turkey. The 
two countries could establish a truth and rec-
onciliation committee over the genocide ques-
tion. The EU could support these steps. For 
Turkey this would occur in the context of the 
accession process. For Armenia, the EU could 
make the deepening of its relations through the 
new neighbourhood policy conditional on ef-
forts in this direction. A second stage could 
introduce progress on Nagorno Karabakh, in-
volving Armenian withdrawal from the occu-
pied territories surrounding Karabakh, together 
with guaranteed transport corridors between 
Karabakh and Armenia, as well as between 
Nakichevan and Azerbaijan. Turkey would 
establish normal diplomatic relations with 
Armenia. In a final phase the status of Kara-
bakh itself would be settled.  
 
Also in the case of the Georgian-Abkhaz con-
flict, Turkey could play an important role. The 
existence of large diasporas in Turkey pres-
ently constrains its involvement. Turkey has 
also limited influence on Russia, key to any 
breakthrough in the conflict. But in a post-
settlement phase Turkey’s Abkhaz community 
(larger than the population of Abkhazia itself) 
could play an important role in reconstruction 
efforts. Progress in Abkhazia could also allow 
re-opened rail links from Russia to Turkey and 
the implementation of the proposed new oil 
pipeline from Novorossisk to Supsa, linking to 
the BTC pipeline. The prospect of projects 
such as these might induce Russia to shift its 
positions.  
 
Taken together this would mean a transforma-
tion of the perspectives for the region. They 
would combine with Turkey’s pre-accession 
status leading the way for an enhanced ENP 
towards the Caucasus. In turn, the seemingly 
utopian vision of a Stability Pact advocated by 
Demirel in 1999, could have greater chances 
of success a decade later.  
Central Asia  
In the early 1990s, the EU established contrac-
tual ties with all the Central Asian Republics 
(Partnership and Cooperation Agreements), 
but these have been rather thin relationships. 
Technical assistance has been supplied under 
TACIS, but this has not been an easy process, 
partly because of the scarcity of relevant ex-
perts with Russian or Turkish language skills. 
Financial assistance has been limited also, par-
ticularly when compared to the aid to Mediter-
ranean and the Western Balkans, not to men-
tion Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
Turkey instead has cultural, linguistic and reli-
gious ties with four of the five Central Asian 
Republics. In 1992 after the collapse of the 
USSR, Turkey embarked on an ambitious for-
eign policy initiative in Central Asia. It pro-
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numerous projects covering trade, investment, 
business cooperation, training in public ad-
ministration, media and education, communi-
cations and transport. However, particularly in 
the fields of culture and education, Turkey’s 
role was often perceived as patronising or as 
attempting to impose Turkish cultural domina-
tion. The Republics wanted to assert their own 
identity and did not wish to alienate Russia. In 
addition, Turkey’s own economic instability 
meant that Turkey did not have the means to 
assist state-building and development in Cen-
tral Asia.  
 
However, Turkey’s accession process could 
offer the potential to strengthen both the EU 
and Turkish roles in Central Asia. The EU 
could benefit from Turkey’s bilateral ties. The 
deficiencies of technical assistance due to the 
lack of necessary language skills could be rec-
tified to some extent through Turkish partici-
pation. At the same time, these initiatives 
would not be tainted by pan-Turkic under-
tones.  
The Arab-Israeli conflict 
In the Middle East, the EU, despite being the 
largest donor to the Palestinian Authority and 
enjoying strong contractual ties with most 
states in the region and Israel in particular, has 
always played a secondary role in any peace 
process. The EU has been unwilling to use its 
primarily economic instruments effectively in 
the political realm.  
 
Turkey’s accession process would not alter EU 
positions towards the conflict. In fact, EU and 
Turkish views are largely convergent. How-
ever, Turkey’s role could contribute to the 
EU’s increased ‘actorness’ in the region. Tur-
key has enjoyed good relations with Israel and 
is constantly improving its relations with the 
Arab world and with Syria in particular. Pro-
vided the EU became more willing to use ef-
fectively its instruments, Turkey’s perceived 
neutrality as well as its proximity could allow 
the EU to act more credibly as a facilitator and 
mediator between the parties. In view of its 
membership of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference, Turkey could also act as a bridge 
between the EU, as a member of the Quartet, 
and the OIC. In May 2004, Turkey together 
with a sub-group of the OIC met with the EU 
Presidency (as well as with Russia and the UN 
Secretary General) to discuss the institutionali-
sation of relations between OIC and the Quar-
tet.  
Iraq 
In principle EU and Turkish interests in Iraq 
are convergent. Like the EU, Turkey’s inter-
ests are in fostering a peaceful and democratic 
Iraq. However in view of its proximity, Tur-
key’s sensitivities regarding Iraq go beyond 
the general concerns of most EU actors. These 
concern first and foremost the activities of the 
PKK in Northern Iraq as well as the fear that a 
possible secession of Iraqi Kurdistan could 
fuel instability in south-east Turkey.  
 
Yet irrespective of these fears, the possibility 
of a Turkish invasion in Northern Iraq appears 
far-fetched to say the least. It is thus feasible 
that as and when there is a greater internation-
alization of Iraq, Turkey (and in particular the 
Turkish General Staff, who is the principal 
Turkish actor in Iraq) together with the EU 
could develop a valuable operational and po-
litical partnership.  
 
A promising avenue of Turkey’s role in the 
Gulf is the ‘Neighbouring Countries Initia-
tive’. The Initiative was born in 2003, stem-
ming from the common interest of all of Iraq’s 
neighbours to prevent the war. It includes all 
of Iraq’s neighbours, with the exception of 
Kuwait (that supported the US invasion and 
occupation), and also including Egypt. The 
countries of the Initiative have met five times 
both before and following the American at-
tack. So far the Initiative remains ad hoc, and 
the only item on the agenda has been Iraq. 
However, it is conceivable that the Initiative 
persists and institutionalises. If so it could be-
come of considerable interest to the EU, which 
is still in the process of developing a concerted 
strategy towards the war-torn country.  
Iran  
In recent decades Turkish-Iranian ties have 
been strained over the two aspects that have 
been viewed as most critical to Turkish na-
tional security: namely political Islam and 
Kurdish separatism. Yet both threats have con-
siderably diminished in the last few years, 
opening the space for EU and Turkish coop-
eration in Iran. Like the EU, Turkey has an 
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cooperation on terrorism, in restraining Iran’s 
nuclear programme and in ensuring energy 
security. Its preferred means to pursue these 
aims have converged  with those of the EU 
rather than of the US, opting for a policy of 
engagement rather than confrontation.  
 
Beyond convergent interests, Turkish and EU 
policies could be complementary. Turkey’s 
deepening political, social and economic ties 
could act as an asset to EU endeavours to en-
gage in dialogue with Iran. There is currently 
an annual flow of 450,000 Iranians crossing 
visa free into Turkey for tourism, education 
and business purposes. The Tabriz-Erzurum 
gas pipeline from Iran into Turkey is also of 
much interest to the EU, as this connects with 
the Turkish gas network, soon to be expanded 
and then linked with that of Greece and thence 
into the rest of the EU. The Iranian gas con-
nection is viewed as particularly important to 
Europe given that Iran’s own network con-
nects with Turkmenistan and that the EU is 
keen to develop alternative energy sources to 
Russia. 
Gulf and the OIC 
Both Turkey and the EU have an interest in 
gradual reform towards political participation, 
human rights, and then democratisation in the 
Gulf region. They also have an interest in se-
curing cooperation of the Gulf countries in 
energy security and in the fight against terror-
ism. However both Turkey and the EU have 
enjoyed relatively thin relations with these 
countries. The EU has attempted in recent 
years to relate to the Gulf countries though 
multilateral forums, exploring the prospects 
for deepening and institutionalising relations 
between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC). Turkey instead principally 
relates to the Gulf through bilateral relations, 
as well as interacting with them in the context 
of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC). Particularly through bilateral commer-
cial ties, Turkey’s relations with most Gulf 
states have been steadily expanding in recent 
years. Investors from the Gulf have also 
shown increasing interest in projects in Tur-
key. 
 
In principle, a secular and democratising Tur-
key could offer important lessons to the initia-
tion of a reform process in the Gulf countries. 
Indeed in the context of the emerging ‘Broader 
Middle East and North Africa’ initiative of the 
G8 summit Turkey has accepted to co-chair 
the Democracy Assistance Dialogue. How-
ever, precisely in view of Turkey’s secular 
nature, there are serious limits to its ability and 
willingness to foster political change in the 
Gulf.  
United States 
Turkey and the US have been allies for over 
fifty years, both in the context of NATO and 
through their bilateral relations. The EU, Tur-
key and the US have shared similar strategic 
interests. This has remained so both during the 
Cold War and thereafter. In other words, to-
gether with all European countries and the US, 
the Turkish Republic has always firmly placed 
itself within the ‘West’.  
 
This is not to say that Turkey’s (or indeed the 
EU’s) relations with the US have been static. 
Particularly in the run-up and with the advent 
of the 2003 Gulf war, relations between both 
Turkey (and several EU member states) and 
the US have been strained. On 1 March 2003 a 
resolution was brought to the Turkish parlia-
ment by the ruling AKP government to allow 
the temporary deployment of 62,000 US 
troops on Turkish soil. The deployment and 
transit through Turkey would have allowed a 
second front attack against Iraq. By a few 
votes, the motion failed to pass through par-
liament and the American troops were re-
routed to Kuwait. At the time, the rejection of 
the motion appeared to have plunged US-
Turkey relations to their lowest ebb since the 
1974 arms embargo following the partition of 
Cyprus.  
 
However the Turkish government is, notwith-
standing, positioning itself to play a construc-
tive role in the Middle East, in a manner that is 
convergent with both US and European de-
clared interests. Prime Minister Erdoğan en-
gaged in highly positive political debate in the 
US, as evidenced for example by his speeches 
in January 2004 in New York and at Harvard. 
The Turkish leadership is able to deploy ar-
guments about favouring the progressive de-
mocratisation of the Middle East region, os-
tensibly supported by American as well as 
European leaderships.  
 62 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
 
In conclusion, following Turkey’s stance to-
wards the war in Iraq, Turkish policy seems to 
be settling down into a maturing, rather than a 
breaking, relationship with the US. It has 
brought also Turkey’s foreign policy closer to 
the underlying ideology of European foreign 
policy, even if the EU has itself been so deeply 
split over Iraq. The scene is set therefore for a 
credible deepening of Turkish-EU collabora-
tion over future developments in the Middle 
East.   
 
Box A: Potential convergence, complementarity 
or otherwise of EU and Turkish foreign policies 




Does the idea of integrating Turkish and EU 
foreign and security policies hold out the pros-
pect of something important and valuable for 
both parties. Would Turkey be an asset or li-
ability? Our conclusions are unambiguously 
positive. 
 
This does, however, depend on the EU’s level 
of ambition for its foreign and security policy. 
Does the EU aspire to become a major actor in 
the nearby southern and eastern neighbour-
hoods, or does it prefer to retreat into itself 
behind the most secure possible external bor-
ders? If the EU truly aspires to play a stabilis-
ing, pacifying and modernising role in its 
neighbourhood beyond mere token actions, 
then the incorporation of Turkey into the 
common external policy offers the prospect of 
real advantages. In the contrary case it would 
be consistent for the EU to reject Turkey’s 
future membership once and for all. Yet in this 
case the EU would run the risk of destabilising 
Turkey itself, which could mean adding to the 
chaos of the wider neighbourhood.    
 
Turkey’s EU accession stands to be of compa-
rable importance for the EU’s emerging for-
eign and security policy as the recent acces-
sion of the ten new member states put to-
gether, if not more so. Turkey is almost com-
pletely surrounded by a set of regions that rep-
resent the EU’s prime security concerns, from 
the residual instability of the Balkans to the 
West, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Iraq and 
Iran to the East, and Israel-Palestine and the 
Mediterranean to the South. The Turkish ac-
cession would mark the end of the EU’s 
enlargement to the East, while opening at the 
same time new dimensions to the EU’s rela-
tionship to the Middle East and Eurasia to the 
South and East, regions that are unstable and 
unpredictable.  
 
The potential advantages for the EU in inte-
grating Turkey as foreign and security policy 
actor are several. Objective factors lie in con-
crete logistic and locational advantages, cou-
pled to military capabilities and civilian hu-
man resources that can be readily deployed in 
the Eurasian and Middle Eastern neighbour-
hoods. More subjective but perhaps even more 
important are the prospects for the Turkish 
experience to be viewed as a positive prece-
dent by its neighbours. This general statement 
has a number of versions, some of which have 
been recently tried and failed (e.g. the pan-
Turkic experiment in Central Asia in the early 
1990s). Some other variants are also likely to 
provoke adverse reactions, like over-selling 
the Turkish model of multi-party democracy 
and secularism in parts of the Arab world. Not 
only does Turkey’s democracy still have im-
portant shortcomings. But also Turkey’s Arab 
neighbours, in view of the legacy of Ottoman 
rule, react adversely to arguments suggesting 
their emulation of Turkey’s political and eco-
nomic system.  
 
Balkans  Convergent and complementary 
Black Sea  Convergent and complementary 
South  
Caucasus 
Potentially complementary  
but not yet convergent: special 
factors – Armenia and Azerbaijan 
Central 
Asia  Convergent and complementary 
Russia  Convergent but risks of  
unintended effects 
Mediterra-
nean  Convergent and complementary 
Middle East  Increasingly convergent and  
complementary 
Iraq 
Potentially convergent and  
complementary but special  
sensitivities – Kurds and Turkomans 
Iran 
Convergent and potentially  
complementary: special 




Convergent and potentially  
complementary: special  
sensitivity – religion 
United 
States 
Turkey is increasingly convergent 
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However more subtle arguments seem full of 
promise. The Turkish case suggests that the 
values of democracy, human rights, the rule of 
law and secularism are not specific to any par-
ticular culture or religion. On the contrary they 
are universal values with no geographical, cul-
tural or religious limitations. Rather than rep-
resenting a static model of democracy, the 
continuing process of Turkey’s democratisa-
tion could act as a source of inspiration to its 
neighbours. The same is true also of the grad-
ual transformation of Turkey’s security and 
foreign policy culture. While in the past Turk-
ish foreign policy had focused on the impor-
tance of military security and balance of power 
politics, it now increasingly appreciates the 
value of civilian instruments of law, econom-
ics and diplomacy, as well as of multilateral 
settings in which to pursue its aims. Related to 
this, the Turkish example demonstrates the 
value of European integration as a key external 
anchor to domestic processes of modernisa-
tion.  
 
The final point concerns the EU’s own model. 
Turkey’s EU accession and integration would 
vindicate the EU’s ambitions to represent an 
inclusive project and a multi-cultural commu-
nity of values. If the EU and Turkey were to 
make best use of their joint opportunities in 
the foreign policy domain, Turkey would build 
on the advantages of its comparative openness 
as well as proximity to the Middle Eastern and 
Eurasian neighbourhoods. The EU and Turkey 
could thus devise an original blend of open-
ness towards their southern and eastern 
neighbours, with the model of a graduated ex-
ternal border of the EU. However Turkey 
would need to be re-assured that this would 
not in any way deprive it of normal political 
rights as future member state. To have a 
graduated border regime that adds value is not 
to be confused with the negative connotations 
of a second-class member state.  
 
Finally, an integration of EU and Turkish stra-
tegic cultures could in the context of the pre-
sent turmoil in the Middle East and transatlan-
tic discord over Iraq carry a message also to 
Washington, supporting a shift back towards 
multilateralism, moderation and the rule of 
law. 
 
Our conclusions in viewing Turkey as a poten-
tial asset to the EU’s foreign and security poli-
cies can be distilled into two terms used in 
military security studies: bridgehead and 
spearhead. In the present context these words 
have meaning in terms of the civil values and 
the objectives of an expanding European Un-
ion. The democratising Turkey would be the 
bridgehead of a modern, multi-cultural Europe 
right up to and alongside the ideological chaos 
and violence of the neighbourhood beyond. Its 
civilian, military and human resources could 
be integrated with those of the EU and serve as 
a spearhead of the EU’s soft and not-so-soft 
power projection into the region. 
 
Box B: Turkey’s possible assets for EU foreign 
and security policy 
Objective factors 
- Turkey’s accession would lead to an extended 
reach of the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
-  Turkey’s neighbours would become direct 
neighbours of the EU. Turkey has the role of geo-
graphic hub for regional cooperation. 
-Turkey is a secure energy transport hub for Cas-
pian, Middle East and Russian oil and gas.  - Tur-
key is well situated to become a forward base for 
the EU’s security and defence policy, for military 
logistics and the credibility of the EU’s presence in 
the region.  
- Turkey has valuable human resources to com-
plement those of the EU for cooperation pro-
grammes, ranging from business know-how to lan-
guage skills. 
 
Normative arguments-  
-Rather than representing values specific to particu-
lar cultures or religions, the Turkish case shows 
that democracy, secularism and human rights are 
universal values. 
- Turkey’s EU accession would demonstrate 
Europe to be an inclusive concept, with a multi-
cultural values, open to different religions.  
- Turkey’s transformation of its security and for-
eign policy culture, with less reliance on military 
power and greater emphasis on diplomacy and ci-
vilian instruments 
- Turkey’s accession would confirm the contribu-
tion of European integration to conflict resolution, 
with the reconciliation between the Turkish state 
and its Kurdish population, its rapprochement with 
Greece, and constructive role over Cyprus.  
 
Synergy 
- Combining this list of points could give a syner-
getic boost to the EU’s capabilities and credibility 
as foreign policy actor across the EU’s southern 
and eastern neighbourhoods.  
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TURKISH BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES 
by 
TÜSIAD 






A NEW CORPORATE WORLD 
FOR EUROPE 
 
European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) 
prepared a report entitled “Turkey: A New Cor-
porate World for Europe” with the aim of assist-
ing the evaluation of the implications of potential 
Turkish membership to the EU. It provides ample 
information on the evolution of the relations be-
tween EU and Turkey, and on the strength and 
openness of Turkish industry.  
 
Overall,  the primary message of the report is 
that Turkey's institutions and dynamic private 
sector are well prepared to start the negotiation 
process that will lead to EU membership and a 
higher level of welfare for both Turkey and the 
EU. 
  
¾ Main headlines from the report include: 
 
- In recent years, Turkey has taken major steps 
to restructure its economic, administrative, in-
stitutional and judicial environment with the 
long-term objective of meeting the challenge of 
global competition as a strong partner of the EU.  
 
- The obligations that Turkey has contracted with 
the EU have served as fundamental benchmarks 
during difficult times. Turkey has responded to 
major economic crises with root and branch re-
form of its financial and regulatory institutions, 
thus demonstrating its reliability as a partner of 
the EU. 
 
- European endorsement of Turkey’s political aspi-
rations will, as much as any other conceivable fac-
tor, guarantee the long-term, stable macroeco-
nomic environment which industry demands. That 
environment, in turn, provides the conditions for 
growth and opportunity which European manufac-
turers are well situated to exploit. As a destination 
for exports, as an opportunity for investment, 
and as a location for competitive manufactur-
ing, even as the source of invisible earnings in  
tourism and finance, Turkey already offers im-
mediate substantial returns to the European 
Union which it aspires to join. In return, Turkey 
asks a low-cost, long-term commitment to work 
together. It is a textbook case of a win-win 
situation. 
 
- The start of accession negotiations, the markets 
are convinced, will remove the final barrier to 
investor confidence. Although Turkey attracts its 
share of portfolio investment, foreign direct in-
vestment has historically been below $1 billion per 
year. This is less than 0.5% of GDP. International 
experience shows that an economy of Turkey’s 
size and importance should be attracting six to 
eight times of that ratio. Re-confirmation of its 
eventual membership to the EU and the conse-
quent stimulation of FDI will expand major 
employment opportunities. 
 
¾ Many ERT companies (BP, British American 
Tobacco, Eczacıbaşı, Fiat, Lafarge, Nestlé, 
Pirelli, Renault, Roche, Shell, Siemens, Total, 
TT&TİM, Philips, Tuborg, Unilever, Volvo) 
contributed to the report with the reflection of their 
corporate experiences in Turkey: 
 
- “Turkey could play a vital role with regard to 
global and regional development through her 
dominant position in the region, linking together 
diverse cultural and business traditions and cus-
toms.” 
 
- “Turkey is an important country both as a pro-
duction base and as a market. Recent develop-
ments such as increasing productivity, improve-
ments in FDI legislation and stability in political 
and economic life have rendered Turkey more at-
tractive for investment.” 
 
-   “ Turkey has young and well-educated human 
resources with a high capacity of adaptation to new 
developments.” 
 
- “With its large and growing domestic market, 
Turkey is a country with great potential.” 
 
- “We invested in Turkey due to Turkey’s current 
domestic market, its potential domestic market and 
geo-strategic location and skilled workforce.” 
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Introductory Note from CEPS 
 
This issue of CEPS Turkey in Europe Monitor 
presents an extract from a CEPS working pa-
per titled “European Integration and the 
Transformation of Turkish Democracy”, pre-
pared by Senem Aydın and E. Fuat Keyman 
within the scope of the joint CEPS-EFPF Pro-
ject, “Strategy for EU and Turkey in the Pre-
Accession Period”. The project is realised 
with the financial contributions of the Open 
Society Institute of Istanbul, Akbank, Coca 
Cola and Finansbank. CEPS acknowledges 
the kind support for the production of the Tur-
key in Europe Monitor provided by EU Infor-
mation Group of Turkey (ABIG). The paper’s 
general argument is that the Copenhagen po-
litical criteria constitute the leverage that is 
making Turkish modernisation and democrati-
sation more plural, multi-cultural and con-
solidated. The paper presents a historical 
overview of modern Turkey from the perspec-
tive of political modernisation and democratic 
consolidation in order to assess Turkey’s abil-
ity to meet the requirements of the Copenha-
gen political criteria and evaluates the impact 
of EU conditionality and the remaining prob-
lems and prospects in four major areas – the 
role of the military, human rights, protection 
of minorities and the judicial system. The full 
text of the working paper is available at 
www.ceps.be. This and other working papers 
of the Project (justice and home affairs, trade, 
banking, agriculture, energy, growth, budget-
ary implications, monetary and fiscal policy) 
will be presented for public debate at high-
level conferences to be held in Brussels on 27 
September and Istanbul on 8 November. Those 
interested in attending either of the two con-
ferences are invited to write to 
turkey_europe@ceps.be. Participation in the 
conferences is subject to a limited number of 
places. 
 




European Integration and the Transforma-
tion of Turkish Democracy 
Senem Aydın and Fuat Keyman
1 
 
In recent years, Turkey’s reform process, 
aimed at opening of accession negotiations 
with the European Union, has been impres-
sive. Since August 2002, the Turkish parlia-
                                                                                                 
1 Senem Aydin is a Research Fellow at the Centre 
for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and a PhD 
candidate at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. E. Fuat 
Keyman is Professor of International Relations at 
Koç University and a member of the Coordination 
Board of EFPF. This note is an extract from a 
longer EU-Turkey Working Paper entitled “Euro-
pean Integration and the Transformation of Turk-
ish Democracy”, available on CEPS website 
www.ceps.be. 
ment has made a number of important legal 
and constitutional changes to upgrade Turkish 
democracy in accordance with European stan-
dards. The European Union for its part under-
stands that the accession of Turkey would be a 
political act of huge importance for itself as 
well as Turkey. It has therefore to inform it-
self about the political origins of the Turkish 
application, and to understand the nature of 
the current political transformation underway 
there. However this effort of understanding 
has also, in our view, to be based on a crucial 
premise, that the issue of Turkey’s possible 
accession should be decided on fair and objec-
tive grounds, namely the standard admission 
criteria, and more particularly not on grounds 
of geographic or cultural essentialism, since 
this would mean that the process had no point.     66 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
 
In order to substantiate these points, we first 
provide a historical overview of modern Tur-
key from the perspective of political moderni-
sation and democratic consolidation, followed 
by a discussion on the problems and prospects 
that exist in Turkey’s attempt to fulfil the Co-
penhagen political criteria. 
 
From Republican Origins to Democratic 
Transformation 
As Feroz Ahmad correctly observes, "Turkey 
did not rise phoenix-like out of the ashes of 
the Ottoman Empire. It was 'made' in the im-
age of the Kemalist elite which won the na-
tional struggle against foreign invaders and 
the old regime".
2 The history of the making of 
modern Turkey has been that of Westernisa-
tion, conditioned by "the will to (Western) 
civilisation". In this process of 'making', the 
image of the Kemalist elite was to "reach the 
contemporary level of civilisation" by estab-
lishing its political, economic, and ideological 
prerequisites, such as the creation of an inde-
pendent nation-state, the fostering of industri-
alisation, and the construction of a secular and 
modern national identity. The Kemalist elite 
thus accepted the universal validity of West-
ern modernity as the way of building modern 
Turkey.    
 
The idea of the state employed by the Kemal-
ist elite was by no means abstract. It was a 
reaction to two fundamental problems, which 
had caused the decline of the Ottoman Em-
pire.
3 First, the Ottoman state was identified 
with the personal rule of the sultan, which 
eventually led to its inability to compete with 
the European nation-state system. Second, the 
Islamic basis of the Ottoman state was re-
garded as the primary obstacle to progress in 
Ottoman society. For the Kemalist elite, there 
was therefore a need to create a nation-state 
distinct from the person of the sultan and 
secular enough to reduce Islam to the realm of 
individual faith. This meant a reconstruction 
of the idea of national sovereignty. The state 
was thus viewed not as an arbitrary institution, 
nor an expression of class interest, but an ac-
tive agent that reshapes the nation to elevate 
                                                                                                 
2 See Feroz Ahmad (1993), The Making of Modern 
Turkey, London: Routledge. 
3Heper, Metin (1985), The State Tradition in Tur-
key, North Humberside: The Eothen Press. 
the people to the level of contemporary 
(Western) civilisation. 
 
The Kemalist elite also took seriously the 
Weberian answer to the riddle of the 'Euro-
pean miracle' - that the reasons behind West-
ern advancement could be located precisely in 
Western cultural practices. Kemalism under-
stood modernisation not just as a question of 
acquiring technology, but as something that 
could not be absorbed without a dense net-
work of cultural practices, which made in-
strumental thought possible. The commitment 
to political modernity had to be supplemented 
with a set of cultural practices in order to 
ground "the articulation of reason and capital 
via the nation-state", or the institutional and 
discursive construction of national identity.   
The Kemalist elite initiated a set of reforms 
that had to be imposed from above to 




Republicanism, nationalism, étatism, secular-
ism, populism, and revolutionary reformism 
were the six principles of the act of modern 
governance. Republicanism defined the na-
tion-state as impersonal rule, which was con-
textualized as national sovereignty through 
nationalism. Etatism was designated to foster 
capitalist industrialisation through import-
substitution policies carried out by the state, 
and gave expression to the politico-economic 
logic of the Kemalist elite. These principles 
indicated the acceptance of the dominance of 
the West and the Kemalist elite's will to civili-
sation. They also indicate the significance of 
nation-state building for nationalist discourse.  
What gave specificity to Kemalist national-
ism, however, was its populist character, its 
rejection of the West as a class-based social 
formation.  Populism meant, in the Turkish 
context, the affirmation of the non-class char-
acter of Turkish society.   
 
The second political period of the Turkish re-
public began in 1945 with the transition to the 
multi-party system, and later in the 1960s to 
the rise of the New Left. As a result it was no 
                                                                                                 
4 See Ernest Gellner (1995), Encountering Nation-
alism, London: Polity. These reforms include "the 
hat revolution", "the reform of attire", "the adop-
tion of a civil code", "the alphabet reform', and 
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longer possible to define the Turkish political 
landscape purely on the basis of the secularist 
versus anti-secularist axis. With the multiparty 
system, the emergence of the liberal vision of 
Westernisation and modernisation presented a 
serious alternative to the Kemalist principle of 
étatism and populism.  At the same time, with 
the rise of the New Left, the emergence of the 
socialist vision challenged the non-class based 
populist image which had been used to define 
Turkish society as an organic totality. How-
ever, these challenges did not lead to a signifi-
cant transformation of state identity.  Nor did 
they give rise to a radical rupture in the per-
formance of Kemalist nationalism in giving 
meaning to the making of modern Turkey.  
It was by then clear that Turkish modernisa-
tion should involve some elements of eco-
nomic and political liberalism, but this did not 
alter the dominant role of the state and its 
strong nature vis-à-vis society. The effective 
instruments of formal democracy were estab-
lished with the transition to multi-party and 
parliamentary democracy in Turkey. There 
were now free and recursive elections, and the 
opposition parties were able to criticise the 
governing party or the governing coalition. 
The military coups of 1960 and 1980 were 
both short lived with relatively smooth transi-
tions to civilian rule. However, the establish-
ment of formal democracy proved to be in-
adequate to resolve the problems of the coun-
try.  
 
The 1980 coup nonetheless brought about a 
radical rupture in the making of modern Tur-
key, the impact of which was deeply felt at 
each and every level of Turkish society. At the 
economic level, the goal of industrialisation 
was decisively shifted from import-
substitution to export-promotion, and much 
more emphasis was placed on market forces. 
The crucial point here is that since export-
promotion meant adaptation to the interna-
tional division of labour, the shift in industri-
alisation was in fact the transformation of 
Kemalism via laissez-faire, which however 
contradicted the Kemalist image of the or-
ganic state. While serving to create a secure 
ground for the liberal restructuring of eco-
nomic life, the 1980 coup also ironically cre-
ated the ground for a new idea of the state 
which could replace the Kemalist republican 
populist state, the existence of which the mili-
tary was supposed to protect. Indeed, the 1980 
coup resulted in the transformation of state 
identity from radical secularism to what has 
been termed neo-republicanism.
5 By incorpo-
rating Islamic discourse and implicitly umma 
(a community of believers who are united by 
the same Islamic faith) as its model of social 
organization, and also by abandoning the radi-
cal secularism of the early republic to secure 
its popular support and to open up the domes-
tic market to Islamic capital, the post-1980 
military regime weakened the very conditions 
of the existence of Kemalist nationalism and 
the republican state. 
 
The use of Islamic discourse and its notion of 
umma were considered by the military regime 
to be a temporary and short-term pragmatic 
strategy to restructure the political system and 
to restore the performative power of the Ke-
malist republican state.
6 However, such a con-
tradictory move led to unintended conse-
quences. The first was that in the 1983 na-
tional election, which marked the transition to 
civilian rule, the neo-liberal Motherland Party 
came to power despite the resistance of the 
post-1980 coup military regime. The military 
supported the Nationalist Democracy Party, 
which had been formed as the "state party" of 
the post-1980 coup regime. This indicated the 
crisis in the capacity the state to carry out the 
Kemalist vision.  
 
The regime's temporary and pragmatic appeal 
to the Islamic discourse became one of the 
enabling factors for the emergence and re-
emergence of Islamic organisations within 
both state and civil society as political parties, 
or as tarikats (the religious brotherhoods), and 
also for their increasing strength within the 
Turkish political landscape. While the re-
gime’s objective of depoliticisation was tar-
geting the discourses of the left-right axis, 
                                                                                                 
5See Faruk Birtek and Binnaz Toprak (1993), “The 
Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal Reconstruc-
tion and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey”, 
Praxis International, No. 13, p. 194, July. 
6Interestingly enough, the use of Islamic identity 
by the military regime in the form of the Turkish-
Islam synthesis, in order to depoliticise society and 
eliminate the Left-discourse from the political 
sphere, which contributed to the resurgence of Is-
lamic identity as a political force, ended in 1997, 
when the National Security Council declared that 
Islamic fundamentalism constitutes a fundamental 
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whose modus operandi were not directed at 
the essential identity of Kemalist nationalism, 
it gave rise to discourses aiming primarily at 
dismantling that identity. Thus, the attempted 
depoliticisation brought into existence once 
again the secularist versus anti-secularist axis. 
 
The search for a political community both 
outside the terrain of and as a response to the 
Kemalist vision was one of the significant 
themes of Turkish politics in the 1990s. The 
political landscape was characterised by a 
clash between the discourse of progress and 
secularism versus the discourse of traditional-
ism and anti-secularism, as well the emer-
gence of the ethnic issues centred on the 
Kurdish question, whose activities ranged 
from the politics of identity to PKK terrorism.   
 
This intersection between the decline of the 
hegemony of Kemalist nationalism and the 
rise of Islamic discourse was crucial to the 
crisis of identity that was then taking place in 
Turkish political life. This could be consid-
ered to be a positive development, insofar as 
the emergence of alternative visions of mod-
ernity might be an indicator of multi-
culturalism and pluralism. However, the Is-
lamic resurgence was mainly the outcome of 
the ‘weak state consensus’, which was created 
through neo-liberalism, and which generated a 
clash between the Western and the Islamic 
visions of modernity.  To the extent that the 
weak state consensus aims at minimising state 
power rather than democratising it, it could 
not provide for the democratic regulation of 
the state/society relations, in which Islamic 
identity acts not as the essence of an alterna-
tive vision of society, but as an identity among 
others in a multi-cultural, plural setting. 
 
The main conclusion from the impasse of 
Turkish politics in the 1990s, was the follow-
ing. Democracy could not only open possibili-
ties for the articulation of essentialist claims to 
identity, but could also, on the contrary, lead 
to strategies against essentialism, nationalism 
and religious communitarianism. What was 
most needed in Turkey as it approached the 
new millennium was the building of a democ-
ratic consensus between state and civil soci-
ety. 
 
Driving Forces of Turkish Democratisation 
in the 2000s 
 
Since 2000, it has become possible to observe 
five crucial developments (international and 
national) that have generated extremely im-
portant, if not system-transforming changes in 
state-societal relations in Turkey. These have 
forced political and state elites to come to 
terms with the fact that democracy is not only 
a normatively good system of governance, but 
also constitutes a valuable strategic and politi-
cal device to enable any country to be strong 
and stable in its homeland and in international 
relations. These developments have also cre-
ated an adequate ground for the solution of the 
paradox that has described the process of the 
making and the remaking of modern Turkey. 
 
The changing Turkey-EU relations since 
1999. Since the Helsinki Summit of 1999, 
when Turkey was granted a status of a candi-
date country for full membership, Turkey-EU 
relations have gained in ‘certainty’. This has 
forced the political and state actors to focus on 
democracy, since the candidate country status 
was requiring Turkey to fulfil the Copenhagen 
political criteria. This process still continues, 
and Turkey takes further measures to consoli-
date its democracy to get a starting date for 
negotiations.  What is important here is that 
the more that Turkey-EU relations have 
gained ‘certainty’ over time, the more Turkish 
politics have come to terms with the fact that 
democracy should be the only game in town. 
 
The February 2001 financial crisis and Tur-
key-IMF relations. As the Turkish economy 
collapsed in February 2001 and generated 
devastating and tragic impacts on the country, 
the need to restructure state-economy relations 
became very apparent. Although the crisis 
appeared to be economic and financial, it was 
in fact a crisis of governance, which has oc-
curred as a result of the populist, clientalist 
and corruption-producing nature of Turkish 
politics. For this reason, the strong-economy 
program, prepared in accordance with the 
structural adjustment program of the IMF, had 
as its first aim to restructure the state through 
freeing the economy from Turkish politics. 
Thus, it had become clear to political and eco-
nomic actors that without a strong and stable 
economy, Turkey faced drastic problems, for 
which the viable solution is to democratise NO. 8 / AUGUST 2004 | 69 
 
both the state and its governing relations with 
society.  
 
The November 2002 elections and the AKP 
government. On the evening of 3 November 
2002, as the final vote count came in, an elec-
toral earthquake shook Turkish politics. The 
three parties that had formed the coalition 
government after the 1999 elections, as well 
as two opposition parties, failed to pass the 10 
per cent national threshold and found them-
selves left outside the parliament. The election 
results demonstrated popular feeling that the 
ineffective and undemocratic governing struc-
ture based on economic populism, clientalism, 
corruption and democratic deficiencies had 
run its course, and that a strong single-party 
government with institutional and societal 
support could make Turkey a democratic and 
economically stable country. The AKP gov-
ernment has indeed created political stability 
in Turkey, and has made a number of impor-
tant legal and constitutional changes necessary 
for meeting the requirements of the Copenha-
gen political criteria. 
 
The Iraq war in 2003 and Turkish-American 
relations. The September 11 terrorist attacks 
have generated consequences for the world 
much beyond the killing around 3000 innocent 
people. The unilateral declaration of the US-
led global war on terrorism, aiming at revital-
ising the international politics on the basis of 
the normative and strategic primacy of secu-
rity issues as opposed to global social justice 
problems, has not only concretised itself as 
war. It also unearthed the underlying problems 
of the key international institutions, such as 
the UN and the NATO, created a split in the 
process of European integration, and divided 
the world into those who are the friends of the 
US and those who are against the war on ter-
rorism.  
 
Turkey has not been immune from this proc-
ess, and this became clearer as the US em-
barked on its war against Iraq, and occupied 
the country in order to remove the Saddam 
Hussein tyranny. Turkey with its border with 
Iraq found itself subjected to the military and 
political demands from the Bush Administra-
tion to deploy its military in its South Eastern 
regions. Turkey’s rejection of this demand, 
with its famous parliamentary decision of 1 
March 2003, obviously created big problems 
in Turkey-US relations. What has become ap-
parent, beyond its decision keep out of the war 
and occupation, is that as long as Turkey does 
not solve its own Kurdish problem, it will face 
security problems from Kurdish tribal forces 
in Northern Iraq. This in turn means Turkey 
will remain very hesitant towards the political 
future of Iraq involving, as a likely scenario, a 
federal system in which the Northern part will 
be governed by the Kurds. The war on Iraq 
has thus made the political and state elite real-
ise that only a democratic Turkey willing to 
solve its problems stemming from the ques-
tions of identity and difference, most con-
cretely the Kurdish question, would be strong 
enough to face up to the increasingly prob-
lematic structure of the Middle East region in 
general and the post-war Iraq in particular. 
 
The role of civil society: In addition to these 
international and national changes, there have 
been strong societal calls for the further de-
mocratisation of relations between the state, 
society and the individual. Since 2000 most of 
the civil society organizations have made such 
calls, and in doing so have shown their sup-
port of Turkey-EU relations.  Strong eco-
nomic actors, such as the Turkish Industrialist 
and Businessman Organisation (TUSİAD), the 
Independent Industrialist and Businessman 
Organisation (MUSİAD) and the region-based 
and province-based Industrialist and Busi-
nessman Organisations (the SİADs) have sup-
ported Turkey’s entry into the EU and initi-
ated lobbying-based activities for this end. 
They have voiced the need for more democ-
racy in Turkey and recognised the role of the 
EU as international anchor for democratisa-
tion. Similarly, a number of civil society or-
ganisations and think-tanks operating in vari-
ous fields have worked in their own ways for 
further democratisation and modernisation. 
Civil society has become an important ele-
ment of Turkish politics not only through its 
discourse of democratisation but also by its 
associational activities.  
 
All these changes - Turkey-EU relations, Tur-
key-IMF relations, the AKP single-majority 
government, Turkish-American relations and 
the increasing importance of civil society - are 
together making Turkish modernity more so-
cietal, liberal, plural and multi-cultural, as 
well as of transforming Turkish democracy 
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deepened democratic mode of governance.   
However, the current Turkey-EU process of 
political conditionality appears to be most sig-
nificant for societal modernisation and democ-
ratic consolidation.   
 
The EU-driven Political Agenda 
 
By making basic norms of liberal democracy 
the sine qua non condition for membership – 
its most important possible incentive and re-
ward -, the EU has developed its policy of 
‘conditionality’ as an instrument to transform 
the governing structures, economy and civil 
society of the candidate countries, initially of 
Central and Eastern Europe. The major in-
struments of conditionality were ‘gate-
keeping’ along with ‘bench-marking’ and 
‘monitoring’.
7 Hence, the EU institutions de-
cided on whether or not to give the green light 
to the different stages along the accession 
process which, in the case of Central and East 
European countries, consisted of privileged 
access to trade and aid, signing and imple-
menting enhanced association agreements, the 
starting of accession negotiations, the opening 
and closing of thirty-one chapters of the ac-
quis, signing of the Accession Treaty, ratify-
ing the Accession Treaty and finally, entering 
the EU.
8 Benchmarking and monitoring were 
undertaken by yearly ‘Progress Reports’ out-
lining the steps taken by the candidate coun-
tries in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, and 
‘Accession Partnerships’ listing short and me-
dium-term recommendations to achieve that 
end. The Commission has also supported 
these mechanisms through a significant 
amount of financial aid and technical assis-
tance. This has allowed the EU to offer re-
sources and legitimation to some actors and 
constrain the behaviour of others in the do-
mestic sphere. It has influenced the democra-
tisation process of candidate countries primar-
ily by empowering reformist elements in soci-
                                                                                                 
7 Grabbe, Heather (2001), ‘How does Europeanisa-
tion Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Dif-
fusion and Diversity’, Journal of European Public 
Policy, vol.8, no.6, pp.1013-1031. 
8 Noutcheva, Gergana et al. (2004) ‘Europeaniza-
tion and Secessionist Conflicts: Concepts and 
Theories’, in Bruno Coppieters et al., Europeaniza-
tion and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from 
the European Periphery, Ghent: Academia Press, 
pp. 1-50. 
ety and by altering the domestic opportunity 
structure.
9         
  
The Helsinki Summit of December 1999 
caused a significant shift in the EU’s policy 
towards Turkey by declaring it a candidate 
country and by subjecting it to the same for-
mal mechanisms used for the Central and East 
European countries to guide and measure pro-
gress on the Copenhagen criteria. The Euro-
pean Commission published the first Acces-
sion Partnership in March 2000, which was 
followed by the preparation of the Turkish 
‘National Program for the Adoption of the 
Acquis’ by the Turkish authorities in March 
2001.  
Immediately following the approval of the 
National Program, the silence on political re-
form was broken with a record number of 
thirty-four amendments made to the Constitu-
tion in October 2001. The amendments were 
not restricted to political rights, but extended 
over a large area of socio-political life. Al-
though most of these amendments dealt with 
matters of detail or were simply changes in 
language that did not create a new legal situa-
tion, some of them were real constitutional 
reforms, such as the shortening of pre-trial 
detention periods, the limitation of the death 
penalty to times of war and terrorist crimes, 
changes that made the prohibition and dissolu-
tion of political parties more difficult, and ex-
pansion of the freedom of association and 
strengthening of civil authority in the National 
Security Council. After the constitutional 
amendments, the new Civil Code entered into 
force on 1 January 2002, introducing signifi-
cant changes in the area of gender equality, 
protection of children and vulnerable persons. 
It established new practices and institutions in 
Turkish Law, such as pre-nuptial contracts on 
the management of family assets.    
 
There followed three ‘Harmonisation Pack-
ages’
10 in the wake of the Copenhagen Euro-
pean Council of December 2002. These not 
only aimed to translate the preceding constitu-
tional amendments into action by harmonising 
Turkish Law with them, but also introduced 
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further reforms particularly in the fields of 
human rights/protection of minorities, free-
dom of expression and freedom of association. 
The most notable of these were the easing of 
restrictions on broadcasting in and the right to 
learn ‘different languages and dialects tradi-
tionally used by citizens in their lives’, namely 
Kurdish. These measures culminated in the 
Copenhagen decision of December 2002 that 
‘if the European Council in December 2004, 
on the basis of a report and a recommendation 
from the Commission, decides that Turkey 
fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the 
EU will open negotiations without delay’.  
 
This decision was received with considerable 
disappointment in Turkey as general expecta-
tions had been raised in the country by the 
political elites as well as by the media that the 
decision to actually launch accession negotia-
tions with Turkey would have been taken at 
that Summit. However, contrary to some theo-
ries circulated by the more fervent Euroscep-
tics in Turkey, this disillusionment has not led 
to a slowdown in the reform process, nor has 
it led to the abandonment of the ‘EU Project’- 
as it is often referred to in Turkey. In fact just 
the opposite happened. The Copenhagen 
Summit has fostered a ‘sense of certainty’ in 
EU-Turkey relations by giving a specific date 
for the beginning of accession negotiations.
11 
Even though the year 2004 was a conditional 
date, it was nevertheless a significant step 
forward, as it provided Turkey with the pros-
pect that full EU membership was a real pos-
sibility.
12 In the meanwhile, the EU also de-
cided to significantly increase the amount of 
financial assistance to Turkey. Pre-accession 
financial assistance would reach 250 million 
Euros in 2004, 300 million Euros in 2005 and 
500 million Euros in 2006 to ‘help Turkey 
prepare to join the EU as quickly as possi-
ble’.
13 
                                                                                                 
11Öniş, Ziya and E. Fuat Keyman (2003), ‘Turkey 
at the Polls: A New Path Emerges’, Journal of 
Democracy, vol. 14, no.2, pp. 95-107.  
12Keyman, E. Fuat and Ziya Öniş (2004), ‘Hel-
sinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the 
New Europe and the Turkish State’, in Mehmet 
Ugur and Nergis Canefe (eds.) Turkey and Euro-
pean Integration: Accession Prospects and Issues, 
London: Routledge. 
13European Union European Commission Repre-
sentation to Turkey, ‘EU Funded Programmes in 
Turkey: 2003-2004’, December 2003 (accessible 
The strengthening of the credibility of EU 
conditionality was immediately reflected in 
the subsequent reform packages adopted by 
the Turkish government. Four comprehensive 
sets of democratic reforms entered into force 
in the year 2003, aiming to improve the most 
criticised aspects of Turkish democracy, such 
as limits to freedom of speech and expression, 
freedom of association, torture and mistreat-
ment along with the strong influence of the 
military on domestic politics.  
With the two democratisation packages that 
entered into force in January 2003, the Law on 
Political Parties was further liberalised, the 
fight against torture strengthened, freedom of 
the press further expanded, the procedures for 
setting up associations eased and the restric-
tions applying in the acquisition of property 
by non-Muslim community foundations abol-
ished. Retrial of cases on the basis of the deci-
sions taken by the European Court of Human 
Rights was also made possible, paving the 
way for the retrial of some former Kurdish 
nationalists such as Leyla Zana.  
 
The sixth reform package that entered into 
force in mid-July 2003 became famous for the 
lifting of the infamous Article 8 of the Anti-
Terror Law, with expansion of the freedom of 
speech, abolition of the death penalty and ex-
pansion of broadcasting rights in Kurdish. It 
was the final set of democratic reforms, how-
ever, which entered into force at the end of 
July 2003, that attracted the most attention, 
due to its emphasis on strengthening the civil-
ian control of the military, as well as the addi-
tional measures to strengthen the fight against 
torture and the exercise of fundamental free-
doms. 
 
In May 2004, there was another set of 
amendments to the Constitution, some of 
which consisted of harmonising the Constitu-
tion with the previous democratisation pack-
ages. However, more significant amendments 
regarding the further civilianisation of Turkish 
politics, reform of the judiciary and freedom 
of press were also approved by the Parliament. 
The subordination of domestic law to interna-
tional law in the area of fundamental rights 
and liberties was also now secured in the 
Turkish Constitution. The eighth democratisa-
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tion package adopted in July 2004 resolved 
yet another long-criticised issue, repealing the 
provision that allowed for the nomination of a 
member of the High Audio-Visual Board 
(RTÜK) by the Secretariat General of the Na-
tional Security Council. The new Penal Code 
and the Law on Associations, currently pend-
ing in the Parliament are also expected to be 
adopted before the Commission Report in Oc-
tober. Most of the reforms in the past were 
passed immediately after or before crucial 
European Council meetings, displaying once 
again the clear drive of the prospect of mem-
bership.     
In addition to legislative changes, the gov-
ernment has also taken specific steps geared 
towards securing effective implementation, 
the most notable of which was the establish-
ment of Human Rights Boards in cities and 
provinces as well as a special Reform Moni-
toring Group composed of various representa-
tives of selected ministries and government 
bodies.   
 
As the prospect of EU membership and the 
associated conditionality became more ‘real’, 
it became impossible to separate the domestic 
and international spheres from each other. By 
helping to create a ‘strong language of rights’ 
in the country, the EU started to play an im-
portant role in furthering the change in state-
society relations and provided legitimacy for 
civil society organisations calling for a more 
democratic Turkey and demanding recogni-
tion of cultural and civil rights/freedoms.
14 
Similarly, the EU has also provided increasing 
legitimacy for the governing party AKP’s 
heavy emphasis on democracy and the protec-
tion of individual rights and freedoms, as was 
reflected in the speed of political reforms after 
the Party came to power in November 2002. 
Democracy as advocated by the EU became 
the ‘catchword and the strategy through which 
the former Islamists seek to change the system 
at the same time as they change themselves’.
15  
 
                                                                                                 
14 See Keyman, E. Fuat and Ahmet İçduygu 
(2003), ‘Globalization, Civil Society and Citizen-
ship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries and Dis-
courses’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 7, no.2, pp. 219-
233. 
15 Bazoglu Sezer, Duygu (2002), ‘The Electoral 
Victory of Reformist Islamists in Secular Turkey’, 
International Spectator, vol. 37, no .4, pp .7-21.  
Another reason that facilitated compliance by 
Turkey was the perceived decrease in the 
costs of these measures for the mili-
tary/security establishment, which used to be 
particularly high in the 90s. This was specifi-
cally the case for reforms related to minority 
rights. The political costs of compliance were 
reduced with the virtual end of Kurdish terror-
ism in late 90s, weakening the previous oppo-
sition of the military/security establishment 
and strengthening the view that national unity 
can be preserved through further democratisa-




Recent years have clearly seen substantial im-
provements in Turkish democracy. Nobody 
today questions whether the basic institutions 
of government – the parliamentary legislature, 
the government and presidency – are function-
ing democratically. Reforms recently under-
taken have been addressing long-criticised 
aspects of Turkish democracy, particularly the 
role of military in politics, respect for human 
rights, protection of minorities and the judicial 
system. Yet while in legislative and institu-
tional terms a lot has been achieved and few 
challenges remain, there is still much to be 
done regarding implementation.  
 
For example, in the field of torture and ill-
treatment by the police and in penal estab-
lishments, there are still legislative measures 
to be taken, the most significant of which are 
the lifting of the statute of limitations for such 
crimes, removal of law enforcement officials 
from active duty pending the outcome of in-
vestigation and abolishing the practice of giv-
ing a copy of medical reports to security offi-
cers. Annulment of Article 159 of the Penal 
Code and a comprehensive reform of the Law 
on Political Parties would constitute funda-
mental steps in further expanding the freedom 
of expression. With respect to the freedom of 
association, the draft Law on Associations 
introduces the legislative remedies for long 
standing obstacles regarding government ap-
proval mechanisms and cooperation with for-
eign associations. The draft, however, does 
not touch upon the broad authority of the Inte-
rior Ministry and government officials to in-
spect premises and records of associations. 
This would require further legislative action in 
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The issue of the protection of minorities is no 
longer a ‘taboo’ subject in Turkish political 
life. There are serious efforts to improve the 
lives of minorities in Turkey. Regarding non-
Muslim minorities, the remaining problems in 
the field of property rights for community 
foundations and religious freedoms are re-
solvable through the correct and full applica-
tion of the provisions of the Treaty of 
Lausanne. The other minority groups, particu-
larly the Kurds, would benefit greatly from the 
extension of cultural rights such as the grant-
ing of local broadcasting rights, the introduc-
tion of optional language classes in public 
schools upon demand and the lifting of restric-
tions on expressions of cultural identity. In 
order to ensure effective implementation of 
such measures for all minorities, it is also nec-
essary to undertake a gradual shift from the 
traditional interpretation of the monolithic 
Turkish nation to a redefined notion of politi-
cal community which requires a more inclu-
sive and truly civic concept of citizenship. 
 
The guarantors of the rule of law and of re-
form process, the judiciary, has also under-
gone significant reforms, the most notable of 
which was the recent abolition of the State 
Security Courts that have in the past dealt with 
crimes against the state. Future reforms should 
focus on ensuring proper training and working 
conditions for the members of the judiciary, 
and ensuring its full independence from the 
executive. Implementation here is a major 
challenge that will take many years.  
 
The process of change already extends 
throughout society, from the policemen who 
are actually now following the newly opened 
Kurdish languages courses, to the civil ser-
vants who revise the implementing regula-
tions, the military which decreases its spend-
ing upon the request of the civilian power, the 
judges and the public prosecutors who give 
increasing references to the European Con-
vention of Human Rights, and the majority of 
the citizenry who support the European inte-
gration process. Further training and education 
coupled with the continued and credible appli-
cation of EU conditionality would secure the 
path of reform which in the eyes of many is as 
revolutionary as those achieved by Mustafa 
Kemal and his followers in the 20s and 30s. 
 
Given the pace of reforms in the last 3 years, 
the remaining legislative and institutional 
tasks could be achieved in a relatively short 
period of time by the Turkish authorities. 
What requires more energy and more time are 
efforts geared towards changing the mindsets 
of the public officials, in particular the police 
force, bureaucracy, military, public prosecu-
tors, the judges and the citizenry of the coun-
try. This is particularly the case for military-
civilian relations where the full implementa-
tion of the comprehensive reforms requires 
changes in the assessments of the military’s 
role, both in the eyes of the public and of the 
military itself.  
 
In the case of Turkey, the progress achieved 
so far suggests that for the existing reforms to 
be entrenched and further proceed, the EU 
should follow the same path as for Romania 
and Bulgaria. It is generally recognised that 
the EU opened negotiations with these coun-
tries before they fully respected the Copenha-
gen political criteria, with high degrees of cor-
ruption and malfunctioning public administra-
tions.
16 Also one may bear in mind the case of 
Latvia, where according to a report by the 
European Parliament in February 2004 there 
remain significant problems regarding the 
situation of its Russian minority. The opening 
of accession negotiations with Turkey on the 
grounds of ‘sufficient progress’, to be fol-
lowed by regular assessments of compliance 
with the political criteria upon closing of a 
certain number of previously agreed chapters, 
is plausible.  
 
In the case of Turkey, the adoption costs of 
the ultimate transformation that will occur on 
the path to eventual accession still seem to be 
perceived as high, particularly by the mili-
tary/security establishment, those at the ex-
treme left and right of the political spectrum, 
and even for a majority of ‘social democ-
rats’
17. The costs are perceived to arise from 
the pooling of sovereignty, decentralisation 
and increased recognition of multiple identi-
                                                                                                 
16 Emerson, Michael, ‘Has Turkey Fulfilled the 
Copenhagen Political Criteria?’, CEPS Policy 
Brief, April 2004, no. 48, p. 2. 
17 Schimmelfennig, Frank et. al. (2003), ‘Costs, 
Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU 
Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and 
Turkey’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 
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ties, which comprise the defining traits of 
European integration. These processes come 
into direct conflict with the authoritarian vi-
sions of nationalism based on a single identity, 
and lead the members of the anti-EU coalition 
to regard major political reform along these 
lines as a major threat to the unity of the na-
tion.
18 Although such resistance was also pre-
sent in a majority of the Central and East 
European countries, the levels are higher in 
the Turkish context due to ‘historical legacies 
and the peculiarities of her nation-building 
experience’.
19 There is no complete overthrow 
of the existing system in the Turkish case, 
making it difficult to achieve reform from 
within the existing structures.
20  
 
A credible and consistent policy of condition-
ality is thus necessary to empower reformist 
elements in Turkish society. In cases where 
the incentive of membership offered by the 
EU requires the adoption of principles per-
ceived as threatening for the ruling elite, the 
only means for the EU to bring about change 
are through direct democracy promotion and 
mobilisation at both elite and the mass level. 
As an example, this indeed worked in the case 
of Slovakia, in overcoming the resistance of 
the Mečiar leadership.
21 In addition the EU 
also needs to continue offering aid and assis-
tance to pro-democratic forces in Turkish so-
ciety and to build transnational networks for 
change. Close and direct links with civil soci-
ety and the reformist elite are essential for fur-
ther change to occur. Determined attempts to 
change the perceptions of the elite, particu-
larly in the security forces and the judiciary, 
would also prove beneficial. All these meas-
ures would also be helpful in fostering ‘so-
cialisation’ into European norms and values.  
                                                                                                 
18 Öniş, Ziya (2003), ‘Domestic Politics, Interna-
tional Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-
EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era’, Turkish 
Studies, vol. 4, no.1, pp. 9-34. 
19 Ibid, p. 5. 
20 See Muiznieks, Nils and Ilze Brands Kehris 
(2003), ‘The European Union, Democratization, 
and Minorities in Latvia’ in Paul J.Kubicek (ed.), 
The European Union and Democratization, Lon-
don: Routledge, pp. 31-55.  
21 See Krause, D. Kevin (2003), ‘The Ambivalent 
Influence of the European Union on Democratiza-
tion in Slovakia’ in Paul J.Kubicek (ed.), The 
European Union and Democratization, London: 
Routledge, pp. 56-86. 
We conclude with a suggestion, based on two 
words – fairness and objectivity. For the deci-
sion about Turkey’s readiness for the full ac-
cession negotiations to be taken fairly, it has 
to have an objective basis, which can only 
mean the capacity and willingness of Turkey 
to meet the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey’s 
place in Europe should not be based on reli-
gious or geographical references. Instead, 
Turkey’s identity and its compatibility with 
the Europeans norms of democracy and eco-
nomic modernisation should be judged on the 
basis of an objective, historical and analytical 
reading of modern Turkey.  
 
The history of modern Turkey since 1923 has 
been one of modernisation and democratisa-
tion. However, this history has had, and con-
tinues to have, its problems in linking together 
modernity and democracy. Yet Turkey’s pro-
found political identity as a secular parliamen-
tary democracy appears indeed to be compati-
ble with European norms of democracy and 
liberal economy. That is evidenced in the fact 
that the more Turkey has attempted to meet 
the Copenhagen criteria, the more it has con-
solidated its democracy and made its moder-
nity liberal, plural and multi-cultural.  Turkey 
has achieved this in a short period not only 
because of the strong political will to do so, 
but also because it has already established the 
institutions and norms of democracy and 
modernity. 
 
In this sense, we suggest that, rather than cul-
turalist and essentialist discourses of Europe, 
which privilege religion and geography over 
universal norms of democracy and liberal 
economy, the principle of fairness and objec-
tivity should be the basis of the EU’s decision 
about Turkey. Fairness and objectivity have 
the potential to create a reciprocal relationship 
between Turkey and the EU, in which both 
parties have mutual benefits. While accepting 
Turkey as a full member of the EU would 
demonstrate that the process of European in-
tegration and its enlargement operates on the 
basis of universal norms rather than religion 
or geography, the project of Europeanisation 
in Turkey makes a significant contribution to 
the process of democratic consolidation and 
societal modernisation. With its secular mod-
ernity and mostly Muslim identity, Turkey can 
contribute to the reshaping of the political 
identity of Europe as a multi-cultural space NO. 8 / AUGUST 2004 | 75 
 
governed by the universal norms of democ-
racy and liberal economy. With such a politi-
cal identity, Europe will for its part reshape 
international relations as a democratic space 
of world governance, which our extremely 
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WOMEN IN TURKEY AND THE EU 
 
Turkey’s progress towards EU membership 
is an important catalyst in empowering 
Turkish women and generating positive ef-
fects on the status of Muslim women in 
Europe and beyond. 
 
Turkish women’s achievements for gender 
equality dates back to the Ottoman Empire. 
With the legal codifications of 1836 and con-
stitutional reform movements of 1876 and 
1908, women became more vigorous in claim-
ing their rights. Accordingly, they dissemi-
nated the debate on gender equality and indi-
vidual rights to public through their associa-
tions and by publications in daily papers.  
 
With the foundation of the Republic in 1923, 
the pace of the modernisation process of the 
society increased. Secularisation, adoption of 
civil code and the enactment of law on the 
unity of education contributed positively to 
women’s status in society. Women’s access to 
education and admission to public professions 
were substantial changes. In 1940s the per-
centage of women studying medicine, law, 
engineering, which are mainly seen as profes-
sions for men, was 42 %. Women acquired the 
right to vote in 1934 and in the next elections 
18 women were elected to the Turkish parlia-
ment. 
 
Post-1980, academics, professionals, journal-
ists and students raised consciousness on gen-
der equality by challenging the patriarchal 
structures in some segments of the society. 
They organised campaigns against domestic 




cles of the Civil Code and the Penal Code, as 
well as founding the Women’s Library and 
Women’s Shelter and several other associa-
tions to defend women rights.  
 
One of these associations, KA-DER (Associa-
tion for the Support and Training of Women 
Candidates) promotes women’s representation 
in the parliament with a view to end gender 
inequality in politics.   
 
KAGIDER is an influential association, 
which promotes women entrepreneurship 
(www.kagider.org).  
 
It is also interesting to stress that in some sec-
tors such as banking, engineering, legal, and 
the medical, the presence of  Turkish women 
is among the highest in Europe. 
 
The Women Initiative for Turkey in the EU 
was founded with the aim of contributing to 
Turkey’s accession process to the EU. The 
broad perspective of this initiative is to promote 
women’s status in Turkey through better coop-
eration with its counterparts, stimulated by the 
launch of accession negotiations with the EU.  
 
Problems related to gender equality and 
women’s rights within the social, cultural and 
political sphere of a society are still a problem 
in Turkey. Women in the EU face discrimina-
tion and have to struggle for their cause as well.  
In this context, status of women in Europe will 
be analysed in the below mentioned seminars: 
 
“Raising Mutual Understanding: 
Women in Turkey and the EU” 
organised by KA-DER with the support of Eczacı-
başı Group, on September 13, 2004, 





“Comparative Perceptions of Women’s Role 
in the EU and Turkey” 
organised by Women Initiative, on October 13, 2004 
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Introductory Note from CEPS 
 
This issue of CEPS Turkey in Europe Monitor 
presents the CEPS-EFPF working paper titled 
“Turkey and the European Budget: Prospects 
and Issues”, prepared by Kemal Derviş, 
Daniel Gros, Faik Öztrak and Yusuf Işik, in 
cooperation with Firat Bayar, within the scope 
of the joint CEPS-EFPF Project, “Strategy for 
EU and Turkey in the Pre-Accession Period”. 
The project is realised with the financial con-
tributions of the Open Society Institute of Is-
tanbul, Akbank, Coca Cola and Finansbank. 
CEPS acknowledges the kind support for the 
production of the Turkey in Europe Monitor 
provided by EU Information Group of Turkey 
(ABIG).The paper argues that although it is 
highly speculative to calculate the cost of 
Turkish membership for the incumbent mem-
bers due to changes that both Turkey and the 
EU are going through, there are ways to – at 
least to some extent – to calculate the cost that 
Turkey as a fully integrated EU member would 
represent to the budget.  
 
 
The first possibility is to calculate what Turkey 
would receive under the Common Agricultural 
Policy and the Structural Funds, as a full 
member today. The second approach would be 
to calculate what the EU would have to pay by 
a likely accession date such as 2015, under 
current rules. Although the authors are aware 
of the fact that the elaborated numbers may be 
altered, they reach the conclusion that net 
transfers would have a significant impact in 
Turkey, while being a manageable amount for 
the EU budget.  
10 working papers of the Project (justice and 
home affairs, democratic governance, foreign 
policy, trade, banking, agriculture, energy, 
growth, budgetary implications, monetary and 
fiscal policy) and the Final Report that out-
lines the major findings and the conclusions of 
the Project are now available at www.ceps.be. 
(see the end for the full list of working papers 
and further information on how to purchase 
the final report). 
 
Michael Emerson and Senem Aydın 
 
 
Turkey and the European Budget: 
Prospects and Issues 
Kemal Derviş, Daniel Gros, Faik Öztrak and Yusuf Işik 
in cooperation with Firat Bayar
1 
The factors that will determine the speed of convergence of Turkish incomes to EU averages are dis-
cussed in Working Paper No. 8 of this same series. We present here a brief discussion of the impact 
Turkish membership would have on the EU budget. How much would Turkish membership cost the 
then incumbent members? This is a question that is at the same time straightforward and impossible to 
answer. It is impossible in the sense that the EU is evolving constantly so that it is difficult to predict 
with any precision what the financial consequences of accession of Turkey, in, say, 2014, would be. 
However, it is straightforward to calculate how much Turkey would cost the EU budget if it were to 
enter under present rules. 
                                                                                                 
1 Kemal Dervis is former Minister for Economic Affairs, Member of Parliament and Member of the Coordina-
tion Board, EDP. Daniel Gros is Director at CEPS. Faik Oztrak is former Undersecretary of the Turkish Treas-
ury and Visiting Professor at Middle East Technical University. Yusuf Isik is Advisor to Kemal Dervis, and 
former Head of the Strategic Research Department of the State Planning Organisation. Firat Bayar is former 
Associate of the Turkish Treasury and Ph.D candidate at Middle East Technical University. NO. 9 / SEPTEMBER 2004 | 77 
One may be tempted to argue that the transfers 
from the EU budget to Turkey will simply be 
whatever member countries agree that these 
transfers should be, because they do indeed 
under the current treaties all have to agree. On 
the other hand, it would not be possible to ne-
gotiate membership with any Turkish govern-
ment if Turkey is not able to get a ‘fair’ deal, 
where ‘fairness’ will entail some comparison 
to other countries that will have joined rela-
tively recently. The three countries on which 
Turkish negotiators are likely to focus are 
Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia, assuming that 
the first two will have joined in 2007, and 
Croatia some time thereafter. Turkey will be 
able to accept transition rules of the type ac-
cepted by the 2004 accession countries as well 
as those already accepted by Romania and 
Bulgaria. And Turkey may even be ready to 
accept a lengthening of these transition rules 
reflecting recognition of her size. Turkey will 
not accept a deal, however, which would set it 
apart from other member states in a qualitative 
and lasting fashion. Nor is it actually likely 
that the EU would propose anything signifi-
cantly less than fair to Turkey as the experi-
ence of Romania and Bulgaria suggests. The 
principle of equal treatment of member states 
is deeply ingrained in the EU’s framework – 
even when it comes to financial matters. 
A key factor limiting the degree of freedom of 
the EU budget is the fact that the financial en-
velopes are determined in a multi-annual 
framework called the ‘financial perspective’. 
The current framework, which was decided 
among the EU-15 in 2000, and thus long be-
fore the current enlargement, runs until 2006. 
The next framework, which will be negotiated 
à 25, will run until 2012. By that time Turkey 
is not likely to have already become a member 
country so that it will have only a limited in-
fluence for the following financial framework, 
which would run until 2018, Assuming acces-
sion by 2015, this would imply that the finan-
cial envelope for the first three years of Tur-
key’s membership would have been decided 
by the EU-28 (the current EU-25 plus B, R 
and HR). In this respect, the situation of Tur-
key might thus resemble that of Bulgaria and 
Romania, which are likely to join by 2007, so 
that their first years of membership will also 
be covered by a financial framework in whose 
negotiations they were not present. 
In terms of negotiations, Turkey would thus be 
fully part of the EU’s financial framework 
only during the 2018-2024 round. Given that 
for all present and former member states it 
took between 5 and 10 years before they were 
integrated into all support programmes, it is 
thus likely that Turkey will benefit fully from 
the EU’s budgetary support schemes some 
time after 2020. 
What will determine Turkey’s share in the EU 
budget of the 2020s, are the rules that will by 
then be in effect for everyone else and the 
level of development reached by the EU and 
Turkey itself. One cannot know with certainty 
what these rules will be and any long-term 
projections are therefore highly speculative. 
In reality, however, the discussion about the 
financial burden Turkey would represent for 
the EU budget usually focuses on the current 
rules. The experience with the current 
enlargement process suggests that over time 
the discussion will shift from how much it 
costs to who will bear the (minor) burden. But 
this point is still some way into the future. 
Current circumstances have another impact, 
however, in that it is usually assumed that the 
burden would have to be borne by the current 
EU-15 because it is usually assumed that most 
of the new member countries will remain net 
beneficiaries for quite some time to come. By 
the early 2020s this might no longer be the 
case, but again it is impossible to forecast with 
any precision which of the new member coun-
tries would no longer qualify for financial 
support (under current rules) by that date. 
The ‘maximum’ that Turkey would receive 
after a transition period under current rules is a 
‘starting point’ many analysts have chosen.
1 
There are two variants to this approach.  
a)  How much would Turkey receive if it 
were a fully established member today? 
b)  How much is Turkey likely to receive un-
der current rules by a likely accession 
date, e.g. 2015? 
The overall calculations are actually quite 
simple in both cases since the budget of the 
EU is dominated by two items: Structural 
Funds (destined for regions with a GDP per 
capita at PPP below 75% of the EU average) 
                                                                                                 
1 See Hughes (2004) as well as Quaisser & 
Reppegather (2004). 78 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
 
and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
The gross receipts of any member country are 
to a large extent determined by these two 
items.  
Turkey in the EU today 
If Turkey were a member country today, it 
could count on Structural Funds allocations, 
which would be capped at 4% of its GDP as 
decided at the Berlin European Council. Given 
that Turkey’s GDP has averaged around €200 
billion in recent years, this implies immedi-
ately that its allocation would be around €8 
billion annually. 
It has also been calculated that extending the 
current CAP to Turkey (with per hectare pay-
ments based on current yields) would cost 
around €9 billion. This implies that the total 
receipts of a hypothetical Turkish EU member 
today might be slightly less than €20 billion 
(Turkey would also receive funding under 
other programmes). Turkey would then also 
have to contribute as all other member states 
to the EU budget. With a current contribution 
rate of around 1% of GNP (the ceiling for the 
EU budget is 1.25% of GDP, but the EU 
spends just slightly above 1% of GDP at pre-
sent), this would mean around €2 billion annu-
ally, leading to a net financial benefit of 
around €16 billion annually. Apart from the 
fact that this approach is based on today’s 
conditions, the sum mentioned also represents 
an upper bound. 
Turkey in 2015 in an enlarged EU 
In calculating the sums Turkey would receive 
in 2015, it does not make sense to use current 
euros since both the EU and the Turkish econ-
omy are likely to grow over the next decade. 
Once again, the starting point for the Struc-
tural Funds is that the absorption limit has 
been set at 4% of the recipient’s GDP. This 
implies that one can immediately calculate the 
ceiling of what Turkey could receive under 
current rules for the Structural Funds, once 
one has an idea of the size of the Turkish 
GDP.  
Under the growth scenario presented in section 
2 above, Turkey will grow much more quickly 
than the EU over the next decade and Turkish 
GDP could reach about 4% of that of the EU-
28 GDP (at present it amounts to only around 
2%) by the middle of the next decade. This 
implies immediately that the cost of extending 
current Structural Funds to Turkey would cost 
at most 0.16% of EU-28 GDP (=0.04*0.04).  
The calculations for agriculture are potentially 
more complicated since one would have to 
guess the output structure of agriculture in 
Turkey in about a decade and then calculate to 
what extent this would change if Turkey par-
ticipates in the CAP. This would actually be an 
exceedingly complex operation as one would 
have to take into account the entire in-
put/output matrix. For example, some com-
modities (maize) are used an input in the pro-
duction of others (meat). However, this is not 
necessary as an indirect approach can yield a 
better result.  
The starting point is that Turkish farmers are 
likely to obtain at most 20% of their value 
added from the EU’s CAP, for the simple rea-
son that this is what farmers in the EU-15 ob-
tain today: the CAP costs at present amount to 
0.5% of GDP and the value added produced by 
agriculture is about 2.5% of the EU-15 GDP.  
Agriculture produces at present around 12% of 
GDP in Turkey, but taking into account that its 
share has been declining continuously over the 
last decade, a reasonable assumption might be 
that in about a decade agriculture will account 
for about 10% of Turkish GDP at the maxi-
mum. On this basis one can easily calculate 
the potential maximum cost of extending the 
present rate of support of the CAP to Turkey. 
Assuming, as before, that the Turkish econ-
omy accounts for 4% of EU GDP (and that 
agriculture contributes 10% to this), the cost of 
providing an ‘equivalent rate of support’ for 
Turkish agriculture would be 0.08% of EU-15 
GDP (=0.2*0.04=02.*0.04*0.1). To repeat, 
this is again an upper bound. Other estimates 
arrive at much lower numbers; see for example 
Quaisser and Reppegather (2004) who argue 
that the cost of extending the CAP to Turkey 
should only be around 0.045% of the EU’s 
GDP. 
The number calculated above is again an upper 
limit, as the CAP is likely to change over time, 
inter alia, because of the commitments made 
by the EU in the context of the WTO to abol-
ish exports subsidies, and the general limita-
tions the WTO imposes on various types of 
domestic agricultural subsidies in general. NO. 9 / SEPTEMBER 2004 | 79 
Moreover, it has already been agreed within 
the EU that the cost of the CAP should rise by 
less than 80% of the increase in nominal GDP. 
This implies that the cost of the CAP as a per-
centage of EU GDP has to fall over the next 
decade.
2 Depending on the overall growth rate 
of the EU, the cost of the CAP is thus likely to 
be less than 0.4% of the GDP of the enlarged 
EU once Turkey joins. Since any single coun-
try, even if it is the largest one, is not likely to 
get more than one-fourth of this sum, it is clear 
that the cost of extending tomorrow’s CAP to 
Turkey cannot be more than 0.05 to 0.1% of 
the EU’s GDP. 
The gross cost (Structural Funds plus CAP) 
together might thus amount to 0.26% of EU-
28 GDP (=0.096+0.16). Against the gross re-
ceipts, one would have to set the contribution 
that Turkey would have to make to the EU 
budget. At present, and this is unlikely to 
change any time soon, all member states con-
tribute at the same rate, or rather %of GNP, to 
the EU budget. The contribution rate is equal 
to the share of the EU budget in overall GDP. 
Assuming that the EU budget will continue to 
be limited to around 1-1.2% of GDP, this im-
plies that Turkey will have to contribute about 
1.2% of its own GDP to the EU budget. Under 
the assumptions made so far (Turkish GDP at 
about 4% of that of the EU-15), this would 
then amount to around 0.048% of EU-15. 
Table 1. Maximum budgetary cost, full mem-
bership 
  Turkey in 
today’s EU 
(in billions of 
current euros) 
Turkey 2015 in 
enlarged EU 





CAP receipts  9  0.08 
Total receipts  16  0.25 
Contributions 





16 (0.16% of 
EU GDP) 
0.20 
Source: Own calculations based on current EU budgetary 
rules and regulations. 
                                                                                                 
2 For example, with a growth rate of nominal GDP 
of 5% p.a., this rule would imply that the budget 
available for the CAP would have to fall by around 
1% (not 1 percentage point) every year). 
The  ceiling  for the net cost should thus be 
around 0.20% of EU GDP (equivalent to about 
€20 billion given today’s EU GDP of around 
€10.000 billion) under both illustrative calcu-
lations.  
Transitional arrangements 
The numbers calculated above represent the 
maximum that would be achieved only after a 
considerable transition period, as in the case of 
the new member countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe, assuming current rules. The 
immediate post-membership transfers would 
be much lower, as in the case of all new mem-
ber countries. As argued above, the experience 
of Romania and Bulgaria might be particularly 
instructive in this respect given that these two 
countries have a similar GDP per capita and it 
could thus be said that they set the benchmark 
for Turkey. Neither Romania, nor Bulgaria 
will participate in the current negotiations for 
the next financial framework, but the EU has 
already proposed a certain allocation for them 
(and the two countries have not objected), 
amounting to a total of around €15 billion at 
current prices. Since the combined population 
of these two countries is about 30 million, 
Turkey should receive about 2.3 times as 
much if it were to be treated equally on a per 
capita basis. This would then amount to about 
€35 billion over three years. All this suggests 
that for the first years of membership, transfers 
in the range €9-12 billion per annum might be 
realistic. 
The new member states from Central and 
Eastern Europe benefited also from modest 
amounts of pre-accession aid, originally under 
a programme, PHARE, whose primary justifi-
cation was to support the transition to a market 
economy, not preparation for accession. The 
PHARE funds (mostly for technical assistance 
for democracy building, etc.) were later aug-
mented by two additional programmes: 
SAPARD (support to structural change in ag-
riculture) and ISPA (infrastructure). Over the 
last years (2000-03) the total support going to, 
for example Bulgaria has been around €300 
million per annum, with about half coming 
from PHARE, one-third under ISPA and the 
remainder under SAPARD. The original justi-
fication for PHARE funding does not apply in 
the case of Turkey; but it is clear that a sub-
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building will appear needed viewed from the 
EU side.  
Since the equality of treatment is so much en-
grained in the EU approach, it is thus likely 
that as negotiations proceed a similar amount 
of financial support for the preparation for ac-
cession will become available for Turkey as 
well. Scaling the funds available for Bulgaria 
– either on a per capita or on a % of GDP basis 
– yields a similar result in that the total avail-
able for Turkey might be just a bit below €3 
billion per annum (not immediately, but after 
4-5 years). This would correspond to approxi-
mately 1-1.2% of GDP for Turkey (0.03% of 
the EU’s GDP or 2-2.5% of its budget). 
Concluding remarks 
Are figures in the range of 0.15% to at most 
0.20% of EU GDP large or small numbers? 
Compared to national government expendi-
ture, which is usually around 40-50% of GDP, 
they are negligible. However, a figure of, say, 
0.17% of EU GDP would not be negligible 
compared to the EU-budget ceiling of 1.25% 
of GDP. The current discussion whether the 
EU budget should be limited to 1 or 1.25% of 
GDP shows that sometimes even small sums 
can have a considerable political impact. It 
must be stressed, however, that all the num-
bers referred to here are highly tentative. The 
rules themselves are likely to become more 
restrictive for both Structural Funds and agri-
culture as the current discussions on reform of 
the CAP and Structural Funds show. 
Nevertheless, the projections made here appear 
realistic in terms of what is economically and 
politically likely to be feasible. Net transfers in 
the €9-12 billion range in the first post-
membership years and of about €15 to €20 
billion in the 2020s would constitute an impor-
tant amount for Turkey, a significant but man-
ageable amount for the EU budget and be neg-
ligible compared to the sum of national budg-
ets or the overall EU economy.  
The budgetary side of membership negotia-
tions is usually left to the very end because 
this is the only area with a zero sum game. 
What Turkey gains, others must pay. In the 
end, however, the numbers tell only part of the 
story. The nature of the financial package will 
depend to a large measure on how the EU has 
developed in the meantime. For a self-
confident enlarged EU that has successfully 
absorbed more than a dozen member countries 
during the first decade of the 21st century, the 
challenge of integrating Turkey into its rules 
of financial support to its weaker member 
states will be manageable, particularly if some 
of the recent member countries have in the 
meantime graduated from the need for large-
scale financial support. Sustained rapid growth 
in Turkey would be another key factor as it 
would dispel the fear that Turkey would be a 
drain on the EU budget for a long time to 
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TURKISH BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES 
by 
TÜSIAD 






TURKEY AT THE EDGE OF A NEW 
ERA: 
THE EU AND NEW TURKISH LIRA  
 
On the 6th of October the European Com-
mission will unveil the Regular Progress Re-
port and The Impact Assessment for Tur-
key. In addition, the Commission is re-
quired to provide the European Council 
with a recommendation on whether or not 
to launch the accession negotiations with 
Turkey. On the verge of these reports and 
the recommendation, the intuition of the 
European political and financial circles 
about the outcome is rather positive. Such a 
feeling might be the result of encouraging 
and clear messages conveyed by the 
Enlargement Commissioner, Günter Ver-
heugen following his monitoring visit to 
Turkey and his meeting with Prime Minis-
ter R.Tayyıp Erdoğan in Brussels.  
 
Positive prospects regarding Turkey’s EU bid 
increases the level of market confidence for 
the Turkish economy. Recently, Standard & 
Poor’s has raised Turkey’s long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit rating from B-plus 
to BB-minus and long-term local currency 




Likewise, Fitch Ratings raised the outlook for 
Turkey’s long-term foreign and local currency 




Progress in EU – Turkey relations has re-
flected positively to the Turkish macroecono- 





mic conditions leading to a sustainable stabil-
ity. As an outcome of constantly ameliorating 
economic  
performance in the last two years, Turkey has 
stepped into the “low inflation-high growth” 
era. In Turkey, investments have risen even 
with the volatile external and internal prices. 
Cooperation between Turkey and IMF contin-
ues to lead the country day by day to a better 
economic condition. According to IMF, mac-
roeconomic conditions in Turkey are at their 
best in decades. 
 
The economic growth in Turkey will be em-
powered by the launch of New Turkish Lira 
(YTL). YTL will be in circulation from Janu-
ary 1, 2005. Conversion rate will be: 
 
1 YTL = 1.000.000 TL 
Sub-unit of YTL will be KURUS (YKr), the 
equivalent of cents in Euro. 
1 YTL = 100 YKr 
 
The composition of denominations for YTL 
banknotes will be 1, 5, 10, 20, 50 and 100. 
The denominations for the coins will be 
1,5,10,25,50 YKr and 1 YTL. The YTL and 
old Turkish Lira will co-exist during 2005 and 
at the end of the year old Turkish Lira will be 
withdrawn from circulation.  
 
Coupling the ongoing hard work to drive in-
flation down to single digit with the introduc-
tion of YTL, the Central Bank aims at restor-
ing Turkish citizens’ confidence to their own 
currency as well as improving Turkish cur-
rency’s reputation in the world markets. Re-
moving zeros from the currency will also 
eradicate the technical and operational prob-
lems caused in the past by multiple zeros in 
currency.  
 
As the Central Bank authorities proclaim, the 
New Turkish Lira is the symbol and the 
evidence of Turkey’s determination to 
drive inflation down and move forward to-
wards EU membership.  
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Introductory Note from CEPS 
 
This issue of CEPS Turkey in Europe Monitor 
presents an article and extracts of two other 
articles, demonstrating the arguments that are 
used in favour of and against Turkish acces-
sion to the European Union.  
Ingmar Karlsson, the Consul General of Swe-
den in Istanbul, in his article titled ‘Turkey’s 
cultural and religious heritage-an asset to the 
European Union’, takes the three well-known 
arguments often used in arguing against Turk-
ish membership – absorption capacity of the 
EU, security and geopolitics, the identity fac-
tor - and develops counter-arguments to prove 
that Turkish accession will in fact be benefi-
cial for the Union. Regarding the absorption 
capacity of the EU, the author highlights that 
there can be no objection to Turkey’s incorpo-
ration into an EU which will in the foresee-
able future be characterised as a political and 
economic union with variable geometry, con-
centric circles and different speeds, rather 
than as the strong United States of Europe on 
the American model. Karlsson responds to the  
security and geopolitical arguments that ad-
vocate Turkey’s exclusion on the grounds that 
Turkey will import the instability of its region 
to the Union, by stressing the point that an 
excluded Turkey can not act as a firewall 
against the crises in the Middle East as all the 
crises in the Middle East so far have directly 
affected Europe and will affect even more so 
in the future. He underlines that having Tur-
key as a full member will have significant ad-
vantages for the Union as it will increase the 
EU’s opportunities for pursuing a proactive 
policy in the Arab world and, with its stable 
democracy, stand as a model for a Muslim 
world that is in need of such models. With re-
spect to the arguments that Turkey should be 
left out due to its ‘alien culture’ and its ‘relig-
ion’, Karlsson highlights that a no to Turkey 
on religious and cultural grounds would cre-
ate severe problems in the integration of ‘Eu-
romuslims’ by sending out an immediate and 
strong message to the fastest growing seg-
ments of the European population that they 
will always be considered unwelcome and 
second-class citizens even if they choose a 
secular way of life. This, Karlsson argues, 
would lead to the emergence of a ghetto Islam 
in Europe instead of a modern tolerant Euro-
pean Islam. 
Steven Everts from the Centre for European 
Reform, in the extract from the article entitled 
“An asset but not a model: Turkey, the EU 
and the wider Middle East”, looks at two sets 
of questions: the consequences of Turkey’s 
accession for EU policies in the wider Middle 
East and the ‘Turkey as a bridge’ or ‘model’ 
arguments. With respect to the first issue, he 
concludes that Turkey has a lot to contribute 
to EU policies on the Middle East in terms of 
credibility, political access, know-how and 
economic leverage. Everts stresses that the 
prospect of Turkey’s accession should be used 
to deepen EU engagement in the Middle East 
and cites Israel – Palestine, Iran and Syria as 
areas that provide good opportunities for 
early joint EU – Turkish action. He highlights 
that rejection by the EU would not only hinder 
the reform process inside the country but that 
it would also jeopardise the ‘Europeanisation’ 
of Turkish foreign policy that involves the 
adoption of EU’s distinct foreign policy style 
of promoting security through multilateral 
mechanisms and institutional integration. Re-
garding the ‘model’ or ‘bridge’ argument, 
Everts’ view is that Turkey cannot be a 
‘model’ for democratising the wider Middle 
East as it is a unique case in three key re-
spects: its long – standing ties with the West, 
its secular state structure, and the transforma-
tion of its political elite through the prospect 
of EU membership. According to Everts, the 
fact that Turkey has ambivalent relations with 
most of its neighbours in the region also ag-
gravate the need to tone down the ‘Turkey as 
a bridge’ argument and avoid the ‘Turkey as a 
model’ rhetoric altogether. 
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Turkey’s Cultural and Religious Heri-




Ever since Turkey concluded an Association 
Agreement with the then European Commu-
nity in 1963, it has, apart from Bulent Ecevit´s 
period as prime minister in the 1970s, pursued 
its ambition of joining the  
 
European Union. Turkey entered into a cus-
toms union that has been in force since 1996 
and its candidacy for membership of the EU 
was confirmed in Helsinki in 1999. 
 
The rediscovery of the ‘Turkish peril’ in some 
quarters in Europe is therefore surprising. The 
basic principle of Roman law – pacta sunt 
servanda  – is part of the European cultural 
heritage. Anyone who ignores this principle 
with regard to Turkey loses political credibil-
ity and flouts official EU policy, according to 
which Turkey is to be treated like any other 
candidate. Accordingly accession negotiations 
should start as soon as the country meets the 
Copenhagen criteria. 
 
The arguments against a Turkish EU member-
ship that have been used so far have lost much 
of their force in view of the rapid reform proc-
ess launched by the Erdoğan government and 
the result of the referendum in Cyprus. Con-
sequently, those who are opposed to Turkey’s 
membership now talk less about the country’s 
“EU maturity” and the fulfilment of the Co-
penhagen criteria. Instead they argue that EU 
cannot absorb a new member of the size of 
Turkey, that a Turkish membership would 
cause serious geopolitical and strategic prob-
lems and, last but not least, that EU is a com-
munity based on Christian values. 
 
The absorption capacity of the EU 
With 25 members the EU is said to be an 
over-extended structure, and that further geo-
graphical expansion can only take place the 
expense of a deepening of political coopera-
tion. This line of argument – that Europe is 
not powerful enough to absorb Turkey – can 
only be described as political tactics. If there 
was any truth in it, it should have been de-
                                                                                                 
1 Ingmar Karlsson is the Consul General of Swe-
den in Istanbul. This article has first been pub-
lished in Turkish Policy Quarterly, Fall 2004. 
ployed over ten years ago when the EU’s 
eastward enlargement process started. In those 
days the main opponents of Turkish member-
ship – the CDU/CSU in Germany – were the 
keenest advocates of enlargement. 
 
The project of building a strong United States 
of Europe on the American model is no longer 
on the political agenda after the accession of 
ten new members on May 1 2004, and will be 
even more passé by the time Bulgaria and 
Romania join the EU in 2007. A united Caro-
lingian Europe must now be built up again by 
Paris and Berlin. The new enlarged EU will 
for the foreseeable future be a political and 
economic union with variable geometry, con-
centric circles and different speeds. What ob-
jection is there to Turkey’s incorporation into 
such a union, particularly in view of the fact 
that, with its geographical location, its size 
and its decades-long membership of NATO, 
Turkey is a strategically important partner 
which by itself would enhance the role of 
Europe in global politics more than the ten 
new members combined? The accession of 
Turkey – at the beginning of a new budget 
period in 2014, say – would increase the popu-
lation of the Union by 12 per cent. There must 
be something seriously wrong with a union 
that cannot absorb such an expansion. Demog-
raphy, after all, is one of the most serious 
problems facing the EU, not least in Germany, 
and Turkey, with its large, youthful popula-
tion, could help to solve this problem.  
 
Security and geopolitical arguments 
The geopolitical and strategic arguments that 
were used in favour of the accession of Po-
land, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary 
and the Baltic states are valid for Turkey too, 
in fact even more so than was the case in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. 
Some day the enlargement process will come 
to an end, but terminating it without admitting 
Turkey would be a serious mistake and an 
unwise policy. Those who are opposed to 
Turkish membership seem to think of the EU 
as an “island in the sun”, a Switzerland sur-
rounded by good, friendly neighbours. But 
Europe’s geostrategic location is far from 
idyllic. Europe must stabilize its own periph-
ery to ensure that it is not affected by the 
problems that exist there. Turkish membership 
of the EU would strengthen Europe on its 
most vulnerable front. NO. 10 / OCTOBER 2004 | 85 
 
Turkey now faces three geostrategic choices: 
affirmation of its European identity, rap-
prochement with the Arab and Muslim world, 
and integration with the Turkic-speaking peo-
ples of Central Asia. There is no doubt that the 
present Turkish government has chosen the 
first of these three options and that the coun-
try’s political and economic elite are playing 
the European card. If this fails because the EU 
defers its decision or refuses to admit Turkey 
to the Union, both the other options would 
become more feasible. In that case, the friends 
of modernization would probably not be able 
to persist in their pro-European stance.  
Both the pro-Islam and the pan-Turkic option 
would entail serious consequences for the sta-
bility of Southeastern Europe. Even though 
Turkey is not likely to achieve a dominant 
position in the Central Asian republics, the 
mere attempt to do so would have a destabiliz-
ing effect and also exacerbate the existing 
problems in the Caucasus. It is in Europe's 
vital interests to see to it that the problems in 
the Middle East, including Iraq, and the south-
ern periphery of the former Soviet Union do 
not converge. There is an obvious risk of this 
happening if Turkey were to play the pan-
Turkic card. The second option, i.e. rap-
prochement with the Arab and Muslim world, 
would have an adverse affect on Europe too. 
One argument against Turkish membership is 
that in that case part of the EU’s external fron-
tier would abut on the most crisis-ridden and 
troubled region in the world and that Europe 
should at all costs keep away from the prob-
lems of the Muslim world in general and the 
Middle East in particular. 
 
But we cannot escape this part of the world 
and its problems, and therefore the opposite 
conclusion is the most credible one, i.e. a rap-
prochement between Turkey and this region 
would bring its crises closer to us. The idea 
that a Turkey excluded from the European 
Community could be a firewall against the 
crises in the Middle East is politically naïve. 
All the crises in the Middle East so far have 
directly affected Europe, and they will affect 
us even more in future. If Turkey were a 
member, this would increase the EU’s oppor-
tunities for pursuing a proactive policy in the 
Arab world. This is not without risks, but if 
Turkey remains outside the Union this will 
have serious consequences. A stable democ-
racy in a Muslim society, on the other hand, 
could stand as a model for a Muslim world 
that badly needs such models. The Turkish 
membership of the EU would demonstrate the 
falsity of the argument that Islam and democ-
racy cannot mix and help to bring about fa-
vourable changes in the Islamic world’s atti-
tude to Europe. A no to Turkey in December 
would on the other hand have a radicalizing 
effect both in the Muslim world at large and 
within Turkey itself. It will strengthen the ar-
gument of the fundamentalists that the Muslim 
world must turn inwards because the rest of 
the world conspires against it and it will 
strengthen those in Turkey who question the 
reform policies of the prime minister. 
 
The identity factor – Is the EU a Christian 
community? 
The resistance to Turkish membership is not 
only motivated by fears about the EU’s lack of 
absorption capacity and about the risk of im-
porting problems and disturbances, but also by 
vague qualms about a culture that is regarded 
as alien. One argument that is now gaining 
ground, especially in Catholic Europe, is 
linked to identity, namely Europe’s Christian 
values, which are mentioned as a reason for 
keeping Turkey out. In that case it might just 
as well be argued that Greece should not have 
been admitted to the EU because of its Eastern 
Orthodox roots, that "semi-Orientals" such as 
Romanians and Bulgarians should be kept out 
too and that Albania and Bosnia are forever 
doomed to be Muslim ghettos in Europe. 
 
What will happen if the secularization process 
in Europe continues? Where do the limits of 
identity go? Will a secular country such as 
Sweden have to leave the EU in the not too 
distant future when the number of Muslims 
who go to mosques for Friday prayers is larger 
than the number of churchgoers on Sundays? 
 
The Justice and Development Party has 
emerged as a result of the transformation of 
Turkish Islamism and has come to power in 
free elections. Turkey is now undergoing a 
historic reform process that is mainly moti-
vated by the prospect of EU membership. 
Prime Minister Erdoğan wants to transform 
the AKP into a modern European party – a 
Muslim version of a Christian Democratic 
Party – and he needs Europe’s support for this 
process. 
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There have never been any religious criteria 
for membership of the EU. To refuse Turkey 
admission on religious grounds would send a 
false and dangerous signal, especially after 11 
September 2001. Such a decision would ig-
nore the fact that Islam is a mainstream relig-
ion in Europe today. As late as the end of the 
1960s Europe was a net emigration area. But 
nowadays 10-15% of the population in most 
Western European countries were born outside 
their present home country, and a growing 
percentage of them were born outside Europe. 
More immigrants arrive in Europe every year 
than in the USA. There are today at least 15 
million Muslims in the EU, which is more 
than the number of Protestant Scandinavians, 
and the number will increase as immigration 
continues. 
 
The trend towards a multiracial and multicon-
fessional Europe is therefore unstoppable. 
This trend will be further strengthened by cur-
rent demographic trends in Europe. Today, the 
birth rate among Muslim immigrants in 
Europe is three times higher than in the non-
Muslim population. If this trend continues the 
Muslim population will, given current immi-
gration patterns, have doubled by 2015, while 
Europe’s non-Muslim population will de-
crease by 3.5%. Some estimates of the number 
of Muslims in Europe in 30 years’ time are as 
high as 65 million. 
Three-four decades ago the Muslim immi-
grants were coming to Europe looking for 
work and they planned to return home as soon 
as possible. They therefore remained marked 
by their culture of origin, Indo-Pakistani, 
North African or Turkish. The parents tried to 
protect their children from the unfamiliar 
European environment rather than integrating 
them into it. But most of these immigrants 
never went back. Their children were born in 
Europe and became better educated than their 
parents. This led to new ways of thinking and 
now we can see how some kind of silent revo-
lution is taking place among the younger Mus-
lim population in Europe. European Muslims 
are now Muslims and not North-African, 
Indo-Pakistani or Turkish Muslims and a 
European Islamic culture is slowly develop-
ing.  
Islam is thus already today an integral part of 
Europe and a European religion and as we 
have been talking about Eastern Christianity 
we will soon be talking about Western Islam. 
Islam must therefore be recognized and re-
garded as a "domestic" European religion. 
There is nothing which intrinsically prevents a 
Muslim from being as good a Swede as a 
member of the Pentecostal Brethren or an ad-
herent of the Jewish faith, or that mosques 
cannot become as natural a feature of Swedish 
cities as churches have always been in Istan-
bul, Aleppo, Damascus, Mosul or Cairo.  
Only a depoliticised and liberal Islam can be 
integrated into Europe, and such an integration 
is only possible if it is paralleled by economic 
and social integration. A future Europe with a 
flourishing Muslim presence and an open 
European identity must therefore be based on 
self-criticism, a permanent and open dialogue 
and a respect for diversity. We must realize 
that Muslims can make a positive contribution 
in the construction of a new Europe. Their 
presence should be seen as a source of en-
richment and not as a problem.  
Young Muslims in Europe now mobilize for 
recognition, identity and survival. They often 
look upon themselves as a new force distanc-
ing themselves from traditional and interna-
tional bonds, wanting to be a European face of 
Islam. They are not only born in the West by 
Muslim parents. Some of them have grown up 
in mixed marriages and they know both a 
Muslim and a Christian way of living. They 
speak the languages and are born citizens of 
European states and their common language is 
English, German, Dutch, French or Swedish.  
They are using Islam as a way of establishing 
the universal values they have in common 
with those around them. Defining their own 
identity as Muslim thus is a way of interacting 
with the rest of society.  
With the sociological change there will be an 
ideological change as well. In Islam law and 
ethics are identical. If you change the ethics 
you thus change the law. Through the princi-
ple of "ijtihad" (to develop, interpret and ap-
ply Muslim doctrines to contemporary situa-
tions) there will be a new interpretation of Is-
lam. The integration of Europe’s Muslims de-
pends on the adoption of a form of Islam that 
embraces the principal Western political val-
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church and state, democratic civil society and 
individual human rights.  
We are already today witnessing the emer-
gence and creation of a several European 
Muslim identities, German, French, British, 
Swedish, Dutch etc. Interviews with Swedish 
Muslims show that they are more and more 
focusing on their presence, role and future in 
Sweden: What kind of multicultural Sweden 
do we as Muslims want to have in the future? 
What kind of multicultural state do we think is 
necessary to safeguard the long-term survival 
of the Muslims as a cultural, ethnic and reli-
gious minority group in Sweden and what can 
we as Muslims do to bring this about?  
They thus want to draft a new brand of Islam, 
one that aims to reconcile the basic tenets of 
the faith - such as the five pillars, social jus-
tice and submission to the will of God - with 
the realities of contemporary European life.  
For this new generation "Euro Islam" is not a 
zero sum game. They see no contradiction in 
being Muslim and European at the same time. 
In a report from the Swedish Muslim Youth 
Association you can read: "The goal for young 
Muslims should be to accept, understand and 
respect differences but also to understand 
common values and goals and try to imple-
ment them. Young Muslims should form a 
bridge between the European and the Muslim 
countries".  
If immigrants are integrated in this way, the 
Islamic communities in Europe can become a 
bridge between Europe and the immigrants' 
countries of origin. "Euromuslims" will then 
be able to set an example, and transfer democ-
ratic approaches and liberal ideas and reforms 
to their native countries. This would enable a 
fruitful triangular relationship to develop be-
tween the Islamic communities, their native 
countries and their new home countries, since 
many people living in the Diaspora want to 
maintain close contacts with their origins. 
 
A no to Turkey on religious and cultural 
grounds would be disastrous for Europe since 
it would send an immediate and strong mes-
sage to the fastest growing segments of the 
European population that they will always be 
considered unwelcome and second-class citi-
zens also if they chose a secular way of life. 
 
Sending such a message could, before we 
know it, lead to the emergence of a ghetto Is-
lam in Europe instead of a modern tolerant 
European Islam. Radical mullahs all over 
Europe are already doing their best to exploit 
Muslim immigrants’ psychological, cultural 
and material problems for their own purposes, 
and this message would only make their work 
easier. 
 
If this happens, we might soon witness a 
‘clash of civilizations’ in Western Europe, not 
in the form of a military showdown between 
the West and the Islamic world, or as envis-
aged by Samuel Huntington, the proponent of 
the clash of civilizations theory, but in the 
form of a continuous guerrilla warfare in ghet-
toized suburbs of our cities. 
 
Against this background the decision taken in 
the Netherlands in December this year will be 
fraught with consequences for the destiny of 
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1. A success story for EU foreign policy, but 
what next? 
At the December European Council, the heads 
of state and government will have to decide 
whether and when to open accession talks 
with Turkey. EU leaders are rightly mindful of 
public opposition and the effects that Turkey’s 
membership could have on the Union’s cohe-
sion and capacity to act. But the best way for 
the EU to consolidate and anchor Turkey’s 
democratisation process is by giving Turkey 
the green light to start accession negotia-
tions…It would be a triumph of EU foreign 
policy to welcome a successful Turkey, which 
has laid to rest the ghosts of military authori-
tarianism and chronic economic instability. 
Europeans should say, loudly and repeatedly, 
that no one else has managed to transform, in 
a peaceful and deliberate manner, the political 
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system of a country as large and complex as 
Turkey. 
 
…It is a great pity that so few Europeans are 
willing to describe and sell the EU-Turkey 
relationship as a geostrategic success story for 
the EU, and a vindication of its distinctive 
foreign policy style. Instead, the debate has 
concentrated on whether Turkey is ‘really’ 
European, whether it is ready to start acces-
sion talks and what would be the conse-
quences for the EU’s institutions, budget and 
policies. This narrow debate on the merits and 
costs of Turkey’s eventual membership is 
necessary. But many larger questions loom, 
such as: what kind of club should the EU be 
and where are the borders of Europe?  
 
…There are also questions relating to Tur-
key’s impact on EU policies towards the wider 
Middle East… 
 
This essay will look at two sets of broader 
questions, first analysing the consequences of 
Turkey’s accession for EU policies in the 
wider Middle East and then probing the ‘Tur-
key as a bridge’ or ‘model’ arguments. It will 
argue that Turkey is an asset for the EU, but 
not a model for the democratisation of the 
wider Middle East. It will conclude with rec-
ommendations for policy-makers in Turkey 
and the rest of Europe. 
 
2. The macro impact of Turkey’s accession 
No one can say for certain how, once inside 
the EU, Turkey will influence EU policy on 
the Middle East. EU accession is probably ten 
years away, if not longer. In that period EU 
and Turkish foreign policy, as well as the 
Middle East itself, are bound to change in un-
predictable ways. Therefore, the debate should 
focus on Turkey’s influence on EU Middle 
East policy in the pre-accession phase.  
 
With its large population and strategic loca-
tion Turkey can expect to exert some influ-
ence over EU policies towards the Middle 
East. But its influence will be limited. Already 
25 member states (soon 27 or 28), plus the 
Brussels-based institutions, have their say in 
shaping EU policies…  
 
Moreover, in the decade ahead, Turkey will 
remain in a position of being a ‘demandeur’, 
with its membership aspirations crowding out 
whatever other EU policy objectives it may 
have. Nonetheless, the prospect of Turkey’s 
accession is already forcing the EU to devote 
more resources and develop more coherent 
policies towards the Middle East. Turkey’s 
accession will increase the salience of the 
Middle East, and accelerate the Union’s al-
ready deepening involvement in the region... 
 
…From their side, leaders in the Middle East 
are already becoming frequent visitors to 
Brussels. In future, more may pass through 
Ankara on their way to Brussels for consulta-
tions. By the same token, representatives from 
civil society in the Middle East will expand 
their contacts with both Turkey and the EU... 
 
At the macro level, the biggest impact of fu-
ture Turkish membership will be on the mind 
maps of EU officials and politi-
cians…Turkey’s accession will confirm and 
accentuate the shift whereby the EU has be-
come a continent-wide, heterogeneous Union 
with a religiously diverse population and a 
political outlook that is increasingly externally 
oriented. The EU and Turkey alike should ac-
knowledge this trend and maximise the poten-
tial benefits. 
 
3. The EU’s Middle East policies 
Over the years, the EU has built up a dense 
web of relations with the countries in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East… 
 
No outsider should expect quick results in the 
Middle East, given the exceptional levels of 
instability, political tensions and economic 
deprivation. But even EU officials admit that 
the EU is underperforming in the Middle East. 
Institutional incoherence, poor political disci-
pline, risk aversion and insufficient emphasis 
on promoting good governance and democ-
racy have all taken their toll.
3 While the EU 
has set itself the right objectives and devel-
oped a dazzling array of policies, partnerships 
and programmes, it lacks credibility and clout. 
Turkey, as a Muslim country straddling 
Europe and the Middle East, could be of help 
here, making EU policies perhaps more ac-
ceptable to countries in the region, especially 
in the pre-accession phase before it becomes 
an EU member. 
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4. Turkey’s international strategy 
The principle challenge of Turkish foreign 
policy has been the need to balance the fact 
that the country borders on the Middle East 
(as well as the Caspian region and the Cauca-
sus) with its Western vocation and orienta-
tion…  
 
Turkey’s elite has mostly stuck to three core 
tenets: conservative nationalism, strict secular-
ism and a strategic alliance with Washington. 
For decades, Ankara’s relationship with the 
US was the lodestar of its foreign policy. This 
US-centric orientation chimed with, and was 
reinforced by, the huge influence of the mili-
tary establishment on Turkish foreign policy. 
Relations with the rest of Europe and the EU 
mattered, but were always of secondary im-
portance. The deep ambivalence on the west 
European side about Turkey’s membership 
aspirations fed this circle of mutual suspi-
cion… 
 
In the past few years, however, Turkish for-
eign policy has changed profoundly. Turkey 
has made its EU membership aspirations the 
central tenet in its foreign policy. Its pro-US 
stance remains solid, but is less automatic. In 
March 2003 the Turkish parliament dared to 
say ‘no’ to Washington’s request to let its 
troops pass through Turkey to open a second 
front against Iraq. But the prospect of EU 
membership has also affected Turkey’s re-
gional strategy. For example, Ankara has 
moderated its position on the touchstone issue 
of Cyprus…  
 
Europeans with high hopes of what Turkey 
may contribute to EU policies should realise 
that, most of the time, Turkey has played a 
low-key role in the region. Turkey’s non-Arab 
status, coupled with the Ottoman legacy and 
Turkey’s pro Western orientation have meant 
that in Turkish - Arab relations, ambivalence 
and ambiguity are always present. Some Ar-
abs and Iranians have accused Turkey of be-
traying its Islamic identity. At times they have 
blasted the Turks for being a stooge of US 
imperialism and of having an unacceptably 
close relationship with Israel… 
 
In the past few years, Turkey has sought and 
achieved a rapprochement with neighbours 
such as Syria and Greece with which it had 
fraught relations. Kemal Kirisci of Bogazici 
University has rightly remarked that there has 
been a striking process of ‘Europeanisation’ in 
Turkish foreign policy.
4 At a basic level, Tur-
key has adjusted its stance on various interna-
tional issues in line with the EU mainstream, 
for instance on the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). But more importantly, Turkey 
has started to adopt the EU’s distinct foreign 
policy ‘style’ of promoting security through 
multilateral mechanisms and institutional in-
tegration. For instance, the Turkish govern-
ment has started to embrace the idea that a 
solution to the Cyprus question can only be 
found in the context of EU and UN involve-
ment. Even before Turkey joins the EU, this 
socialisation process should continue. Both 
the EU and Turkey should nurture this devel-
opment and make sure it becomes more 
deeply embedded in Turkey’s political class 
and the wider national debate.  
 
In turn, Turkey has quite a lot to offer to the 
EU. It can contribute expertise and knowledge 
of the Middle East region. While Turkey has 
fewer Arabic speakers than one might expect, 
the country’s network of contacts, combined 
with the political capital of the AKP govern-
ment and the burgeoning economic ties, will 
be assets for the EU. But the biggest effect of 
Turkey’s pre-accession status will be at the 
level of political symbolism. The EU may 
have a much better image in the Middle East 
than the US. But for many Arabs and Iranians, 
the EU is a white, Christian club with dubious 
colonial legacies. There is a deep sense that 
the ‘West’, of which Europe is a constituent 
part, is a hostile force to Muslims worldwide. 
If the EU took in Turkey, it would send an 
immensely powerful signal to the contrary. 
Public statements by Egyptian and Iranian 
leaders from the region make it clear that they 
support Turkey’s membership bid – and re-
gard it as a litmus test for the EU’s reputation 
in the Muslim world. The unusual move by 
the Israeli Defence Ministry, to warn Ankara 
privately that EU membership would harm 
Turkish – Israeli relations, underlines the same 
point, while highlighting the ambivalence of 
EU-Israeli relations.
5  
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Apart from these general effects, what would 
be the impact of Turkey on EU policies to-




Turkey’s relations with Israel have been close, 
especially for a country with a Muslim popu-
lation. While solidarity among ordinary Turks 
with the Palestinian cause has been great, at 
the level of the government and military estab-
lishment, the relationship with Israel has been 
exceptionally strong… 
  
However, in recent years, Turkish-Israeli rela-
tions have become more strained, as the peace 
process has stalled and Palestinian hardship 
has increased… Sympathy for the Palestinians 
is not an empty slogan for the new govern-
ment…  
 
But there has been no abrupt break in Israeli-
Turkish relations, and none is likely to occur 
in the near future since both countries benefit 
from a close partnership. 
 
Turkey’s relatively constructive relationship 
with Israel could benefit the EU. The Union is 
Israel’s biggest trading partner, but politically 
relations are troubled… 
 
The EU and Turkey could work together fruit-
fully on Israel-Palestine, trying to break the 
deadlock in the peace process. The objectives 
of both sides are the same, while the respec-
tive starting positions and relative diplomatic 
strengths complement each other well.  
 
Concretely, the EU and Turkey should help 
the Palestinians prepare for the day when Is-
rael will withdraw from Gaza, so that Hamas 
does not take over. They should also try to use 
Israel’s disengagement from Gaza to push for 
further withdrawals from the West Bank. In 
practical terms, EU-Turkey co-operation could 
focus on reforming political institutions, or-
ganising elections, training police forces and 
even drawing up plans for a third party secu-
rity force. Significantly, Israeli Deputy Prime 
Minister Olmert has said that Israel would not 
object to Turkish troops helping to provide 





Turkey’s growing political ties with Iran are 
an asset for the EU as it seeks to expand its 
influence and salvage the deal it forged in Oc-
tober 2003 on Iran’s nuclear programme. The 
access of AKP leaders to Iranian leaders, cou-
pled with the visa-free travel conditions, 
strengthen the argument that, especially in the 
pre-accession phase, Turkey could be a useful 
bridge between the West and Iran. As the in-
ternational stand-off over Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme moves to a crisis point, Turkey and 
the EU have a shared interest in seeking a dip-
lomatic yet effective solution. Both Turkey 
and the EU have some leverage over Iran, and 
both will want to forestall a US military at-
tack. Together, they should try to persuade the 
Iranians that national greatness does not de-
pend on having a nuclear bomb, and that their 
interests are best served by staying non-
nuclear. Together, they must underline that if 
Iran continues to defy the demands of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
targeted economic sanctions will follow. To-
gether, they should also explain to the US and 
Israel that plans for ‘surgical strikes’ against 
Iranian nuclear installations will be counter-
productive by triggering a nationalist back-
lash. While air strikes may delay a nuclear 
Iran, they will not succeed in eliminating the 
two key ingredients of a military nuclear pro-
gramme: technological know-how and a keen 
desire to acquire a nuclear deterrent. 
 
Syria 
Turkey and Syria have had frosty relations for 
decades, with tensions peaking in 1998 when 
Turkey threatened military action… But after 
the Syrians expelled Öcalan in 1998, bilateral 
relations have started to improve… Improve-
ments in the Turkey-Syria relationship took 
place while the EU was trying to persuade 
Damascus that closer links with the EU would 
be possible – provided Syria was willing to 
meet EU concerns…  
 
Turkey and the EU should work together 
closely in drawing Syria into a wider web of 
international cooperation and reciprocal obli-
gations. The EU can offer trade, technology, 
know-how and investment, all of which the 
Syrian economy desperately needs. In political 
terms, Damascus also needs more friends in 
the region and beyond. If it wants better rela-
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precise European concerns and demands, es-
pecially in the area of WMD proliferation, its 
control over Lebanese politics and its support 
for Palestinian militant groups. Turkey’s bud-
ding relationship with Syria may offer an ad-
ditional means of influencing the choices that 
the Syrian regime will make. As the dominant 
land route for Syrian exports, Turkey stands to 
gain considerably from an intensification of 
EU-Syrian trade relations. Together, the EU 
and Turkey have an interest in demonstrating 
that a deft political strategy can achieve better 
results than America’s penchant for issuing 
threats and isolating countries. 
 
5. Why Turkey is not a ‘model’ for 
democratising the wider Middle East 
…After the September 11th attacks, when re-
lations between the West and the Muslim 
world shot to the top of the international 
agenda, many commentators and politicians 
started to view and describe Turkey as a ‘stra-
tegic case’. Americans, especially, have 
grown fond of describing Turkey as an inspir-
ing example of a democratic, Muslim country 
where ‘moderate Islam’ has been remarkably 
successful... 
 
Turkey cannot be a ‘model’ for the progres-
sive democratisation of the wider Middle East. 
Turkey is a unique case. Its successful, if in-
complete, democratisation process cannot be 
transplanted to other countries in the region 
for at least three reasons. The first is the most 
straightforward: unlike any other country in 
the region, Turkey has a long-standing rela-
tionship with the West: institutionally through 
NATO, and bilaterally with Washington and 
capitals in Europe. No other country in the 
region has the same, or even a comparable, 
starting position. Nor was any other country in 
the region born out of an empire, which gives 
Turks greater political self confidence than 
countries in the region that started off as colo-
nies. 
 
Second, ever since the beginning of the Turk-
ish republic, the strict secular nature of its po-
litical system has put Turkey in a distinct in-
ternational category. Turkey’s secular state 
structure makes it akin to France – see for in-
stance the similarity in policies on women’s 
headscarves – but very different from Arab 
states, never mind Iran.  
 
But culturally Turkey may well become more 
‘Islamic’ as the AKP and other groups try to 
expand the role of Islam in public life, while 
respecting the main tenets of Turkey’s secular 
state structure. Put succinctly, in Turkey more 
democracy and more power for Islamic politi-
cal groups have gone hand in hand. But this 
was only possible in the context of a firmly 
secular political system, which is absent in the 
rest of the Middle East. 
 
The third reason why Turkey is unique is that 
the deepening of Turkey’s democratisation 
took place largely because of the ‘golden car-
rot’ of EU membership. It is true, as Turkish 
leaders often stress, that the reforms were nec-
essary in themselves. But the prospect of EU 
membership has had a transformative effect 
on the Turkish elite. This also means that a 
different Turkish government will probably 
persist with the current reform agenda, even if, 
as is likely, there will be setbacks on the road 
to EU membership. But apart from the coun-
tries of the Balkans, the EU is not offering a 
membership perspective to any other country. 
Thus the EU will have to influence the rest of 
the Middle East with only the ‘silver carrot’ of 
deeper co-operation in the context of its 
neighbourhood policy. 
 
6. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
…Turkey has a lot to contribute to EU poli-
cies on the Middle East: credibility, political 
access, know-how and economic leverage. If 
handled deftly, the prospect of Turkey’s ac-
cession could be a real boon for EU influence 
in the region. The reverse is also true: a rejec-
tion of Turkey would not only jeopardise the 
reform momentum inside the country, but also 
counter the pro-EU and moderating shift in its 
regional policy. The EU would forego Tur-
key’s contributions. And a shunned Turkey 
will more likely side with the US – both in 
particular instances such as Iran or Israel - 
Palestine, and in its overall foreign policy phi-
losophy. 
 
Turkey and the EU should deepen their politi-
cal relations well ahead of formal accession. 
Here are some policy recommendations for 
both sides to maximise the potential benefits: 
 
For the EU: 
•  Use the prospect of Turkey’s accession to 
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East. The centre of gravity in the Union’s 
foreign policy is shifting south anyway. 
So leaders should make the most of Tur-
key’s know-how and political links to 
strengthen EU policies for the region. Is-
rael - Palestine, Iran and Syria provide 
good opportunities for early joint EU-
Turkish action.  
•  Recognise that compared to the rest of the 
Middle East, Turkey’s case is unique in 
three key respects: it has long-standing 
ties with the West, it has a secular state 
structure, and the bait of EU membership 
has transformed its political elite. More-
over, Turkey has ambivalent relations 
with most of its neighbours in the region. 
Thus, it is best to tone down the ‘Turkey 
as a bridge’ argument and avoid the ‘Tur-
key as a model’ rhetoric altogether. Tur-
key is an asset for the EU but not a model 
for the Middle East. 
 
For Turkey: 
•  Use the anchor of EU accession to step up 
the normalisation of relations with Iran 
and Arab countries such as Syria. The 
paradox is that the closer Turkey gets to 
EU membership, the more it should be 
able to forge closer ties with the Middle 
East. Both domestic and Western support 
for a strategy to reach out to the Islamic 
world will be greater once Turkey’s Euro-
pean destination has been confirmed. And 
the more Turkey can champion its Middle 
Eastern ties in Brussels and elsewhere, the 
more the EU will see Turkey’s accession 
as a help for achieving its own Middle 
East objectives. 
•  Prepare for membership not just in terms 
of adopting the acquis communautaire – 
the body of EU rules and policies – but 
also by incorporating the EU’s distinct 
foreign policy ‘style’ of projecting stabil-
ity through political and economic inte-
gration. Turkey’s leaders must ensure that 
the current ‘Europeanisation’ of Turkey’s 
foreign policy continues, and permeates 
the country’s political class. 
 




La question de l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Un-
ion européenne mérite-t-elle d'être posée? N'a-
t-elle pas été tranchée savant meme queue de 
letter? Le doute est permis si l'on considère 
que la possibilité d'une telle adhésion a été 
officiellement reconnue en 1963, date de la 
signature du traité d'association entre la 
Turquie et la Communauté économique eu-
ropéenne, mais que le débat sur le principe 
même de cette adhésion n'a jamais vraiment 
pris corps au cours des quarante dernières an-
nées. En France comme en Allemagne, le dé-
bat était au reste surdéterminé par la guerre 
froide et par la question de la cohésion du 
camp occidental face à l'Est.  
 
….Perçu comme un facteur de renforcement 
ou d'affaiblissement de l'Alliance, l'accueil 
réservé à la demande turque d'association s'in-
scrivait, en tout état de cause, dans un jeu 
transatlantique bien davantage qu'européen. 
 
Le débat fut de nouveau escamoté à Copen-
hague, en 1993, quand les Douze fixèrent les 
critères d'adhésion des États libérés par la de-
struction du Rideau de Fer.  
 
…. À partir de 1997, à Luxembourg, et surtout 
de 1999, à Helsinki, les membres du Conseil 
européen se sont progressivement engouffrés 
dans la brèche ouverte à Copenhague et, sau-
tant allègrement par-dessus la question de 
l'appartenance à l'Europe du candidat poten-
tiel, ont décidé que celui-ci avait « vocation » 
— admirons l'élévation spirituelle du terme 
choisi — à rejoindre l'Union européenne. Il lui 
fallait seulement respecter tous les critères 
mais rien que les critères applicables aux 
autres candidats. De ce jour, la question de 
principe qui n'avait encore été posée n'avait 
plus lieu de l'être. Le débat était clos avant 
d'être ouvert et, passant des principes aux mo-
dalités et au calendrier, la discussion changeait 
de nature.  
 
….Parce que la candidature de la Turquie con-
fronte les Européens à un choix qui les effraie 
sur la nature — mono ou multiculturelle — de 
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leur Union, le débat qu'elle occasionne se 
présente de façon totalement biaisée. Par une 
sorte de transposition politique de la loi de 
Gresham sur les monnaies, les mauvaises 
questions chassent ici les bonnes. Les bonnes 
questions sont celles du degré d'appartenance 
de la Turquie à la civilisation européenne et 
des conséquences de la transformation éven-
tuelle de l'Union en un ensemble multicivilisa-
tionnel promis à une extension indéfinie. 
 
Les mauvaises questions, légitimes assuré-
ment mais secondes par rapport aux autres, 
privilégient les interrogations sur la démocra-
tisation de la société et de l'Etat turcs ainsi que 
les considérations diplomatiques relatives aux 
conséquences de l'ouverture des négociations 
par rapport à celles qui tiennent à la nature et à 
la portée ultime du pacte qui lie les membres 
de l'Union. 
 
 ….Il est de bon ton aujourd'hui de dénoncer 
l'archaïsme et le cléricalisme de ceux qui pro-
clament le lien nécessaire entre les frontières 
héritées de la chrétienté et les frontières pro-
jetées de l'Europe actuelle. Toute référence 
religieuse dans la définition de l’Europe — 
dédaigneusement qualifiée de «  club chré-
tien » — paraît incongrue à ceux qui font, à 
juste titre par ailleurs, de la laïcité, c'est-à-dire 
de la sécularisation et de la neutralité re-
ligieuse du pouvoir politique, l'une des valeurs 
fondamentales des sociétés européennes. Il 
s'agit là d'un étrange procès instruit au nom 
d'un mélange politiquement très efficace d'in-
génuité, de manipulation et d'ignorance…..  
 
…..Manipulation que de confondre la recon-
naissance du fait religieux comme élément 
constitutif d'une culture déterminée avec le 
refus du pluralisme religieux comme élément 
constitutif des sociétés européennes actuelles. 
C'est une idée singulière que de récuser, sous 
prétexte que la pratique religieuse de chacun 
relève désormais de la sphère privée au même 
titre que le choix d'un livre, la décoration d'un 
appartement ou la détermination d'un lieu de 
villégiature, le rôle central des croyances re-
ligieuses et des institutions ecclésiales dans la 
formation des structures mentales propres aux 
différentes sociétés et dans l'élaboration des 
modèles culturel et politique dans lesquels 
celles-ci se reconnaissent. Nier que les fron-
tières de l'Europe, fiction géographique mais 
réalité historico-culturelle, ont été largement 
déterminées par des confrontations religieuses 
reviendrait à nier l'histoire. Être européen ce 
n'est pas être chrétien mais l'avoir été, non pas 
individuellement mais collectivement, non pas 
personnellement mais historiquement, non pas 
cléricalement mais culturellement….. 
 
…L'inscription géographique de cette identité 
culturelle est à l'évidence malaisée…. 
….L'expansion planétaire du modèle européen 
n'est pas la cause unique de notre difficulté à 
assigner à l'Europe des frontières qui ne soient 
pas le simple produit de conventions 
géographiques ou diplomatiques. À l'ouest et 
au nord, la frontière, l'eau et la glace, est 
géographique bien davantage que culturelle. 
…..À l'est, la situation est moins claire encore. 
Non seulement rien de sérieux ne sépare 
géographiquement le «  petit cap d’Asie  » 
qu’est l’Europe selon Paul Valéry, du reste du 
continent qu’elle prolonge, mais, sur le plan 
de l’histoire et de la culture, s’est de longue 
date dessinée, à la charnière de l’Orient et de 
l’Occident, une immense zone grise em-
pruntant à l’est et à l’ouest ses éléments con-
stitutifs.  
 
…Curieusement, toutefois, alors que la ques-
tion de l'adhésion turque soulève désormais 
les passions, c'est au sud que la frontière de 
l'Europe devrait être regardée comme la moins 
contestable.  
 
…..Aussi bien n'y en a-t-il pas une mais trois 
au sud de l'Europe : une frontière convention-
nelle, celle des géographes, qui arrête l'Europe 
au Bosphore et passe à l'intérieur du territoire 
turc  ; celle de l'islam, qui parcourt les États 
balkaniques, les divise entre eux et à l'intérieur 
d'eux-mêmes  ; la frontière politique, enfin, 
celle qui sépare la Turquie des États bal-
kaniques. C'est à l'évidence cette dernière que 
les Européens devraient retenir. On imagine 
mal qu'on puisse vouloir remettre en cause les 
frontières actuelles de la Turquie ou laisser 
durablement aux portes de l'Union les laissés-
pour-compte musulmans du reflux ottoman — 
Bosniaques, Albanais, Kosovars, Macédo-
niens ou Bulgares — même si l'on ne doit pas 
sous-estimer les difficultés d'intégration au 
modèle européen dominant de ces peuples 
déchirés et tourmentés qui sont dans l'épais-
seur du trait.  
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….Le problème posé par la présence histori-
que de la Turquie sur le territoire européen ne 
se réduit pas à une querelle de bornage. Il 
oblige à s'interroger plus profondément sur la 
nature des liens politiques passés et présents 
entre la Turquie et les États européens. Indé-
pendamment de la différence de civilisation 
entre celle-là et ceux-ci, il serait absurde de 
contester que la Turquie a été dans le passé un 
membre à part entière du système européen et 
qu'elle est aujourd'hui un acteur majeur du 
système atlantique…. 
 
…..On ne saurait ni ignorer la participation 
historique de la Turquie au concert européen 
ni en déduire que cette participation vaut lais-
sez-passer pour l'Union européenne. Ancêtre 
rudimentaire tout à la fois du Conseil eu-
ropéen, du Conseil atlantique, du G8 et du 
Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, le con-
cert européen n'était ni spécifiquement eu-
ropéen ni constitutif d'une véritable Union. 
…..Sur le plan politique, on ne saurait voir 
dans cet instrument parfaitement informel de 
négociation intergouvernementale entre des 
puissances rivales une quelconque préfigura-
tion de l'Union européenne telle qu'elle aspire 
à devenir : ce club d'« amis éternels », selon la 
formule de Pascal Lamy, décidés non pas 
simplement à ajuster leurs intérêts et à régler 
leurs différends mais à agir ensemble, une fois 
pour toutes, sur la base d'un transfert fédéral 
de compétences au profit d'institutions com-
munes. …… 
 
…..Ce sont deux choses fort différentes, en 
effet, que celles qui consistent, d’un côté, à 
construire l'union des Européens et, de l’autre, 
à participer à une alliance internationale de 
type classique, comme l'Otan ou le Pacte de 
Bagdad, associant des États potentiellement 
menacés par un adversaire commun….  
….Pour les Européens d'aujourd'hui, le choix 
est clair : tout dépend de ce qu'ils veulent faire 
ensemble. S'ils veulent organiser une fédéra-
tion de peuples et d'États destinée à exprimer, 
par-delà les rivalités politiques d'hier, leur 
identité commune et à s'imposer plus qu'au-
jourd'hui comme acteur à part entière dans un 
monde multipolaire, il leur est nécessaire de 
s'en tenir autant que possible au cadre territo-
rial que leur a légué l'histoire. S'ils entendent, 
en revanche, poursuivre un simple objectif de 
réconciliation et de rapprochement entre des 
peuples traditionnellement hostiles, s'il ne 
s'agit pour eux que d'ajuster des intérêts con-
tradictoires et de tenter de substituer entre les 
peuples le dialogue et le droit à la confronta-
tion et à la violence, il leur faut s'affranchir 
des contraintes de l'histoire et de la 
géographie, chercher les nouveaux membres à 
raison de ce qui les distingue et non de ce qui 
les rapproche des anciens, engager l'Union sur 
la voie d'une expansion géographique progres-
sive mais illimitée. 
 
L'adhésion de la Turquie trancherait une hési-
tation d'un demi-siècle entre deux conceptions 
de l'Union, idéologique d'un côté, géopolitique 
de l'autre. Elle consacrerait la victoire d'une 
Europe éthérée, réduite à l'exaltation de 
valeurs universelles et du droit, sur une 
Europe enracinée dans une terre et une histoire 
particulière, la victoire d'une Europe onusi-
enne sur une Europe carolingienne….  
 
…L'Union européenne avec la Turquie aurait 
l'avantage de contraindre peu et l'inconvénient 
de promettre moins encore. ….Sur le plan 
budgétaire, l'écart de situation entre ses mem-
bres serait trop massif pour qu'on puisse le 
combler sans des transferts financiers con-
sidérables.  
 
…. Sur le plan juridique, l'inégalité persistante 
des membres de l'Union devant les exigences 
effectives, et non pas simplement nominales, 
de l'État de droit porterait un coup d'arrêt peut-
être définitif au développement de l'espace 
commun de liberté, de sécurité et de justice. 
Fondé sur la mise en œuvre d'un principe de 
reconnaissance mutuelle des différents 
systèmes juridiques nationaux, un tel espace 
est inconcevable s'il n'y a pas entre les États 
membres un socle commun de principes, de 
procédures et de garanties. Économiquement, 
enfin, il sera longtemps illusoire de prétendre 
intégrer la Turquie à la zone euro sans s'ex-
poser à des chocs asymétriques majeurs et 
répétés. 
 
Ce reflux général des politiques communes, 
dont on ne contestera pas qu'il est voulu par 
plus d'un État membre, Royaume-Uni en tête, 
tendrait à faire de l'Union la variante interna-
tionale du célèbre « couteau sans lame auquel 
il manque le manche ». … Ainsi vidée de l'es-
sentiel de sa substance, l'Union élargie 
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que l'Union douanière dont la Turquie est déjà 
membre et qui ne paraît pas lui suffire.  
 
…..L'appauvrissement général des contenus 
de l'Union se doublerait d'un profond dé-
phasage de son système institutionnel. Celui-
ci se révélerait à l'épreuve des faits tout à la 
fois surdimensionné et dénaturé. Surdimen-
sionné parce qu'avec son Parlement élu au 
suffrage universel et son autorité exécutive 
démocratiquement investie et politiquement 
responsable devant les élus des peuples, l'Un-
ion dispose déjà d'institutions caractéristiques 
d'une fédération politique d'États. Réduite à 
une double fonction de concertation entre 
États souverains et de régulation juridique en-
tre partenaires économiques, elle n'aurait nul 
besoin de tout l'appareil institutionnel et 
procédural que lui ont accordé les Traités suc-
cessifs. L'Union deviendrait alors le seul cas 
connu de zone de libre-échange gérée par un 
quasi-État fédéral. À l'inverse de la formule 
traditionnelle, elle ferait figure de Vespa 
équipée d'un moteur de porte-avions ! 
 
Cette contradiction est, en fait, ingérable. 
….L'indétermination des frontières finales de 
l'Union frappe le projet européen d'une 
faiblesse essentielle. La question n'est pas de 
savoir ce que dans la foulée de l'adhésion 
turque il adviendra des candidatures poten-
tielles ou déclarées de l'Arménie, d'Israël ou 
du Maroc et, derrière elles, de celles des États 
de Transcaucasie, du Levant et du Maghreb. 
L'embarras est d'une autre nature. Il tient au 
fait qu'une fois la Turquie admise dans l'Un-
ion, il n'y aura plus de différences entre l'Eu-
rope et la non-Europe, l'intégration de l'altérité 
turque détruisant l'identité historico-culturelle 
de l'Union et ruinant toute idée d'un marqueur 
significatif entre celle-ci et ce qui l'entoure. 
 
Avec la frontière disparaît pour l'Europe la 
possibilité d'être un acteur à part entière de la 
communauté internationale. Là encore, la 
question n'est pas de savoir si la Turquie est 
plus ou moins inféodée à Washington, mais 
plus essentiellement si l'Union européenne a 
vocation à exister en qualité de membre eu-
ropéen de la communauté internationale, dé-
positaire de valeurs, d'intérêts et d’approches 
spécifiques à cette partie du monde ou si elle 
doit s'imaginer comme un instrument de régu-
lation internationale offert à tous ceux qui 
veulent s'y soumettre, une sorte de petite ONU 
géographiquement atrophiée mais politique-
ment aussi impuissante que la grande. L'Eu-
rope élargie qu'on nous propose est, en réalité, 
une Europe désincarnée, condamnée par un 
universalisme à gaz pauvre à laisser aux autres 
le soin d'assumer la défense et la promotion de 
ce qu'ils ont de particulier et d'irréductible au 
sein de la communauté humaine. Les autres, 
c'est-à-dire à l'extérieur les grandes puissances 
mondiales et à l'intérieur les États nationaux, 
dépositaires souverains de leurs particularités 
respectives et manipulateurs sournois d'une 
Union européenne réduite à l'antique et stérile 
concert des nations. 
 
Rien n'est à cet égard plus faux que d'imaginer 
que l'élargissement de l'Union à la Turquie 
puisse lui permettre de jouer un rôle actif de 
médiateur dans les affaires Nord-Sud et de 
contribuer à désamorcer la guerre annoncée 
des civilisations. Pour atteindre un tel but, il 
n'est en réalité que deux approches théorique-
ment possibles  : soit la création d'un instru-
ment efficace de régulation planétaire, c'est-à-
dire une ONU réformée et renforcée ; soit l'é-
mergence d'un acteur géopolitique nouveau, 
disposant de la volonté et des moyens de faire 
prévaloir sur la violence et la confrontation 
l'action multilatérale, la règle de droit et la 
coopération Nord-Sud. L'Union élargie devrait 
perdre ici sur les deux tableaux : ses limites 
géographiques, fussent-elles arbitraires et 
transitoires, l'empêcheraient d'être autre chose 
qu'un ensemble régional confronté à d'autres 
ensembles régionaux. Elle serait d'autant 
moins capable d'être un arbitre respecté que sa 
nouvelle frontière sud traverserait un Moyen-
Orient en feu et la contraindrait à s'engager 
dans l'ensemble des contentieux de la zone — 
avenir du Kurdistan irakien, bataille pour le 
contrôle de l'eau, relations avec Israël et la 
Syrie — moins en qualité d'honnête courtier 
impartial que de partie directement intéressée 
au règlement des conflits. Par ailleurs, la di-
mension kantienne de l'Union, fortement 
stimulée par sa transformation en communauté 
multiculturelle fondée sur le droit et non sur 
l'histoire, l'empêcherait plus encore qu'au-
jourd'hui de s'assumer en tant que puissance à 
part entière, capable de défendre ses intérêts 
spécifiques et de faire prévaloir sa propre vi-
sion du monde. Par une dernière ruse de l'his-
toire, la Turquie apporterait à l'Europe les mo-
yens militaires d'une puissance accrue tout en 
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velle au service d'une identité devenue imagi-
naire et d'une volonté commune introuvable. 
 
C'est au bout du compte Michel Rocard, 
champion désenchanté de la cause d'Ankara, 
qui dit les choses avec le plus de netteté. Son 
plaidoyer sans enthousiasme «  pour une 
Europe sans âme » a le mérite de ne rien dis-
simuler à l'opinion des deux implications fon-
damentales de l'adhésion potentielle de la 
Turquie  : l’engagement de l’Union dans un 
processus indéfini d’élargissement et le renon-
cement à ce que l’ancien premier ministre 
nomme « une Europe capable non seulement 
de défendre mais d’exporter vers d’autres con-
tinents son modèle social, et capable aussi de 
peser fortement sur les affaires mondiales  ; 
bref, d’être une puissance  ». Depuis quinze 
ans, les dirigeants européens refusent de 
choisir entre ces deux conceptions de l'Eu-
rope.  
Maastricht avait simultanément ouvert la voie 
à une Europe fédérale et à une Europe inter-
gouvernementale. La première exclut la 
Turquie et la seconde l'autorise. Depuis lors, 
la préférence implicite des dirigeants na-
tionaux s’est manifestée à divers signes : ad-
hésions dénuées du moindre contenu politique 
explicite, intergouvernementalisation ram-
pante des institutions, déchirement des gou-
vernements sur le conflit irakien, et enfin 
marche résolue de l’Union vers la candidature 
turque. Cette dernière option confirme toutes 
les autres. Par l'ouverture imminente de négo-
ciations d'adhésion avec la Turquie, c'est bien 
l'impuissance conjointe des États dans une 
Europe sans frontières que l’on inscrit à 
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TURKEY AT THE EDGE OF A NEW 
ERA: 
THE EU AND NEW TURKISH LIRA  
 
On the 6th of October the European Com-
mission will unveil the Regular Progress Re-
port and The Impact Assessment for Tur-
key. In addition, the Commission is re-
quired to provide the European Council 
with a recommendation on whether or not 
to launch the accession negotiations with 
Turkey. On the verge of these reports and 
the recommendation, the intuition of the 
European political and financial circles 
about the outcome is rather positive. Such a 
feeling might be the result of encouraging 
and clear messages conveyed by the 
Enlargement Commissioner, Günter Ver-
heugen following his monitoring visit to 
Turkey and his meeting with Prime Minis-
ter R.Tayyıp Erdoğan in Brussels.  
 
Positive prospects regarding Turkey’s EU bid 
increases the level of market confidence for 
the Turkish economy. Recently, Standard & 
Poor’s has raised Turkey’s long-term foreign 
currency sovereign credit rating from B-plus 
to BB-minus and long-term local currency 
sovereign credit rating from BB-minus to BB
1. 
 
Likewise, Fitch Ratings raised the outlook for 
Turkey’s long-term foreign and local currency 




Progress in EU – Turkey relations has re-
flected positively to the Turkish macroeco- 






nomic conditions leading to a sustainable sta-
bility. As an outcome of constantly ameliorat-
ing economic performance in the last two 
years, Turkey has stepped into the “low infla-
tion-high growth” era. In Turkey, invest-
ments have risen even with the volatile exter-
nal and internal prices. Cooperation between 
Turkey and IMF continues to lead the country 
day by day to a better economic condition. 
According to IMF, macroeconomic conditions 
in Turkey are at their best in decades. 
 
The economic growth in Turkey will be em-
powered by the launch of New Turkish Lira 
(YTL). YTL will be in circulation from Janu-
ary 1, 2005. Conversion rate will be: 
 
1 YTL = 1.000.000 TL 
Sub-unit of YTL will be KURUS (YKr), the 
equivalent of cents in Euro. 
1 YTL = 100 YKr 
 
The composition of denominations for YTL 
banknotes will be 1, 5, 10, 20, 50 and 100. 
The denominations for the coins will be 
1,5,10,25,50 YKr and 1 YTL. The YTL and 
old Turkish Lira will co-exist during 2005 and 
at the end of the year old Turkish Lira will be 
withdrawn from circulation.  
 
Coupling the ongoing hard work to drive in-
flation down to single digit with the introduc-
tion of YTL, the Central Bank aims at restor-
ing Turkish citizens’ confidence to their own 
currency as well as improving Turkish cur-
rency’s reputation in the world markets. Re-
moving zeros from the currency will also 
eradicate the technical and operational prob-
lems caused in the past by multiple zeros in 
currency.  
 
As the Central Bank authorities proclaim, the 
New Turkish Lira is the symbol and the 
evidence of Turkey’s determination to drive 
inflation down and move forward towards 
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Introductory Note from CEPS 
 
This issue of CEPS Turkey in Europe Monitor 
presents a long extract of the Working Paper 
titled “The Turkish Gate: Energy Transit and 
Security Issues”, prepared by John Roberts 
within the scope of the joint CEPS-EFPF Pro-
ject, “Strategy for Turkey and the EU in the 
Pre-Accession Period”. CEPS and EFPF 
gratefully acknowledge financial support for 
this project from the Open Society Institute of 
Istanbul, Akbank, Coca Cola, Dogus Holding 
and Finansbank. CEPS acknowledges the kind 
support for the production of the Turkey in 
Europe Monitor provided by EU Information 
Group of Turkey (ABIG). 
The paper sets out Turkey’s current and poten-
tial role in the supply of gas to Europe, start-
ing with the EU’s need for gas, the geography 
of global gas disposition and Turkey’s impor-
tance as a natural funnel through which the 
EU can access gas from many of the world’s 




Turkey’s role in the context of EU reliance on 
Russia as its largest single supplier of gas. It 
deals with the existing and potential pipeline 
infrastructure for gas supplies to Europe via 
Turkey and discusses what role the EU is al-
ready playing, and might be expected to play 
in the future, with regard to ensuring its en-
ergy security by means of pipeline develop-
ment to carry gas to EU market via Turkey.   
Gas is the prime focus of the paper. Although 
oil security is of obvious importance to the EU 
and Turkey is a major transit country for oil 
supplies, essentially the problem of ensuring 
oil security for the EU is, in geographical 
terms, argued to be a global one due to the 
fungibility of oil. Oil issues are therefore cov-
ered in an appendix available with the full text 
of the Working Paper at www.ceps.be. 
 
Michael Emerson and Senem Aydın 
 






Turkey’s role as a gateway through which gas 
can enter the European Community is becom-
ing increasingly important as the European 
Union grapples with the interrelated problems 
of ensuring energy security and the provision 
of energy supplies from multiple sources at 
competitive prices. 
                                                                                                 
1 John Roberts is a specialist on the geopolitics of 
energy with the Platts energy group, serving as 
Senior Editor with the group and focusing on en-
ergy security. 
A net energy importer, and itself a major mar-
ket for regional producers, Turkey’s impor-
tance lies in its ability and willingness to de-
velop major transit systems for gas as well as 
oil, thus enabling hydrocarbon resources to 
access European markets by pipeline from 
such diverse regions as the Caspian, Central 
Asia, the Gulf, and the eastern Mediterranean. 
Regional Gas Disposition 
Turkey lies adjacent to countries or regions 
possessing some 71.8% of the world’s proven 
gas reserves and some 72.7% of the world’s 
proven oil reserves
2. But such figures are 
somewhat misleading, essentially for two rea-
sons. Firstly, gas is a very different commodity 
                                                                                                 
2 According to the BP Statistical Review of World 
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compared to oil; secondly, some producers, 
notably Russia, have comparatively little in-
terest in utilising Turkey as a transit country. 
In this context, the most relevant element 
might be that as many as 10 current producers, 
collectively possessing 35.5% of global 
proven gas reserves, either have, or might rea-
sonably be expected to have, an interest in di-
recting exports to Europe via Turkey.  
Perhaps surprisingly, Turkey’s current or po-
tential role in oil transportation is considerably 
less important than its current or potential role 
in gas transit. There is no doubt that oil pipe-
lines across Turkey do play, and will play, a 
major role in the global energy market but 
their role can best be defined as useful and im-
portant rather than vital. Oil is essentially a 
fungible commodity; it is more flexibly trans-
ported than gas (notably by sea) and Turkey’s 
role in this context is one that concerns the 
global energy supply system rather than that of 
the European Union alone. Gas, however, is a 
different matter: it is more complex and, in a 
strictly EU context, Turkey’s role, both current 
and potential, is much greater.  
Gas Transit Issues 
The European Union is already the world’s 
biggest gas import market while it is also one 
of the world’s fastest-growing energy markets. 
It possesses a variety of energy import sources 
– notably Russia and Algeria – but is naturally 
seeking to diversify supplies. Turkey’s role is 
potentially extremely important in that it fur-
nishes a natural corridor through which gas 
from a wide variety of suppliers in an arc from 
the Caspian through the Middle East and the 
Gulf to Egypt can access the growing EU 
market by pipeline. With the EU already in 
receipt of large volumes of gas from three 
main sources – Russia, the North Sea and 
North Africa – Turkey’s goal is to become 
Europe’s fourth main artery.  
The EU’s Gas Balance to 2030  
The European Union is already looking to 
Turkey as a potential import route, while Tur-
key is very much looking to the EU as a mar-
ket for gas transiting through Turkey. This 
relationship is fuelled by Europe’s prospective 
demand for gas imports and the availability of 
supplies to meet much of this demand in coun-
tries adjacent or close to Turkey.  
The International Energy Agency (IEA) esti-
mates that the EU’s primary gas demand is 
expected to grow by 2.9% per year from 2000 
to 2010 and by 1.6% from 2010 to 2030. It 
anticipates that demand will increase in all 
end-use sectors, but most dramatically so in 
power generation.
3 In this case, it appears to be 
defining the EU as meaning the EU-15, the 15 
members of the Union prior to its enlargement 
on 1 May 2004. In contrast, various other pro-
jections for the EU are based on an EU-30, 
which includes all the current EU member 
states plus the three current candidate states of 
Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey and two other 
countries observing EU energy principles, 
Norway and Switzerland.  
According to recent projections, the EU-30 are 
expected to consume almost 700 bcm/y of gas 
by 2030.
4 The International Energy Agency 
acknowledges a massive dependence on im-
ports. It envisages imports rising from 187 
bcm in 2000 to 632 bcm in 2030, a 449-bcm/y 
increase (see Tables 1 and 2).  
These tables slightly overstate Europe’s reli-
ance on imports, since Norway, which in 2000 
accounted for one quarter of EU imports and 
which is still expected to account for 17% of 
European imports in 2030, is firmly listed as 
an import source. In this context, however, the 
EU’s supplies from Norway should more 
properly be considered as part of EU domestic 
production, in view of Norway’s membership 
of the European Economic Area and its con-
version of the EU’s gas directive into domestic 
legislation. Indeed, the text of the European 
Green Paper of 2002, in asserting that Russia 
and Algeria occupy the two leading places as 
external suppliers of gas to the EU, effectively 
acknowledges Norway as an internal supplier. 
Even so, this still means that the EU will re-
main considerably dependent on imports. In a 
recent presentation, the IEA’s chief economist, 
Dr Fatih Birol, anticipated that the growth in 
                                                                                                 
3 International Energy Agency, World Energy Out-
look 2002, Paris, 2002, p. 189. 
4 Presentation by Dr Fatih Birol, Chief Economist 
for the International Energy Agency, to the seminar 
on Natural Gas in South East Europe: Investment, 
Transit and Trade, in Istanbul, 5-6 May 2004.  100 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
 
imports to 2030 would likely be covered as 
follows: 
5 
•  An extra 79 bcm from Russia;  
•  An extra 51 bcm from Central Asia;  
•  An extra 157 bcm from the Middle East,  
•  An extra 136 bcm from West and North 
Africa; and 
•  An extra 18 bcm from the Americas 
(mainly Trinidad & Tobago).  
This totals 441 bcm/y, possibly indicating a 
slight reduction in the IEA’s anticipated im-
port requirements. In terms of distribution, the 
IEA has produced this assessment concerning 
the distribution of gas imports into the EU – or 
at least the EU-15 – for 2000 and 2030. 
Table 1. EU-15 and EU-30 gas import depend-
ence, 1998-2030 (%) 
  1998 2010 2020 2030 
EU-15   49 54 62 71 
Europe-30   36 42 51 60 
Source: European Commission (2000), Green Paper on a 
European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply, 
November. 
 
Table 2. EU-15 gas balance, 1998-2030 (in bcm) 
 1998  2002  2030 
Production  202.3 208.8  153 
Consumption  349.1 385.6  506 
Balance to be 
covered by 
imports 
147.2 177.2  359 
Import de-
pendency  42.2%  46.0
%  71% 
Source: For 1998 and 2002 figures, BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2003; Projections for 2030 derived from per-
centages cited in European Commission (2000), Green Paper 
on a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply, 
November. Note the BP figures for 1998 reduce the apparent 
level of import dependence to 42.2% when set against the 
49% level cited in the European Commission Green Paper, 
2000. 
                                                                                                 
5 Presentation to seminar on Natural Gas in South 
East Europe: Investment Transit Trade. Held in 
Istanbul, 5-6 May 2004. 
Table 3. EU gas import distribution, 2000 and 2030  
 2000  2030 
Africa   33.5%  28% 
Norway   25%  17% 
Transition 
economies  41% 33% 
Middle East  Neg.  17% 
Latin Amer-
ica  Neg. 5% 
Other   1%  Neg. 
Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2002. 
In terms of import flexibility, it should be 
noted that Libya is due to be directly con-
nected to Italy by the ‘Green Stream’ pipeline 
(with first flows currently scheduled for early 
2006), adding to the variety of low-cost gas 
imports from North Africa. In addition, LNG 
is also becoming increasingly important in the 
EU gas mix, with the IEA arguing that “LNG 
would become especially important if there 
turned out to be less Russian gas than ex-
pected.”
6 LNG is already a significant factor in 
the energy mix of countries with Mediterra-
nean or Atlantic coastlines, but has yet to 
make a significant mark in northern and cen-
tral Europe.  
Transport and Geography 
Turkey’s proximity to gas producers is much 
more directly relevant to the question of EU 
energy security – and to the terms under which 
the EU can expect to secure gas from other 
producers, notably Russia. Gas is essentially 
transported by two methods: by pipeline and 
as liquefied natural gas (LNG). In the Turkey-
EU context, pipelines are the more important 
issue, but their importance is obviously af-
fected by the ability or willingness of the EU 
to increase LNG imports.  
Because Russia has its own direct pipeline sys-
tems serving the EU market, it is not particu-
larly interested in routes through Turkey, 
which it is likely to view in an essentially 
competitive context, even though the EU 
might argue that routes through Turkey are 
intended to complement, rather than compete 
with, Russian pipeline supplies. But Turkey is 
located close to a number of other gas produc-
                                                                                                 
6 International Energy Agency, World Energy Out-
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ers which have had, or may have, an interest in 
assessing the prospect of accessing European 
markets by means of pipelines through Tur-
key. Countries currently studying prospects for 
delivery of their gas through Europe include 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Iran, and Egypt.  
Countries with gas reserves that have previ-
ously considered the issue, and might reasona-
bly be expected to do so again include Turk-
menistan, Iraq and Qatar. In addition, Uzbeki-
stan, Saudi Arabia and Syria have potential 
interests in tacking on their output to networks 
developed to serve their neighbours’ exports. 
These ten countries collectively possess 55.34 
tcm in proven gas reserves, equivalent to 
35.5% of the world’s total reserves of 155.78 
tcm. 
Table 4. Reserve estimates for Turkey’s gas-
producing neighbours (in trillions of 
cubic metres – tcm) 









Saudi Arabia  6.36 
Syria 0.24 




Source: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, London, 
June 2003. 
With regard to Russia, Turkey is mainly, so far 
as transit is concerned, a competitor rather 
than a conduit. However there is one major gas 
line from Russia to Turkey that appears to 
have been built with at least a possible view to 
onward transfer of Russian gas to markets be-
yond Turkey. This is the 16 bcm/y Blue 
Stream line under the Black Sea opened in 
2002 and which, in simple supply terms, could 
be used to ship gas to markets elsewhere in 
Europe. As of mid-2004, Gazprom has refused 
to entertain such ideas, although Turkey has 
raised the issue in repeated negotiations con-
cerning the pricing of gas delivered through 
the line. However, periodically there have 
been various Russian suggestions that the Blue 
Stream line, or fresh connections through the 
Caucasus, might be used to supply Israel with 
Russian gas via Turkey.  
The Challenge from LNG 
Pipeline is the more normal transportation 
method for gas but LNG offers an increasingly 
competitive alternative particularly over dis-
tances of 3,000 kms or more. Although it re-
quires provision of expensive liquefaction 
plants, to convert the gas to liquid form so that 
it can be transported by sea, and the availabil-
ity of purpose-built tankers, in some cases it 
may even prove competitive with pipelines at 
distances of 1,000 kms. Egyptian plans for 
developing gas exports by means of LNG cur-
rently appear to be more advanced than re-
cently revived plans for an extension of the 
recently constructed Egypt-Jordan gas line 
(now being extended to Syria and Lebanon) 
into Southern Turkey. Qatar has already in-
vested heavily in LNG projects and while it 
did consider proposals for piped exports to 
Europe via Turkey in the 1980s, it is only 
likely to revive such proposals seriously if it 
becomes convinced that Turkey is indeed cre-
ating a new artery; that Iraq can offer a stable 
interconnection between the Gulf and Turkey, 
and that gas shipments to new European mar-
kets will not prove counterproductive to its 
existing LNG trade. At present, repeated at-
tacks on Iraq’s northern oil pipeline to Turkey 
make it highly unlikely that anyone will move 
to develop a parallel gas pipeline in the imme-
diate future, although the issue is kept under 
constant technical review in Ankara.  
The focus which Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Oman 
are placing on development of LNG exports 
almost certainly ensures that while Gulf re-
serves remain key to the global gas balance, 
the prospect of major Gulf exports to Europe 
via Turkey is very much a second stage pros-
pect. Iran furnishes an obvious exception to 
this in that it is actively seeking to export gas 
to the EU via Turkey. But whether its 
neighbours on the Arab side of the Gulf will 
follow suit will depend very much on the ini-
tial success of such projects as the Turkey-
Greece gas line and the Nabucco project (see 
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Incoming Pipelines to Turkey 
Whether Turkey can become the EU’s ‘fourth 
artery’ very much depends on the completion 
or implementation of various projects designed 
to bring gas to Turkey, to transport it from 
Turkey, and to increase Turkey’s own 
throughput capacity.  
This is certainly Turkey’s goal and, indeed 
Turkey already has one major important pipe-
line which might, in time, be used to ferry gas 
to European markets beyond Turkey itself: the 
20 bcm/y capacity Tabriz-Erzurum line which 
opened in December 2001 and which now car-
ries Iranian gas to Ankara and other parts of 
Turkey. In addition, in conjunction with BP, 
Statoil and other developers of Azerbaijan’s 
giant Shakh Deniz field, it is committed to 
building the $1bn South Caucasus Gas Pipe-
line from Baku to a connection with its own 
East-West Main Trunk Pipeline at Erzurum. 
The Baku-Erzurum line will initially have a 
capacity of around 7-8 bcm/y but is designed 
for expansion up to at least 16 bcm/y.  
But Turkey’s ability is to import gas from its 
neighbours, particularly with regard to subse-
quent transit of that gas to markets in Europe, 
is not limited to Iran and Azerbaijan alone (see 
Table 5). 
Table 5. Potential Eurasian gas suppliers to the 
EU market (by pipeline) 
a. Supply potential as of 2010 






Iran   10 bcm  Turkey  20-30bcm  3-10 bcm 
Turkmeni-
stan 
13 bcm  Iran/ 
Turkey 












36 bcm  36 bcm 
Azerbaijan  7 bcm  Turkey  20 bcm  6-20 bcm* 
Iraq  10 bcm  Turkey  10 bcm  None 
Egypt 4  bcm  Jordan/ 
Syria 
10-12 bcm  Link  
to Jordan** 
 * SCP system under construction, due to open 2006. 
* * Egypt-Jordan gas line has reached Syrian border. 
 
b. Additional supply potential post-2015 
Country Volume  Transit country  Existing 
system 
Qatar 20-30  bcm  Kuwait/Iraq/ 
Turkey 
None 
Egypt  10-12 bcm  Jordan/Syria  Link to Syria* 
Saudi Arabia  10-20 bcm  Jordan/Syria/ 
Turkey 
None 
Kazakhstan  10-20 bcm  Azerbaijan/  None  
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 20-30  bcm  Azerbaijan/ 
Turkey 
None 
Turkmenistan  30-36 bcm  Iran/Turkey  Limited  
connections** 
Uzbekistan   5-10 bcm  Turkmenistan/ 
Azer/Turkey 
None 
* This would be additional to the 10-12 bcm potential 
delivery before 2015. 
** Turkmenistan’s Caspian shore gas fields are already 
linked into the Iranian network via the 12 bcm/y capacity 
line from Korpedzhe to Kurt-Kui, but there are no sig-
nificant connections to Iran from Turkmenistan’s main 
central and southeastern gas fields. 
 
c. Potential gas pipelines from Turkey to (other) 
EU countries 





























Source: IEA, Methinks. 
The South Caucasus Pipeline 
Construction of the new Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum 
line, officially called the South Caucasus Pipe-
line (SCP), is officially due to be completed in 
September 2006 at a cost of $953m.
7 Curi-
ously, whether construction work on this pro-
ject has yet started remains a moot point. Be-
cause the sections of this line in Azerbaijan 
and Georgia use the same right of way as the 
better known 1.0 mb/d Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
oil pipeline, basic groundbreaking and site 
preparation work, particularly in difficult ter-
rain, is being carried out for both lines simul-
taneously. With a similar stakeholding in the 
two lines, and with BP as operator of both sys-
tems, coordination of the two projects meant 
that as of mid-2004, the emphasis was on lay-
ing oil pipe. But as pipe laying for BTC ends 
in the second half of the year, pipe laying 
work on the gas line was expected to start in 
earnest.  
                                                                                                 
7 Mejid Kerimov, Azerbaijani Minister of Fuel and 
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The SCP will initially have a capacity of 
around 7-8 bcm/y, but documentation pro-
duced by BP in March 2004 showed an even-
tual planned capacity level of 20 bcm/y. This 
now appears to be the general long-term target 
for Azeri gas exports, the marketing of which 
is now being carried out by one of the major 
partner’s in both SCP and Azerbaijan’s giant 
Shakh Deniz gas field, Norway’s Statoil.
8  
The official timetable for delivery of Azeri gas 
to Turkey, which may well slip, envisages a 
starting rate of 2.0 bcm/y in 2006, rising to 3 
bcm/y the following year, to 5.0 bcm/y in 
2008, and then reaching its initial plateau level 
of 6.6 bcm/y in 2009. Although the initial 
2001 sale and purchase agreement were appar-
ently based on projected Turkish domestic us-
age of this gas, it is now clear that much or all 
of it will go straight to Greece. Norway’s Sta-
toil, which is responsible for securing export 
contracts for Azeri gas via the South Caucasus 
Pipeline, is actively assessing various Euro-
pean markets, starting with Greece. 
Other Connections 
Turkey is also pursuing discussions with vari-
ous other potential suppliers. The most impor-
tant of these is, probably, Iran, since Tehran 
has already been discussing eventual deliveries 
of gas to Greece via Turkey, whilst EU offi-
cials have spoken of Iran as a long-term gas 
supplier to EU member states. Current agree-
ments provide for Iranian deliveries to Turkey 
to plateau at 9.56 bcm/y in 2007, but as the 
line has the potential to handle double this 
volume, and as Turkey’s own gas demand pro-
jections remain unclear, it seems likely that at 
least part of the line’s capacity will be used to 
supply gas to the Turkish system that will sub-
sequently be forwarded to other European 
markets.  
As mentioned previously, Turkish officials 
also continue to discuss with their Iraqi coun-
terparts what they call the ‘Iraq Integrated 
Natural Gas Pipeline Project’ by which they 
hope to see a Turkish-Iraqi consortium, em-
bracing both the public and private sector, de-
                                                                                                 
8 Azerbaijan’s Kerimov, speaking in Istanbul in 
January 2004, said Shakh Deniz has a large capac-
ity “so we must set up more pipelines to reach 
northern Europe and the Balkan countries.” He 
added: “I’m sure the gas reserve will yield 20 
bcm/y.” 
velop gas fields in northern Iraq and bring 
some 10 bcm/y into the Turkish system, again 
with a view to forwarding some of this gas to 
other European markets.
9 But while Turkish 
officials say they have current backing for this 
project, which was first mooted in 1996, from 
the Iraqi Ministry of Energy and from private 
Turkish companies, this is a project that can-
not be undertaken until there is a substantial 
improvement in security conditions in Iraq.  
Turkish officials are also continuing discus-
sions with Egypt. But although Egypt is cur-
rently extending its gas system northwards 
though Jordan to Syria, so that it would easily 
be able to affect deliveries to southern Turkey 
by building a few hundred kilometres of extra 
pipeline, whether there is a market has yet to 
be ascertained. The pipeline could obviously 
supply gas to the industrial and petrochemical 
markets of Iskenderun and southern Turkey, 
but Turkish officials remain uncertain as to 
whether local demand justifies such an exten-
sion to the Egypt-Jordan-Syria line. What does 
seem clear is that in due course this line will 
reach the northern Syrian city of Aleppo, for 
which Iskenderun was long the traditional 
port. There is therefore a real prospect that a 
relatively small-scale local trans-border con-
nection between Aleppo and Iskenderun might 
eventually form the basis of a more substantial 
connection. In considering whether this might 
happen, several factors have to be borne in 
mind. One is Egypt’s own desire for new ex-
port markets. A small-scale entry into the 
Turkish market could prove the precursor of 
greater export sales – so long as these are 
competitive with Egypt’s obvious alternatives: 
pipeline deliveries to Europe via a proposed 
connection to Libya and the Libya-Italy 
“Green Stream” line, and development of 
LNG export facilities.  
In addition, it is worth noting that Syria itself 
possesses significant gas reserves. But the 
most important factor of all is the fact that 
Saudi Arabia possesses major gas reserves in 
the northeast of the Kingdom, which could 
easily be connected to the Egypt-Jordan-Syria-
Turkey line. Saudi Arabia is not publicly con-
templating raw gas exports but the existence of 
                                                                                                 
9 “Turkish companies are ready to realise gas pro-
jects in Iraq which will help substantially the re-
construction efforts in that country.” Hakki Akil, 
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a proven export route, albeit one which would 
need considerable expansion to serve Saudi 
interests, could prove highly advantageous as 
and when the Saudi authorities decide to re-
visit the gas export issue.  
As for Turkmenistan, Turkey continues to 
consider that it has an effective sale and pur-
chase agreement with Ashgabat (it signed a 
framework agreement for gas deliveries in Oc-
tober 1998) under which Turkmenistan would 
ultimately deliver as much as 20 bcm/y to the 
Turkish market. But since the Turkmens effec-
tively decided in 2001 to reject a serious pipe-
line project that would have brought this gas to 
Turkey via Azerbaijan, the concept of large-
scale Turkmen gas sales to Europe has, de 
facto, been in abeyance. Essentially, Turk-
menistan President Saparmurat Niyazov does 
not wish to see his gas pass through the terrain 
of a neighbouring state, Azerbaijan, which is 
both a rival gas producer in its own right and 
with which he has a serious maritime border 
dispute concerning a cluster of oilfields in the 
south-central Caspian. Although at least one 
Turkish official argues that, in time, the South 
Caucasus Pipeline from Baku to Erzurum 
“may also constitute the first part of the Turk-
menistan-European route,” accomplishment of 
such a goal will almost certainly have to await 
the post-Niyazov era in Turkmenistan.
10 
Outgoing Pipelines from Turkey 
Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler, recently 
declared that Turkey’s objective “is to make 
sure that the oil and gas resources of the region 
are transferred to the European market via this 
country.” 
Such thinking underpins both the 285-km Tur-
key-Greece pipeline, through which the Azeri 
or Turkmen gas should start to flow in late 
2006, and the much larger Nabucco project, by 
which gas from a variety of sources could start 
flowing to the Balkans as early as 2009, and 
eventually to Austria and the EU’s main con-
sumer markets in central, northern and western 
Europe.
11 
                                                                                                 
10 Direct communication to the author, Ankara, 
February 2004. 
11 “In 2006, the Shakh Deniz project will start into 
life and the Shakh Deniz gas will start flowing to 
Turkey, Greece, Europe and the Southern Ring.” 
Alev Kilic, deputy undersecretary at the Turkish 
The Nabucco Project 
The extent of detailed planning and, in particu-
lar, its development by prospective gas im-
porters makes it look increasingly probable 
that the next few years will see the develop-
ment of at least one major pipeline system for 
delivery of Eurasian gas to Europe via Turkey: 
the Nabucco project. As much as 20-30 bcm/y 
would flow northwards to markets in central, 
northern and western Europe by means of this 
project, currently being developed by Aus-
tria’s OMV in partnership with Turkey’s state 
pipeline company, Botas, Hungary’s MOL 
Transmission plc, Bulgaria’s Bulgargas and 
Romania’s Transgaz.  
Johann Gallistl, manager for international af-
fairs at Austria’s OMV Erdgas, argues that the 
3,400 km line, €4.4 bn, Nabucco project offers 
a serious prospect for delivering Middle East-
ern and Caspian gas to major European mar-
kets. The line is planned to have a capacity of 
25-30 bcm/y as it crosses Turkey. The transit 
countries would themselves take around 8-10 
bcm/y, so deliveries to Baumgarten would be 
around 17-22 bcm/y. The partners in the pro-
ject have all agreed to meet at least part of 
their own domestic demand by means of 
Nabucco.
12 
In mid-2004, a new Vienna-based venture set 
up to coordinate the project, the Nabucco 
Company Pipeline Study GMBH, was incor-
porated, with gas companies in Austria, Tur-
key, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria each 
holding a 20% stake – and with France’s Ga-
sunie showing interest in becoming a mem-
ber.. The new venture, he added, began on 5 
May the technical process for choosing a fi-
nancial adviser. By the end of the year it 
would receive the final drafts of both a full 
feasibility study and a financial assessment by 
the end of 2004 or around the start of 2005. 
These studies, Gallistl said, will present the 
group with “a complete basis for decision of 
our management to go ahead with this project 
                                                                                    
Foreign Ministry, Istanbul February 2004. Kilic 
also said the SCP will constitute the first leg of the 
Caspian-Turkish-European pipeline system. 
12 Johan Gallistl, comments made to Istanbul semi-
nar May 2004 and interview with the author. NO. 11 / NOVEMBER 2004 | 105 
 
– and we are very confident that this will hap-
pen.”
13  
Nabucco’s principals said in May that prelimi-
nary talks had been held “with Iran and some 
other interested parties” with a view to supply-
ing gas for the system, but that formal negotia-
tions with shippers would not start until the 
new joint venture had elaborated a general 
transportation contract. They added that work 
on formulating such a contract had already 
begun.  
As of early May, the joint venture and its 
backers were awaiting an interim study on 
possible usage of existing grids along the pipe-
line route, part of an overall feasibility study 
being conducted by the Boston Consulting 
Group. The current timeframe for the project is 
for a detailed technical design and an envi-
ronmental assessment study to be started in 
2005 and ready by mid-2006. The construction 
phase would last from mid-2006 to end-2009. 
The start of operations would be in 2009. 
Contractual conditions between suppliers and 
buyers will be crucial. The International En-
ergy Agency (IEA) and the Energy Charter 
Secretariat (ECS) noted that what they termed 
non-price differentiation may be a key element 
in developing competition with existing 
sources. By this they meant structuring con-
tracts in new ways that are more attractive to 
buyers, such as short- to medium-term con-
tracts and the introduction of price indexation 
systems that are not dependent on oil prices. 
Non-price differentiation, the IEA and ECS 
said in their summary of their recent seminar 
on Natural Gas in South East Europe: Invest-
ment, Transit, Trade in Istanbul, “may be a 
determinant in attracting and securing gas im-
porters which are increasingly evolving in 
volatile and competitive gas markets.”
14 
At the Istanbul seminar, it was clear that the 
IEA’s estimates for prospective EU gas import 
requirements served as an encouraging back-
ground for presentations concerning lines in-
volving Greece and the major project to carry 
gas to the heart of Europe, the Nabucco pro-
                                                                                                 
13 Interview with Johan Gallistl, Istanbul 5 May 




rope.asp. See Para 51. 
ject.
15 Moreover, there was no feeling that 
proponents of the Turkey-Greece-Italy Inter-
connector were in competition with backers of 
the Nabucco project to carry gas from Turkey 
through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to 
Austria’s major gas terminal at Baumgarten. 
The two projects target quite different regional 
markets: Italy for the interconnector from 
Greece and Central and Western Europe for 
Nabucco. There was a widespread view at the 
seminar that not only were producer countries 
providing an obvious push factor for such 
lines, but that the pull factor from consumers 
in Europe was becoming increasingly appar-
ent. Since the development of pipelines from 
Turkey to the EU is overwhelmingly demand 
driven and since the costs of such pipelines 
have to be spread between several potential 
purchasers, the development of gas importer 
consortia becomes crucial. In their own sum-
mary of the Istanbul seminar, the IEA and 
ECS clearly look forward to the creation of 
such consortia:  
As the development of gas routes is demand 
driven and requires significant investment and 
financial capacities, the involvement of major 
European gas companies and new operators in 
buying and distributing the gas is essential. 
The transformation of isolated national mar-
kets operated by public monopolies toward an 
internal EU gas market with multiple opera-
tors will have a major impact on the gas im-
port scene. Gas distribution companies, which 
will have to face increasing competition, will 
most probably create consortium(s) to secure 
import supplies and share the costs and the 
risks. All these elements combined will im-
pact on the development and the implementa-
tion calendar of transit routes across South 
East Europe, at the earliest from 2006-2007. 
The Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector 
On 23 December, 2003, Turkey’s state pipe-
line company Botas, currently still in posses-
sion of monopoly gas import powers, signed 
an agreement with its Greek counterpart, 
DEPA, concerning the commercial terms for a 
planned new 286-km gas pipeline between the 
two countries. Construction of the 36-inch line 
from Karacabey to Komotimi, costed at Euros 
                                                                                                 
15Proceedings on 
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/subjectqueries/nmc/eu
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250m and including 17kms under water, is due 
to start later this year, with the line itself due 
to open at the end of 2006. The line will ini-
tially deliver 0.75 bcm/y but will then climb to 
3 bcm/y. As and when further pipelines to 
carry gas beyond Greece become available, it 
will be able to carry up to 11 bcm/y.
16 
A feasibility study concerning a further inter-
connector, a 280-km line (with 224 kms off-
shore) between the southern Italian port of 
Otranto and a Greek terminal at Stavrilimenas, 
was due to be ready in September 2004. The 
study should disclose the investment cost 
(within a range of plus or minus 20%); the in-
vestment requirements for the Turkish grid; a 
preliminary survey of the route; and the engi-
neering of selected pipeline configurations. 
This project has long enjoyed EU backing, 
with the then EU External Relations Commis-
sioner Chris Patten providing early vocal sup-
port and the Commission itself financing ini-
tial studies. The very concept of an intercon-
nector is strategic, in that the line, as envis-
aged, would be able to carry gas from Italy to 
Greece and Turkey, or from Turkey to Greece 
and Italy. In other words, it would serve as a 
link between two main supply systems, in-
creasing flexibility of supply. 
The Karacabey-Komotimi line’s capacity is 
also being designed so that it will eventually 
be capable of transporting a potential 8 bcm/y 
onwards to Italy, via the extension to Otranto, 
or northwards to the western Balkans. To this 
end, according to Nadir Biyikoglu, Deputy 
General Manager of Turkey’s Botas pipeline 
company, 6 compressor stations will be in 
place on the Komotimi line by 2010. 
Hakki Akil, deputy director general of the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry, described the Kara-
cabey-Komotimi line as “the first step in 
reaching European markets”. He also called 
the project “an important building block of the 
East-West Energy Corridor” saying it “will 
likely turn into the Interconnector Turkey-
Greece-Italy in the near future.” 
                                                                                                 
16 “This project will be ready in 2006 when the first 
phase of Shakh Deniz will be completed,” Vassil-
ios Tsombopoulos, director for strategy and plan-
ning at DEPA, the Greek gas authority, told the 
IEA/ECS Istanbul seminar in May. 
The West Balkans Pipeline Proposal 
In considering the Turkey-Greece-Italy inter-
connector in Istanbul, DEPA also said that a 
plan for a West Balkans line was “under con-
sideration but is not mature yet.” An agree-
ment to study such the evolution and imple-
mentation of such a line was signed on 8 April 
2003 between DEPA and Botas and the gas 
authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia. A study 
by the Observatoire Méditerranéen de 
l’Énergie (OME), carried out for the European 
Commission’s Synergy Programme and pre-
sented in Istanbul, compared the Nabucco and 
West Balkans options with the Greece-Italy 
interconnector. It concluded that “projects to 
connect Turkey to Austria either through Bul-
garia, Romania and Hungary, or through Ma-
cedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia 
and Slovenia (or possibly both) are more likely 
to see the light, but would still require substan-
tial political backing.”
17 However, these coun-
tries – with the notable exceptions of Romania 
and Croatia – have small gas markets. More-
over, they suffer from political and regulatory 
uncertainties and are mountainous. This pro-
posal has therefore not attracted a real com-
mercial interest and looks more like a long-
term project. In terms of regional gas supply, 
such a line would play a significant role. But it 
is not of major concern with regard to overall 
European gas security unless it is specifically 
developed as a complementary system to the 
Nabucco project, linking Turkey not only with 
the Balkans, but with a major European hub, 
such as Baumgarten.  
Turkey’s Pipeline Infrastructure 
None of the various plans for Turkey to serve 
as a new major transit system for European 
gas deliveries can work unless Turkey’s own 
pipeline network can handle the relevant vol-
umes. Turkish officials appear bullish on the 
subject. Botas chief Biyikoglu has said: “Our 
East-West line is capable of carrying from Iran 
back to the West around 22 bcm/y. This may 
                                                                                                 
17 Observatoire Méditerranéen de l’Énergie (OME), 
Medsupply: Development of energy supplies to 
Europe from the Southern and Eastern Mediterra-
nean Countries, Chapter 2, “Transit role of the 
Mediterranean region for hydrocarbons coming 
from the Gulf and Caspian regions”, Final Report, 
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be increased by looping.”
18 However, there is 
as yet no concrete proposal for constructing a 
new parallel pipe to the existing line and little 
indication as to how such a project might be 
financed. Turkish officials have noted that, 
under Law 4646, anyone can construct trans-
mission pipelines in Turkey. One official said: 
“The Iranians are thinking of constructing a 
pipeline to Europe themselves. EMRA (the 
Energy Markets Regulatory Authority) has 
told them anyone who wants to construct a 
pipeline, after getting a license from EMRA, 
can do so.” However, the official added, there 
might be question marks concerning Iran’s 
ability to raise the capital for such a project. 
There may well be a role for the EU in gen-
eral, and the European Investment Bank in 
particular, in financing construction of such a 
key element of the infrastructure required if 
Turkey is indeed to become Europe’s fourth 
gas artery.  
The Commercial Environment and Implica-
tions: The Role of Gazprom 
The EU, Turkey and potential suppliers of gas 
to Europe by way of Turkey are not the only 
elements whose actions have to be taken into 
account.  
Looming over the whole debate of European 
energy supply and security is Gazprom. It has 
been suggested that, should it so choose, “on a 
purely commercial basis, Gazprom is in a po-
sition to saturate the Balkans market and shut 
off any potential competitor.”
19 In a technical 
sense, this is true. But it is a move with conse-
quences that even Gazprom would have to 
consider.  
There are two main background elements to be 
considered in this regard: the overall state of 
the EU-Russian energy dialogue and Russia’s 
own requirements for foreign investment, par-
ticularly in gas.  
The EU Energy Dialogue 
The fact that the European Union, the world’s 
second biggest gas consumer, is located next 
door to Russia, the world’s biggest gas pro-
ducer, makes it eminently sensible for the two 
                                                                                                 
18 Guler & Biyikoglu: Interviews with the author, 
Istanbul, February 2004. 
19 OME, Medsupply. Chapter 2, op. cit.  
parties to determine how they can best serve 
each other’s requirements. On 30 October 
2000, following a summit meeting between the 
EU and Russia in Paris, the Putin-Prodi initia-
tive was launched. The EU said it had started 
work on developing an energy partnership, 
noting Russia’s statement at the end of the 
summit that “it was prepared to work towards 
improving the Union’s long term security of 
energy supply and, as President Putin stated, to 
put the emphasis on balance in relation to 
prices and quantities.”
20 The EU added that, in 
turn, it was prepared to mobilise European 
technical assistance to facilitate European in-
vestments in transport and energy sector pro-
duction. “Specific measures should be care-
fully studied whether they concern a precise 
legal framework for investments in the energy 
sector, questions relating to taxation or a guar-
antee mechanism for investments. These 
measures should be finalised within the 
framework of a cooperation and partnership 
agreement between the European Union and 
Russia,” the Green Paper said.
21  
Such an agreement has yet to be concluded. 
One reason for the delay would appear to be 
the failure by Russia to sign the Energy Char-
ter’s projected Transit Protocol, an agreement 
intended to ensure the smooth transit of oil and 
gas both between and across countries, essen-
tially in accordance with open access princi-
ples. The protocol, if signed and implemented 
by Russia, would have helped considerably to 
open up access for Caspian producers to the 
Gazprom-controlled Russian pipeline system. 
Russia’s reluctance – refusal might be a better 
word – to sign the agreement despite years of 
prolonged negotiation, means that the envi-
ronment within which EU-Russian negotia-
tions on cooperation in energy in general and 
gas in particular have changed.  
In terms of where Turkey fits into this equa-
tion, it should be noted that Gazprom has not 
merely pursued a policy of eschewing in-
volvement in the Energy Charter Transit pro-
tocol, but has actively developed a broad strat-
egy which appears to be aimed at reducing the 
EU’s ability to import gas from third countries 
without securing Gazprom’s approval. 
                                                                                                 
20 Green Paper, Towards a European Strategy for 
the Security of Energy Supply. The European 
Commission. Brussels, November 2000. p. 74. 
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Gazprom has, in practise, developed a broad 
control strategy along the gas chain which di-
rectly conflicts with diversification routes in 
four main ways:  
•  Construction or control of cut-off routes. 
The most notable example of this is the 
Blue Stream project, which opened in 2003 
and is due to deliver 16 bcm/y of gas to 
Turkey in around 2008. The West Balkans 
line to Turkey can also be viewed in this 
light as can Gazprom’s proposal for a gas 
export system to Bulgaria and Italy.  
•  Trading. There are concerns at the way in 
which Russian companies, such as Itera and 
Eural Trans Gas, established offshore 
schemes in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 
ahead of their accession to the EU. Trans-
parency in gas sales is jeopardised. Both It-
era and Eural Trans Gas, the latter a some-
what obscure company trading offshore, 
are scarcely renowned for their transpar-
ency, whether in terms of their ownership 
or their activities. 
•  Acquisitions. Gazprom has purchased tran-
sit lines in various European countries, no-
tably in Poland, Belarus, Ukraine and Slo-
vakia.  
•  Distribution. Gazprom and other Russian 
companies have purchased distribution 
companies in Georgia, Turkey and Bul-
garia.  
The net impact is that Gazprom and other Rus-
sian gas trading companies (such as Itera, 
whose relationship to Gazprom still remains 
unclear) is already well-placed to use existing 
infrastructure to thwart deliveries by non-
Russian suppliers, or to direct gas supplies 
from Caspian suppliers to European markets 
on terms essentially set out by Gazprom and/or 
Itera or Eural Trans Gas.  
Russia’s investment requirements  
The International Energy Agency, in its World 
Energy Investment Outlook, considers that 
“cumulative investment needs in the Russian 
gas sector are projected to total just over $330 
billion, or $11 billion per year, over the period 
2001-2030.”
22 Of this, the IEA adds, “one 
                                                                                                 
22 World Energy Investment Outlook: 2003 In-
sights, International Energy Agency, Paris, No-
vember 2003. 
third of cumulative investment will be in pro-
jects for export to OECD countries.” The IEA 
report also notes that Russia’s own national 
energy strategy postulates an investment re-
quirement of between $170 billion and $200 
billion for the period 2003 to 2020, with spe-
cific investment levels ranging from $9.4 bil-
lion to $11.1 billion a year.
23 The UK Gov-
ernment, in its 2003 White Paper, Our Energy 
Future, appears to have been drawing on such 
figures when it cited estimates that “invest-
ments of US$170 billion may be required to 
develop gas production in Russia alone to 
2020” – in effect, around $10bn a year.
24  
Yet Russia is currently securing much less 
than this. Total foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in Russia between 1995 and 2003 amounted to 
just $26.13bn, while total investment in the 
country over this period amounted to just 
$57bn. And although actual FDI has grown 
steadily on an annual basis throughout this 
period, so that it totalled $6.781bn in 2003, the 
overall levels of investment fall well below 
Russian requirements.
25 Moreover, other core 
sectors, notably oil and a range of potential 
non-energy industries and projects, are also 
looking to secure both local and foreign in-
vestment. Thus Gazprom looks to face an up-
hill task in securing the investment in requires 
if it is to meet expectations in full concerning 
its own expansion and increased supplies to 
foreign markets. In strictly financial terms, this 
may help explain why Gazprom is seeking to 
lock up long term contracts for the import of 
Central Asian gas at relatively low prices 
whilst simultaneously holding out for much 
higher prices with regard to its own sales to 
European customers (see Issues concerning 
Caspian producers below).  
Indeed, while Gazprom itself enjoyed in-
creased revenues from high oil prices in the 
first half of 2004, it was still suffering from 
major structural problems.  
From an EU perspective, this means that one 
cannot assume that Gazprom will seek to jeop-
ardise the flow of external investment in order 
                                                                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 UK Energy White Paper: Our Energy Future – 
Creating a Low Carbon Economy. From Chapter 6: 
“Energy Reliability”, London, HMSO, 2003. 
25 The source for Russian investment figures is 
Boyko Nitzov, Senior Expert with the Energy 
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to pre-empt non-Russian access to the Balkan 
market. Indeed, it can be argued that the risk 
of otherwise jeopardising external investment 
may yet play a significant role in inducing 
Gazprom to understand that it may have to 
operate in an increasingly competitive com-
mercial environment inasmuch as its exports 
to the EU are concerned.  
The Cost Issue  
Supply costs to Europe vary considerably. The 
International Energy Agency, assessing likely 
import costs in around 2010-15, includes a 
range that starts at around one dollar per mil-
lion Btu for Algerian gas deliveries to Spain to 
just over $3 per million Btu for projected Rus-
sian gas supplies from the Barents Sea via a 
projected new Baltic and North Sea pipeline to 
Germany and Britain. 
In between come a variety of potential sup-
plies to Turkey, with gas from Turkmenistan, 
Iran and Azerbaijan all costed at just over 
$1.50/Mbtu and gas from Iraq at about 
$1.10/Mbtu. In this context, however, it should 
be noted that these are costs to Turkey’s de 
facto gas hub in Ankara. By this stage (2010-
2015), Turkey may or may not be en route to 
becoming a member of the EU, but it will by 
then be a part of the EU’s own South East 
Europe energy market and thus observing EU 
regulations (see Table 6). 
Issues Concerning Caspian Producers  
For one Caspian, producer, Azerbaijan, the 
issue is simply whether Statoil, currently in 
charge of securing export markets for gas pro-
duced from the Shakh Deniz gas field, can 
successfully utilise transit deliveries through 
Turkey to access new markets in southern and 
Central Europe. The supplies are there, the 
infrastructure to get its gas market is being 
developed as construction of the South Cauca-
sus Gas pipeline linking Baku, Tbilisi and Er-
zurum unfolds (see previous section).  
However, for the three gas producers on the 
eastern side of the Caspian – Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – the issues are 
very different. All three remain dependent on 
existing Soviet-era pipelines which convey 
their gas to markets in or beyond Russia under 
terms controlled by Russia (which, effectively, 
means Gazprom). Turkmenistan does possess 
additional pipelines so that it can export gas to 
Iran, but at present these play only a limited 
role in reducing the country’s reliance on Rus-
sian routes. The biggest line, a 200-km, 12 
bcm/y capacity line from Korpedzhe to Kurt-
Kui, only serves the smaller gas fields on the 
Caspian in western Turkmenistan, rather than 
the main gas basins on central and south-
central Turkmenistan. Some smaller direct 
connections to Iran have also been declared, 
but these appear to be purely local connections 
with no substantial export potential.  
Most of the region remains fundamentally reliant 
on the Soviet-era network of pipelines that tie its 
exports to Russian control of export prices. For 
both the Caspian and the European Union, one key 
question is whether the EU will help the Caspian 
countries as a group by using its near-
monopsonist position to secure a better deal 
for Caspian gas transiting the Russian system. 
For example, at present Turkmenistan suppos-
edly receives $44 per thousand cubic metres 
($44/tcm) for gas delivered into the Gazprom-
controlled pipeline stem at the Turkmen-
Uzbek border. This is gas destined for 
Ukraine, to be paid for half in hard cash and 
half in barter. US sources estimate that the bar-
ter component being so poor, in practice 
Turkmenistan is receiving the equivalent of 
just $29/tcm in real terms. Moreover, the use 
by Gazprom of the somewhat obscure Eural 
Trans Gas has raised concerns of overcharge 
for customers as well as transparency issues. 
Contrast this with Russian earnings at point of 
delivery. Turkish officials acknowledge that 
the country’s state pipeline company, Botas, 
has routinely paid some $130/tcm for Russian 
gas supplied via the western, Balkan route 
while one prominent Turkish analyst, Necdet 
Pamir, has calculated the true figure for this 
gas as totalling $133/tcm in 2001.
26 In an age 
in which Europe can be expected to receive 
gas from a variety of sources, such a striking 
disparity in prices shows both the strengths 
and consequences of Russia’s virtual monop-
oly in terms of export pipelines from the coun-
tries on or near the Caspian’s eastern shore – 
and the advantages that Azerbaijan should be 
able to reap by virtue of its direct gas connec-
tion to Turkey. This logic underpinned the 
PSG/Shell venture to construct a TransCaspian 
                                                                                                 
26 “Blue Stream and the Economic Dimension”, 
Private paper circulated by Mr Pamir in August 
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Pipeline from Turkmenistan and across Azer-
baijan and Georgia to Turkey. Turkey still has 
a valid 1999 sale and purchase agreement to 
take delivery of up to 14 bcm/y of gas for its 
own use and to transport 16 bcm/y of gas to 
European markets by virtue of such a line. But 
Turkmenistan President Saparmurat Turkmen-
bashi effectively scuttled the project by de-
manding an upfront payment, variously put at 
$300m and $500m.
27  
Turkey’s Own Energy Balance 
Turkey’s drive to promote its role as a transit 
corridor dates back to the early 1990s. But in 
terms of gas it received a great boost as a re-
sult of the country’s own over-eagerness to 
sign import contracts that in the opening years 
of the Century have caused Turkey to be sig-
nificantly over committed.  
Although Turkey has signed agreements under 
which it might be expected to import consid-
erably more gas than it is currently expected to 
consume, Turkish officials appear to be taking 
a surprisingly relaxed attitude to the problem. 
They argue that Turkey is no longer facing a 
significant over supply problem since the vol-
ume of gas imports actually covered by take-
or-pay agreements is lower than the agreed 
delivery volumes.
28 Indeed, the official focus 
is still on ensuring that Turkey does not face a 
supply shortage, with the government looking 
to assure itself of both the gas supplies re-
quired to feed a burgeoning power market and 
of the power stations required to provide the 
electricity. This is a problem that has bedev-
illed the Turkish energy sector for at least a 
decade, particularly as Turkey has sought to 
secure an almost exponential increase in gas 
supplies by signing contracts with Russia, Al-
geria, Nigeria, Iran and Azerbaijan for deliver-
ies set to reach 58 bcm by 2009, against actual 
consumption in 2003 of just under 22.5 bcm 
and projected demand this year of at least 24.0 
bcm. Botas is currently preparing revised fig-
ures for Turkish demand, but its existing pro-
jections, on which various government state-
ments are based, argue that whereas Turkey 
consumed some 15.6 bcm in 2002, by 2020 
                                                                                                 
27 Both figures have been cited by corporate 
sources in private discussion with the author.  
28 “Contract values are higher than take-or-pay lim-
its; that’s usual,” one senior Turkish energy official 
told the author. 
consumption is expected to rise to no less than 
82.8 bcm/y.  
“To end of 2009, we face no surplus that 
would disturb us,” says one of Turkey’s most 
senior energy officials. “After 2011, we’ll be 
in a minus position – we’ll need gas.”
29 This is 
because in that year the first of Turkey’s major 
gas import contracts, by which it imports some 
6 bcm/y from Russia’s GazExport, comes to 
an end. In this context, the official added, Tur-
key was working on the theoretical assumption 
that the GazExport contract would not be re-
newed and that Turkey would turn to Azerbai-
jan instead to make up the 6.0 bcm. But in 
practice, the official added, he would be look-
ing to renew the existing GazExport contract – 
and that Turkey would then sell the gas from 
Azerbaijan on to other European customers.  
The ‘Onselling’ Issue 
This comment reflects a key issue in the de-
bate over Turkish reactions to possible over 
supply. The Azerbaijani gas purchase agree-
ment allows for onward resale of Azeri gas to 
other markets; whereas agreements for the 
purchase of Russian and Iranian gas lack re-
sale clauses.  
This might not prove too much of a problem 
with regard to eventual onward selling of Ira-
nian gas, since Tehran is eager to see its gas 
enter European markets via Turkey. But Rus-
sia has its own direct gas export routes to 
Europe and would be expected to object vocif-
erously to the idea that Turkey might resell 
Russian gas into markets that GazExport, Tu-
rusGaz and Gazprom, the three companies that 
currently supply Russian gas to Turkey via the 
western lines and Blue Stream, could access 
directly.  
In the summer of 2004, Turkey’s Botas held 
negotiations with Gazprom on consolidating 
the various prices paid for Russian gas through 
the western and Blue Stream pipelines into a 
single tariff and in these discussions Turkey 
also raised the onselling issue. As of August 
2004, there were some indications that Gaz-
prom was showing a greater interest in the po-
tential onselling of Russian gas to other coun-
tries in Europe via Turkey, but the terms and 
conditions for such transit trade remain very 
much in doubt.  
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Much will depend on whether negotiations on 
prospective Turkish entry into the EU are ini-
tiated in the near future, and on how quickly 
any such negotiations might lead to Turkey’s 
de facto adoption of the EU gas directive. 
Should Turkey become incorporated in a 
common gas market with the EU – even if it 
has not attained full EU membership by then – 
Gazprom would have to live with the prospect 
that some of the Russian gas supplied to Tur-
key might be passed through to other Euro-
pean countries. In such a case, Gazprom might 
seek to change its strategy and opt to make 
deliberate use of Turkey as a transit state.  
Regardless, if Gazprom dreams of supplying 
gas to Israel via Turkey ever come to fruition, 
there may come a day when, the Russians 
might be happy to ease the terms on which 
they sell gas to Turkey. But for the moment, 
Turkey is thinking more about a pipeline that 
would bring Egyptian gas north to Turkey than 
the occasionally floated Russian ideas for a 
gas line that would head in the opposite direc-
tion to Israel. 
EU energy security  
The EU’s own Green Paper on Energy Secu-
rity, published in 2000, anticipates a 45% in-
crease in gas demand for the EU’s current 15 
member states between 1998 and 2030. With 
1998 gas demand touching 349 bcm in 1998, 
this would indicate a surge to around 506 bcm 
in 2030. Turkish officials, citing the Green 
Paper and their own discussions with Brussels, 
routinely talk of the EU requiring an additional 
100 bcm of gas by 2020 in justification of pro-
posals for their country to serve as a transit 
route for EU gas imports.  
The Green Paper specifically anticipates that 
the current 15 members of the EU will be im-
porting some 71% of their gas by 2030. And 
even if Norway were factored into the equa-
tion – as the EU does by postulating an “EU-
30” group to include all the current confirmed 
new members, together with all the current 
applicant states and Norway and Switzerland 
as well – Europe would still remain dependent 
on external supplies for some 60% of its gas. 
The EU is clearly looking for multiple supply 
sources and routes, and both EU and Turkish 
officials see an obvious synergy between them 
in this regard. Commenting on the Turkey-
Greece pipeline, the then European Commis-
sion Vice President Loyola de Palacio said in 
January 2004 that the Commission was par-
ticularly pleased at the outcome of the Turkish 
Greek commercial negotiations, saying these 
“will not only bolster peace and stability in the 
region but will also make it possible to supply 
new gas resources from the Caspian Basin and 
Iran to the internal gas market of the enlarged 
European Union, and to the Balkans, thus im-
proving security of supply for all stakeholders 
concerned by this infrastructure." 
Conclusion: What can the EU do? 
In considering whether to open entry negotia-
tions with Turkey, the issue of EU gas security 
is clearly relevant, A Turkey that lies within 
the EU (and from early on is effectively a 
member of a common European gas market) 
brings with it a variety of means by which 
fresh sources of gas can be tapped and brought 
t market within the heart of the EU. 
The EU’s Green Paper, with its emphasis on 
diversity of supply, is relevant in this context. 
So is the question as to whether Gazprom it-
self might require diversity of competition in 
order to improve its own competitiveness in a 
non-monopolistic manner. The Energy Charter 
process and the efforts to develop a transit pro-
tocol in particular, have the same goal as the 
EU, namely diversity of supply, but although 
the EU was a participant in the early stages of 
the Charter process, its support for Charter 
activities appears to have waned in recent 
years.  
At least one major gas analyst, Jonathan Stern, 
Director of Gas Research at the Oxford Insti-
tute of Energy Studies, argues that there may 
yet come a time when monopolistic activities 
by Russian gas suppliers or traders with access 
to monopoly supplies and transit systems 
might come into conflict with the EU, and the 
EU seeks to establish an effective, regulated 
gas market in a 27-, 28- or 30-nation Europe. 
At such a point, Stern believes, the EU might 
feel compelled to turn to the Energy Charter 
process and the Transit protocol in particular 
as the basis for resolving outstanding issues – 
even though Russia has continued to oppose 
signing the transit protocol.
30 
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At the same time, it should be noted that while 
Gazprom accounts for well over 95% of Rus-
sian gas exports because of its monopoly of 
the Russian pipeline system, it only accounts 
for around 70% of Russian gas production. 
Actions that would serve to put Gazprom into 
a more competitive environment would also 
help to improve prospects for other Russian 
gas producers, most of whom are found in the 
country’s main oil companies. 
The development of transit lines through Tur-
key represents the obvious way by which Gaz-
prom could face at least a degree of competi-
tive challenge. There would be no idea of 
wholesale replacement of Russian gas imports 
with those via Turkey, merely of complement-
ing them – and of presenting Gazprom with a 
more competitive environment.  
In this context the EU should certainly look at 
the various Turkish-transit related pipeline 
projects under development and consider 
which of them might serve its energy security 
purposes and whether it might even wish to 
help fund infrastructure development. For such 
pipelines constitute strategic, as well as com-
mercial, infrastructure. As mentioned earlier, 
this may well offer opportunities for the EU in 
general, and the European Investment Bank in 
particular. This is particularly relevant in con-
sidering the proposed West Balkans Pipeline. 
For while its immediate market, the states of 
the southern Balkans, are in a gas context of 
only limited concern with regard to overall 
European gas security, were they to be con-
nected not only to Turkey but to a major Euro-
pean hub, such as Baumgarten, then the line 
would be able to function as a complementary 
system to the Nabucco pipeline.  
Turkey very much wants to be at the centre of 
European efforts to develop alternative ways 
of accessing Caspian and Middle Eastern gas 
supplies. The sheer scale of Europe's drive for 
increased and diversified suppliers drives it on, 
even if Turkish officials are not quite sure how 
far their country can go in meeting European 
expectations.  
Several factors favour attainment of such a 
goal: 
                                                                                    
July 2004. Author’s notes. Dr Stern’s paper has yet 
to be published.  
•  In geographical terms, Turkey is clearly 
increasingly well placed to serve as a cen-
tral transit supplier for the anticipated ma-
jor increases in European demand.  
•  A range of gas companies in central, south-
ern and southeastern Europe are actively 
working on ways to bring gas from the 
Caspian and the Middle East to European 
markets through fully commercial pipeline 
systems transiting Turkey and the Balkans.  
•  For the EU, development of Turkey as a 
transit route helps promote energy security 
through diversification of gas supply 
routes.  
•  As Turkey’s importance as a gateway 
grows, so it further increases European en-
ergy security by ensuring increased access 
to Caspian reserves on a commercial basis, 
as well as offering Middle East producers 
the option of transporting gas to Europe by 
pipeline as well as by LNG. 
•  The greater the volume of gas supplies de-
livered to Europe via Turkey, the greater 
the pressure on Russia’s Gazprom to oper-
ate on a commercial basis, rather than as a 
monopoly, in its dealings with the Euro-
pean Union. Indeed, by offering a competi-
tive challenge to Gazprom, the promotion 
of increased flows of gas through Turkey 
may yet prove to be one of the most effec-
tive ways of promoting gas market reform 
in Russia. In this context, with Russia al-
ways likely to prove a very major supplier 
indeed of gas to the European Union, the 
placement of Russian gas development on a 
sound basis that is both commercial and 
competitive would go a long way to ensur-
ing European energy security.  
Overall, however, whether Turkey will actu-
ally become Europe’s fourth artery will de-
pend on a number of factors, both economic – 
since demand pulls gas lines; and political – in 
view of the importance of government and 
donor support in developing commercially 
supported projects. As the EU ponders the is-
sues of its own energy security and of opening 
entry negotiations with Turkey, it has a win-
dow of opportunity. The next several months 
will see detailed financial and economic as-
sessments of such projects as the Nabucco line 
and the Turkey-Greece-Italy interconnector. 
These may prove financial viable in their own NO. 11 / NOVEMBER 2004 | 113 
 
right, but, at the very least, the EU would do 
well to scrutinise these projects carefully in the 
event that a strategic investment in infrastruc-
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TH, A TEST FOR THE EU 
TO INVIGORATE ITS POLITICAL 
CREDIBILITY 
 
The forces of progress in Turkey have spent 
several decades in struggling for democracy, 
human rights, a constructive foreign policy 
also regarding Cyprus, radical economic re-
forms and social development. Recently, Tur-
key has been very successful in achieving 
these challenges and in integrating itself to the 
EU. 
On its own side, the European Union took 
clear commitments vis-à-vis Turkey: 
1.  The Commission’s Progress Report and 
recommendations are clear enough to 
show the sequel of the process. Thus, the 
negotiations should start without delay 
during the first months of 2005 as it is 
promised by the EU Copenhagen summit 
in 2002. A delay for the purposes of the 
referendums on the EU Constitution is a 
wrong and insincere argument.  
2.  As emphasised by the Helsinki Summit in 
1999, Turkey should be treated equally 
with the other candidate countries. There-
fore, no mention of any outcome of nego-
tiations other than the full membership of 
Turkey is acceptable. 
The EU is a unique example of integration 
between sovereign member states going far 
beyond intergovernmental cooperation. Tur-
key aspires to join this community of common 
values. Turkey also strongly supports the 
adoption of a Constitutional Treaty which is a 
unique opportunity for the common future of 
people believing in human dignity, democracy, 
liberty, justice, equality, the rule of law, re-
spect for human rights and peace. 
 
In reality the European Union’s enlargement 
should be perceived as its expansion to a new 
land. This should also be seen as a triumph of 
the European values, ideals, law, policies and 
economy. When Turkey joins the EU, this 
would mean that it is in compliance with these 
values, ideals, law, policies and economy. 
The main tasks towards membership are to 
transform Turkey’s potential into political, 
economic, social and cultural assets for 
Europe’s future. Turkey’s accession will con-
tribute to Europe’s global competitiveness. 
Full integration of Turkey will bring a fresh 
impetus to the internal market with its dyna-
mism, large market demand, entrepreneurial 
culture and trade creation potential. As Turkey 
engaged in the accession process, the human 
capital will be upgraded to meet Europe’s 
standards and needs. Young, dynamic and 
qualified human resource of Turkey will be the 
social insurance of Europe. 
Today, the historical responsibility for both the 
EU and Turkey is to launch, as soon as possi-
ble, the accession negotiations. And an avoid-
able responsibility for the EU leaders is to 
communicate better with their respective pub-
lic opinion on the realities and challenges 
about Turkey. 
Turkish business community has firmly sup-
ported Turkey’s EU membership perspective 
and never regrets to articulate its credence that 
Turkey is ready to start the accession negotia-
tions. We, the Turkish business community 
believe that democracy will be shaping the 
Europe’s future; not the demagogy. 
Now, it is time for the EU to prove its sincerity 
regarding Turkey’s membership and act as a 
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Introductory Note from CEPS 
 
This issue of CEPS Turkey in Europe Monitor 
presents a long extract of the Working Paper 
titled “Growth and Immigration Scenarios for 
Turkey and the EU”, prepared by Refik Erzan, 
Umut Kuzubaş and Nilüfer Yıldız from Boga-
zici University, Istanbul.  
The paper argues that the current debates 
about Turkish EU membership and free 
movement of labour often overlook that the 
EU cannot exercise a zero migration policy 
even if permanent safeguards were used, since 
even under the currently prevailing strict re-
gime, there is an annual net migration from 
Turkey to the EU-15 in the order of 35 000 
people. The authors highlight that any slow-
down or suspension in Turkey’s accession 
process; resulting in lower growth, higher 
unemployment and a possible slowdown in or 
a reversal of the reform process would mean 
drastically higher number of potential mi-
grants as a considerable proportion of them 
would be finding their way into the EU, de-
spite the legal barriers. 
 
It is thus found that if Turkey loses the mem-
bership perspective, the EU may end up hav-
ing more immigrants than under a free move-
ment of labour regime with a prosperous EU 
member Turkey. Moreover, the composition of 
this migration is expected to be less conducive 
for the EU labour markets – and – for integra-
tion into host societies. The experiences of 
Spain, Greece and Portugal are seen as indi-
cators of the strong relationship between a 
successful accession period and the gradual 
elimination of migration pressures. The full 
text of the Working Paper is accessible at 
www.ceps.be. 
This issue of the Monitor also provides the 
sections of the Presidency Conclusions of the 
Brussels European Council, 16-17 December 
2004, on Turkey and the Framework for Ne-
gotiations. The full text of the Presidency 
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Occasionally, sensational news articles on the 
scary magnitude of potential migrants from 
Turkey take the headlines in EU media. Care-
less interpretation of casual opinion polls can 
put the number up to 25%of a population of 
about 70 million. Magnitudes that emerge 
from serious research work are a fraction of 
that. The survey of this literature undertaken 
by the 2004 “Impact Study” of the EU Com-
mission has reported that forecasts of immi-
gration from Turkey to the EU-15 until 2030 
range between 0.5 and 4.4 million, assuming 
free mobility of labour in about a dozen years 
from now. The Impact Study also underlines 
that to arrive at the higher end estimates 
(about 4 million), the studies have to torture 
the data and the methodology. 
As a result of the literature survey that we 
have undertaken in the framework of this 
study and our contacts with the relevant re-
search centres in the EU (see the references), 
we have not come across any net migration 
forecasts from Turkey to the EU that exceeds 
the probable magnitudes reported in the Im-
pact Study. 
Analytical studies follow two alternative 
methods in making immigration forecasts. The 
first one is statistical inferences based on sci-
entifically designed surveys. The second one 
is econometric methods. The latter draws on 
the pre and post EU membership experiences 
of emigration countries. Quantifiable determi-
nants of immigration - pull and push factors - 
are identified and their joint impact on immi-
gration is estimated. These estimates are then 
used to forecast eventual migration from “to 
be” members.  
Our simulation results for net migration from 
Turkey to EU-15 in the period 2004-2030 is 
between 1 and 2.1 million, foreseeing a suc-
cessful accession period with high growth and 
free labour mobility starting 2015 - a rather 
optimistic assumption to explore the upper 
bound of the immigration potential. On the 
other hand, if Turkey’s membership process is 
endangered and high growth cannot be sus-
tained, 2.7 million people may be penetrating 
the EU-15 despite the prevailing strict restric-
tions on labour mobility. 
REFERENCE GROUP: 1967-2001 
IMMIGRATION FROM ALL EUROPE 
At the first stage of analysis, we followed the 
method of the EU Commission report by 
Brücker, Alvarez-Plata and Siliverstovs 
(2003) used in estimating potential migration 
from Central and Eastern Europe. Using an 
econometric model, the study estimates mi-
grant stocks in Germany originating from 19 
source countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Greece, Holland, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Turkey, UK, and 
(former) Yugoslavia). Germany was chosen as 
the host country because of the size of the mi-
grant communities in this country and the 
availability of robust time series data dating 
back to 1967. 
We used the specification that yielded the best 
overall result in the EU Commission study.
1 
As explanatory variables; income level in the 
country of origin (wht)  captures the cost of 
migration, employment rates (eft),(eht), the 
probability of finding jobs, and,  income dif-
ferences between the home and host countries 
(wft/wht), the material return to migration. To 
these, the lagged migrant stocks (mfh,t-1 
),(mfh,t-2 ) were added to measure the impact 
of “networking” among immigrants. 
Introduction of free labour mobility in EU 
members was captured by the FREE dummy 
variable while GUEST denoted the 1967-1973 
period when “guest worker” agreements were 
                                                                                                 
1  mfht  =  αh + β1mfh,t-1  +  β2mfh,t-2 + β3 
ln(wft/wht) + β4 ln(wht) + β5ln(eft) + β6 ln(eht) 
+ ufht 
mfht:      The share of migrants from country h 
residing in country f (Germany) as a per-
cent of home population 
w:   Wage (income, proxied by GDP-PPP per 
capita) 
e:   Employment rate  (1-unemployment rate) 
h, f, t:  Home, foreign country and year, respec-
tively. 
Population data from World Development Indica-
tors (2003), migrant stock data from the Federal 
German Statistical Office, per capita GDP from 
Maddison (2002) and Groningen Growth and De-
velopment Centre, employment rates, from OECD 
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operational. To correct for the jumps in immi-
gration due to refugees and asylum seekers, 
WAR in (former) Yugoslavia and 
INTERVENTION (1980 military) and 
INSURGENCY (1990-94 terror) in Turkey 
were used. Table 1 gives the estimation results 
for the 1967-2001 period indicating the coef-
ficients of the explanatory factors and their 
significance levels.
2 
It was observed that all the estimated coeffi-
cients were significant and the overall ex-
planatory power of the model (the fit) was 
very high. However, the small values of the 
coefficients indicated that income and em-
ployment rate differences did not have power-
ful effects in determining inter-European mi-
gration during the period under consideration.
3 
 
Table 1. Regression Results - “All Europe” 
Sample, 1967-2001 
Independent 
Variables  Coefficients S.E P-value 
M(-1) 1.23  0.019  0.000 
M(-2) -0.37  0.018  0.000 
Ln(Wf/Wh)  0.05 0.006  0.000 
Ln(Wh)  0.07 0.006  0.000 
Ln(ef)  0.34 0.033  0.000 
Ln(eh)  -0.10 0.008  0.000 
FREE 0.01  0.001  0.000 
GUEST 0.11  0.003  0.000 
INTERVENTION 0.15  0.033  0.000 
INSURGENCY 0.10  0.019  0.000 
Adjusted R2 = 0.99        
 
                                                                                                 
2 The model is estimated using SUR. This method 
was chosen because of its superior performance 
with large databases in the EU Commission study. 
Common slopes were assumed for all countries but 
intercepts were allowed to be country specific.  
3 As the estimation is semi-logarithmic, a coeffi-
cient with an absolute value of 1 implies that a 
change in this variable would affect the dependent 
variable at the same rate of change. Values smaller 
than 1 imply smaller impacts. 
MIGRATION FORECASTS FOR 
TURKEY: 2004-2030 
The coefficients obtained from the estimations 
for migration into Germany from the “all 
Europe” sample of 19 source countries (in-
cluding Turkey) for the 1967-2001 period 
were used to make simulations for emigration 
from Turkey. Following similar studies, Ger-
man per capita GDP was assumed to grow 2% 
annually and the employment rate stay at the 
1991-2001 average level. Income and em-
ployment projections for Turkey were adopted 
from our ongoing study scrutinizing alterna-
tive growth scenarios for Turkey, analysing 
demographic developments, urban and rural 
growth and productivity, internal migration 
(urbanization) and unemployment.
4  
The main scenario used here foresees a suc-
cessful EU accession with sustained high 
growth and gradually declining unemploy-
ment (Table 2). UN population projections 
were adopted in all computations. 
 
Table 2. High Growth Scenario for Turkey, 
2005-2030 (annual values) 
Urban GDP Growth        0.065 
Urban Productivity Growth     0.03 
Rural GDP Growth     0.02 
Unemployment – 2015  Urban          0.13 
Average       0.09 
Unemployment – 2030  Urban          0.05  
Average       0.04 
 
Under these assumptions, projections were 
made for immigration from Turkey to Ger-
many.
5 According to latest available data cov-
ering the EU-15 area, Germany hosted 76%of 
all immigrants in the EU originating from 
Turkey.
6 Using this share as a benchmark, 
                                                                                                 
4 See, “Growth, Employment and Active Policies”, 
Bogazici University, June 2004, 
www.cee.boun.edu.tr. 
5 The iterations include the decline in unemploy-
ment in Turkey (about 1 percentage point) result-
ing from migration to the EU. 
6 The migrant stock data used in the simulations do 
not cover those who were naturalized in Germany. 
Data on naturalization of EU citizens were not 
available for Germany. Therefore naturalized im-
migrants could not be included in the estimations 
covering all European source countries. Data on NO. 12 / DECEMBER 2004 | 117 
 
immigration estimates for Germany were in-
flated to represent the total for the EU-15 
area.
7  
Two scenarios were simulated with these pa-
rameters. Both assumed that restrictions on 
labour mobility would be largely abolished in 
2015. This rather optimistic assumption was 
adopted to arrive at an upper bound for immi-
gration numbers.  
The first simulation emulates for Turkey the 
actual experience of EU countries with free 
movement of labour (using the FREE 
dummy). This involves a considerable integra-
tion of these economies during the accession 
periods. 
The second simulation emulates – repeats 
Turkey the experience of these countries (in-
cluding Turkey) with guest worker agreements 
until 1973 (using the GUEST dummy). The 
purpose of simulating this inferior scenario is, 
again, to explore an upper bound for the mi-
gration potential. 
When the actual membership cum free labour 
mobility experience of the EU countries - an 
experience that Turkey has yet to live through 
- was taken as the benchmark, immigration 
forecasts from Turkey exhibited a rather 
smooth curve (Figure 1). The small hike of 
2015 transformed into a declining flow. Total  
                                                                                   
naturalized immigrants originating from Turkey 
were available. This factor could be incorporated 
in forecasts based solely on the Turkish experience 
- reported further on in this study.  Although natu-
ralization entailed considerable numbers in the last 
decade, it did not affect the immigration projec-
tions significantly.  
7 This assumes that all other EU-15 countries that 
host immigrants have the same “pull” effects as 
Germany.  
net migration barely reached 1.1 million by 
2030 (Table 3). 
Instead of relying on the actual experience of 
the EU members with free labour mobility, 
when we emulated (and repeated) the guest 
worker episodes for Turkey in 2015, we ob-
served a jump in migration, reaching moderate 
levels around 2020 (figure 2). Even under this 
inferior scenario, the total immigration projec-
tion to EU-15 from Turkey until 2030 was not 
drastic, about 1.8 million (Table 3). This infe-
rior scenario depicts an accession process not 
properly utilized for structural adjustment and 
integration. 
The authentic free movement of labour sce-
nario (the first scenario) incorporated the so-
cioeconomic improvements in the accession 
countries. These improvements relieved the 
migration pressures. Restrictions on labour 
became much less binding, hence, as they 
were removed, there was no major rush. 
It should be emphasized that socioeconomic 
improvements were not simply higher in-
comes and more jobs. Otherwise the coeffi-
cients for these basic economic variables 
would have been much larger in the estima-
tions. The improvements in accession coun-
tries covered dimensions such as social secu-
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Figure 1. Simulation of Free Movement of Labour 
 
Figure 2. Simulation of Guest Worker Scenario 
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Table 3. Comparison of the Two Scenarios 
Net Change in the Turkish 
Migrant Stock 
2004-2015 2015-2030 Total 
Scenario FREE   460.000 613.000  1.073.000 
Scenario GUEST  564.000 1.274.000  1.838.000 
Turkish Migrant Stock  2004 2015 2030 
Scenario FREE  2.675.000 3.140.000 3.750.000 
Scenario GUEST  2.700.000 3.250.000 4.500.000 
 
REFERENCE GROUP: 1967-2001 SPAIN, 
PORTUGAL AND GREECE 
We have verified the methodological accuracy 
of our estimations reported above (Tables 1 
and 3) by comparing them with the findings of 
research conducted for the EU Commission on 
Central and Eastern Europe. We have also 
exchanged notes with these researchers at the 
October 2004 Istanbul conference where this 
paper was originally presented. Nevertheless, 
to test for sensitivity of sample selection, we 
repeated our parameter estimations by exclud-
ing rich countries such as Austria and Den-
mark. We confined our sample to the southern 
“cohesion” countries - Greece, Portugal and 
Spain (and Turkey) - that had characteristics  
resembling Turkey at the time of their acces-
sion. 
Figure 3 depicts the immigration episodes 
from these countries and Turkey to Germany. 
To adjust for differences in country sizes, the 
net immigration figures were given as per-
centage of their respective populations. There 
were major flows from all these countries dur-
ing the guest worker agreements. As restric-
tions on labour mobility were lifted, the de-
creasing Spanish migrant stock continued its 
tendency. In Greece and Portugal there was a 
modest hike in the number of migrants but it 
smoothened shortly after. In the more recent 
years, the stock was declining, indicating re-
verse net migration.  
 
Figure 3. Migrants in Germany as % of Source Country Population 
Note: The apparent decline in the Turkish migrant stock stemmed from naturalization. Number of migrants 
from Turkey who were naturalized in Germany was less than a thousand per year until 1984. 1984-1990 
this annual figure reached 2 thousand. There was a steep climb during the 1990s. For 1990-2003, the an-
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MIGRATION FORECASTS FOR 
TURKEY BASED ON SOUTHERN 
EUROPE: 2004-2030 
Estimates for the “determinants” of migration 
were obtained using similar specification as 
with “all Europe” for the period 1967-2001. 
Using these parameters, again the two simula-
tion exercises were repeated - the FREE and 
GUEST scenarios. In both simulations, Tur-
key was assumed to be on its baseline high 
growth path (Table 2). 2015 was retained as 
the regime switching date. Computations for 
Germany were adjusted for EU-15 in the same 
way as in the previous exercises. 
The picture that emerged (Figure 4) closely 
resembled that with “all Europe” sample. 
When the free labour mobility experience of 
Greece, Portugal and Spain was emulated for 
Turkey, a small hike occurred in migration 
that stabilized promptly at a low level. In this 
scenario, total net migration forecast until 
2030 was not exceeding 1 million (Table 4). 
The experiment using the Southern Europe 
sample but mimicking the guest worker syn-
drome led to a major jump that normalized in 
due course (Figure 5). The total net migration 
estimate approached 2 million, doubling the 
previous forecast based on the actual member-
ship experience of these countries. Neverthe-
less, even this inflated figure was considerably 
below sensational projections.  
TURKEY’S OWN EXPERIENCE 1967-
2001 AS THE ONLY REFERENCE 
How to inflate further the migration forecasts? 
“Turkey is not any other South European 
Country”, “unlike Greece, Portugal and Spain, 
Turkey has a nomadic tradition”. If these 
prejudices are taken for granted, Turkey’s own 
experience would be the only benchmark. 
The model was estimated for the period 1967-
2001 for immigration from only Turkey to 
Germany. The coefficients of the explanatory  
variables denoting income and employment 
differences were again significant. So were the 
INTERVENTION and INSURGENCY dum-
mies. The absolute values of the income and 
employment parameters were considerably 
greater than those obtained in estimations with 
the “all Europe” and “Southern Europe” sam-
ples. This was expected since Turkey has not 
had yet the socioeconomic transition that the 
current EU members have accomplished dur-
ing their accession periods.   
Using the parameters obtained from these es-
timations, migration projections were made 
for the 2004-2030 period, and they were ad-
justed upward for EU-15. Obviously, these 
parameter estimates and projections, unlike 
the previous ones, did not contain any infor-
mation on actual EU membership or free la-
bour mobility experience. The only labour 
mobility Turkey had in accordance with an 
agreement was the guest worker episode of the 
1960s until 1973.  
HIGH GROWTH, EU MEMBERSHIP 
AND FREE MOVEMENT OF LABOUR: 
FORECAST 2004-2030 
In our first simulation with the Turkish record 
as the only benchmark, we retained our base-
line high growth scenario as depicted in Table 
2. Following a successful accession period, 
Turkey becomes an EU member and free la-
bour mobility is introduced in 2015. Given 
that Turkey’s only experience with a labour 
arrangement was the guest worker episode, 
free movement of labour could only be intro-
duced in the forecast as the repetition of this 
experience. 
The resulting projection exhibited a major 
jump in migration that moderated gradually 
(Figure 6). The forecast for total net migration 
until 2030 reached 2.1 millions. This some-
what exceeded the higher scenario based on 
the South European experience (Table 5). 
 NO. 12 / DECEMBER 2004 | 121 
 
 
Figure 4. Simulation of Free Movement of Labour 
 
 
Figure 5. Simulation of Guest Worker Scenario 
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Table 4. Comparison of the Two Scenarios 
Net Change in the Turkish 
Migrant Stock  2004-2015 2015-2030 Total 
Scenario FREE  320.000 640.000 960.000 
Scenario GUEST  440.000 1.480.000  1.920.000 
 
 
Table 5. Comparison of the Two Scenarios 
Net Change in the Turkish Migrant Stock  2004-2015 2015-2030 Total 
High Growth – Membership – Free Move-
ment of Labour 
246.000 1.888.000  2.134.000 
Lower Growth - No Membership – No Free 
Movement of Labour 
760.000 1.974.000  2.734.000 
 
Turkish Migrant Stock  2004 2015 2030 
High Growth – Membership – Free Move-
ment of Labour 
2.499.000 2.745.000 4.633.000 
Lower Growth - No Membership – No Free 
Movement of Labour 
2.506.000 3.267.000 5.241.000 
 
 
Figure 6. EU Membership Emulating the Turkish Guest Worker Episode 
Turkish Migrant Stock  2004 2015 2030 
Scenario FREE  2.755.000 3.075.000 3.715.000 
Scenario GUEST  2.755.000 3.195.000 4.677.000 
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SUSPENDED EU ACCESSION, LOWER 
GROWTH AND NO FREE MOBILITY 
OF LABOUR: FORECAST 2004-2030 
Our last simulation depicts a scenario where 
Turkey’s EU accession is suspended. High 
growth cannot be sustained and unemploy-
ment climbs. More specifically, the urban 
GDP grows at 4%annually with 
1.5%productivity increase and rural GDP 
stagnates. Unemployment approaches to 20 
%.
81  
In this scenario, the prevailing EU visa regula-
tions are retained. This obviously curtails ma-
jor jumps in migration. However, the slow 
pace in income growth and the deterioration in 
the labour market increase migration pressures 
considerably. An increasing number of the 
potential migrants penetrate the EU (Figure 7). 
The forecast for total net migration until 2030 
in this scenario exceeded 2.7 million. The re-
sult is a warning that if the membership per-
spective is lost, EU may end up having more 
immigrants from Turkey despite strict restric-
tions on labour mobility. This paradoxical 
scenario is indeed realistic for three reasons. 
Firstly, Turkey’s growth record clearly shows 
very high rates can be achieved but cannot be 
sustained without political stability and inflow 
of foreign savings. Without the EU anchor 
provided by the membership perspective, a 
growth performance that will cope with un-
employment is not feasible. 
Secondly, unlike successful accession scenar-
ios, not only growth in Turkey would be 
slower and unemployment higher, but also 
sensitivity of migration to income and unem-
ployment differences would be greater.
82  
Thirdly, the prevailing restrictive visa system 
of the EU and the absence of labour mobility 
provisions cannot stop immigration. EU cur-
rently receives about 70,000 (gross) migrants 
from Turkey, annually. (Because of return 
migration, net migration is about half of this 
                                                                                                 
81 In this lower growth scenario, average (urban + ru-
ral) unemployment reaches 17 % in 2015 and 22 % in 
2030. Migration to the EU reduces these figures to 16 
% and 19 %, respectively. 
82 Coefficients for income and employment differ-
ences have considerably higher values in the estima-
tions with the “Turkish experience only” compared 
with that of the “all Europe” and “South European” 
samples. The reason is lesser convergence of the Turk-
ish socioeconomic system.  
gross inflow figure.
83) Most of them come 
with family unification and family formation. 
In the presence of a very large Turkish mi-
grant community in the EU of about 3 million 
(with major trade, investment, tourism and 
educational links), all conceivable tight door 
policies short of totalitarian rules would be 
porous. A relative deterioration in Turkey 
would certainly increase this inflow consid-
erably and reduce return migration. 
Finally, it should be noted that the eventuality 
of political turmoil was not incorporated in the 
projections. With the lost EU perspective and 
climbing unemployment, this is more than a 
slim possibility. Estimations based on past 
record show that political and security prob-
lems lead to waves of migration.
84  Add that 
on top of the 2.7 million forecast! 
IMPACT OF THE AGING OF TURKISH 
POPULATION ON MIGRATION 
In the current study, as the estimations were 
based on past population structures, the impact 
of the changes in the age composition of Turk-
ish population was not specifically taken into 
consideration.
85 However, the propensity to 
migrate differs among age groups considera-
bly and the very young Turkish population is 
bound to age. 
A regional survey conducted in Turkey by 
Hacettepe University, Ankara, jointly with the 
Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic 
Institute (NIDI) and Eurostat (2000) revealed 
that the migration tendency of people aged 55 
and above was extremely low.
86  
                                                                                                 
83 We have crosschecked stock and flow data (OECD, 
SOPEMI) for current Turkish migrant inflow to EU-
15. Due to missing data, we do not have exact figures.  
We infer that the gross inflow can be 60,000 to 90,000 
and the gross outflow 30,000 to 40,000.  
84 As reported in the first section of the study, in the 
estimations covering 1967-2001, dummy variables 
INTERVENTION (1980) and INSURGENCY (1990-
94) were highly significant and improved the fit con-
siderably. 
85 The estimations based on 1967-2001 data do implic-
itly incorporate the aging experienced in the sample 
countries. However, the projections implicitly assume 
the same average population structure as in the past. 
86 The regional coverage of this study was not repre-
sentative for Turkey as a whole. Therefore, the age 
configuration of propensity to migrate was not for-
mally incorporated in our projections. 124 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
 
Figure 7. No Membership and No Free Movement of Labour 
 
Hubert Krieger’s (2004) study based on Euro-
barometer surveys corroborated these results. 
Turkish population is aging. According to the 
UN projections, the share of people aged 55 
and above in Turkey will nearly double by 
2030 (Figure 8). When this demographic de-
velopment was crudely incorporated in our 
projections, it was found that total migration 




As Turkey becomes an EU member and en-
joys free movement of labour, the net inflow 
of migrants will most likely be in the direction 
to the EU-15 in the foreseeable future. The 
projections for potential Turkish migration 
based on the experiences of various groups of 
countries differed. However, the magnitudes 
involved were by no means sensational, de-
spite the fact that we wishfully assumed that 
free movement of labour would be introduced 
as early as 2015.  
It should be emphasized that the EU cannot 
exercise a zero migration policy. Even under 
the currently prevailing strict regime, there is 
an annual net migration from Turkey to the 
EU-15 in the order of 35,000 people. What 
should be scared of are the consequences of a 
slowdown or suspension in Turkey’s acces-
sion process. The economic impact of such an 
eventuality is lower growth and climbing un-
employment in Turkey.  
The political impact would be a slowdown or 
reversal of the reform process. The outcome 
of the two would yield a drastically higher 
number of potential migrants. A considerable 
proportion of them would be finding their way 
into the EU. If Turkey loses the membership 
perspective, the EU may end up having more 
immigrants than a free movement of labour 
regime with Turkey. And the composition of 
this migration would be less conducive for the 
EU labour markets - and - for integration in 
the host societies. 
The experiences of Greece, Portugal and 
Spain indicate that a successful accession pe-
riod with high growth and effective imple-
mentation of the reforms reduces and gradu-
ally eliminates the migration pressures. There 
is no a priori reason why Turkey would not go 
through a similar experience. 
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BRUSSELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL 





4. The European Council welcomed the find-
ings and recommendations presented by the 
Commission on 6 October 2004 to the Council 
and the European Parliament in its Regular 
Reports on Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, 
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Croatia, Recommendation on Turkey and 
document on Issues Arising from Turkey's 
Membership Perspective. 
5. With the accession of ten new Member 
States to the European Union successfully ac-
complished, the European Council expressed 
its determination to continue the process it has 
engaged in with the candidate countries, thus 
contributing to Europe's prosperity, stability, 
security and unity. In this connection, it re-
called that the Union's capacity to absorb new 
members, while maintaining the momentum 
of European integration, is an important con-
sideration in the general interest of both the 
Union and the candidate countries. 
Turkey 
17. The European Council recalled its previ-
ous conclusions regarding Turkey, in which, 
at Helsinki, it agreed that Turkey was a candi-
date state destined to join the Union on the 
basis of the same criteria as applied to the 
other candidate states and, subsequently, con-
cluded that, if it were to decide at its Decem-
ber 2004 meeting, on the basis of a report and 
recommendation from the Commission, that 
Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political crite-
ria, the European Union will open accession 
negotiations with Turkey without delay. 
18. The European Council welcomed the deci-
sive progress made by Turkey in its far-
reaching reform process and expressed its 
confidence that Turkey will sustain that proc-
ess of reform. Furthermore, it expects Turkey 
to actively pursue its efforts to bring into force 
the six specific items of legislation identified 
by the Commission. To ensure the irreversibil-
ity of the political reform process and its full, 
effective and comprehensive implementation, 
notably with regard to fundamental freedoms 
and to full respect of human rights, that proc-
ess will continue to be closely monitored by 
the Commission, which is invited to continue 
to report regularly on it to the Council, ad-
dressing all points of concern identified in the 
Commission's 2004 report and recommenda-
tion, including the implementation of the zero-
tolerance policy relating to torture and ill-
treatment. The European Union will continue 
to monitor closely progress of the political 
reforms on the basis of an Accession Partner-
ship setting out priorities for the reform proc-
ess. 
19. The European Council welcomed Turkey's 
decision to sign the Protocol regarding the 
adaptation of the Ankara Agreement, taking 
account of the accession of the ten new Mem-
ber States. In this light, it welcomed the decla-
ration of Turkey that "the Turkish Govern-
ment confirms that it is ready to sign the Pro-
tocol on the adaptation of the Ankara Agree-
ment prior to the actual start of accession ne-
gotiations and after reaching agreement on 
and finalising the adaptations which are nec-
essary in view of the current membership of 
the European Union". 
20. The European Council, while underlining 
the need for unequivocal commitment to good 
neighbourly relations welcomed the improve-
ment in Turkey's relations with its neighbours 
and its readiness to continue to work with the 
concerned Member States towards resolution 
of outstanding border disputes in conformity 
with the principle of peaceful settlement of 
disputes in accordance with the United Na-
tions Charter. In accordance with its previous 
conclusions, notably those of Helsinki on this 
matter, the European Council reviewed the 
situation relating to outstanding disputes and 
welcomed the exploratory contacts to this end. 
In this connection it reaffirmed its view that 
unresolved disputes having repercussions on 
the accession process, should if necessary be 
brought to the International Court of Justice 
for settlement. The European Council will be 
kept informed of progress achieved which it 
will review as appropriate. 
21. The European Council noted the resolution 
adopted by the European Parliament on 15 
December 2004. 
22. The European Council welcomed the 
adoption of the six pieces of legislation identi-
fied by the Commission. It decided that, in the 
light of the above and of the Commission re-
port and recommendation, Turkey sufficiently 
fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria to 
open accession negotiations provided that it 
brings into force these specific pieces of legis-
lation. It invited the Commission to present to 
the Council a proposal for a framework for 
negotiations with Turkey, on the basis set out 
in paragraph 23. It requested the Council to 
agree on that framework with a view to open-
ing negotiations on 3 October 2005. 
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Framework for negotiations 
23. The European Council agreed that acces-
sion negotiations with individual candidate 
states will be based on a framework for nego-
tiations. Each framework, which will be estab-
lished by the Council on a proposal by the 
Commission, taking account of the experience 
of the fifth 
enlargement process and of the evolving ac-
quis, will address the following elements, ac-
cording to own merits and specific situations 
and characteristics of each candidate state: 
•  As in previous negotiations, the substance 
of the negotiations, which will be con-
ducted in an Intergovernmental Conference 
with the participation of all Member States 
on the one hand and the candidate State 
concerned on the other, where decisions re-
quire unanimity, will be broken down into a 
number of chapters, each covering a spe-
cific policy area. The Council, acting by 
unanimity on a proposal by the Commis-
sion, will lay down benchmarks for the 
provisional closure and, where appropriate, 
for the opening of each chapter; depending 
on the chapter concerned, these benchmarks 
will refer to legislative alignment and a sat-
isfactory track record of implementation of 
the acquis as well as obligations deriving 
from contractual relations with the Euro-
pean Union. 
•  Long transition periods, derogations, spe-
cific arrangements or permanent safeguard 
clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently 
available as a basis for safeguard measures, 
may be considered. The Commission will 
include these, as appropriate, in its propos-
als for each framework, for areas such as 
freedom of movement of persons, structural 
policies or agriculture. Furthermore, the de-
cision-taking process regarding the eventual 
establishment of freedom of movement of 
persons should allow for a maximum role 
of individual Member States. Transitional 
arrangements or safeguards should be re-
viewed regarding their impact on competi-
tion or the functioning of the internal mar-
ket. 
•  The financial aspects of accession of a can-
didate state must be allowed for in the ap-
plicable Financial Framework. Hence, ac-
cession negotiations yet to be opened with 
candidates whose accession could have 
substantial financial consequences can only 
be concluded after the establishment of the 
Financial Framework for the period from 
2014 together with possible consequential 
financial reforms. 
•  The shared objective of the negotiations is 
accession. These negotiations are an open-
ended process, the outcome of which can-
not be guaranteed beforehand. While taking 
account of all Copenhagen criteria, if the 
Candidate State is not in a position to as-
sume in full all the obligations of member-
ship it must be ensured that the Candidate 
State concerned is fully anchored in the 
European structures through the strongest 
possible bond. 
•  In the case of a serious and persistent 
breach in a candidate state of the principles 
of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and the 
rule of law on which the Union is founded, 
the Commission will, on its own initiative 
or on the request of one third of the Mem-
ber States, recommend the suspension of 
negotiations and propose the conditions for 
eventual resumption. The Council will de-
cide by qualified majority on such a rec-
ommendation, after having heard the candi-
date state, whether to suspend the negotia-
tions and on the conditions for their re-
sumption. The Member States will act in 
the IGC in accordance with the Council de-
cision, without prejudice to the general re-
quirement for unanimity in the IGC. The 
European Parliament will be informed. 
•  Parallel to accession negotiations, the Un-
ion will engage with every candidate state 
in an intensive political and cultural dia-
logue. With the aim of enhancing mutual 
understanding by bringing people together, 
this inclusive dialogue also will involve 
civil society. 128 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
 
 
TURKISH BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES 
by 
TÜSIAD 




TURKEY HAS STEPPED INTO 
A HISTORICAL DECADE 
 
 
With the conclusion of the EU Council Summit on 
December 17, 2004 a historical era has opened be-
fore Turkey. As a consequence of Turkish govern-
ment’s successfully accomplished reform agenda 
and vigorously conducted diplomacy, EU has de-
cided to launch the accession negotiations with 
Turkey on October 3, 2005. TÜSIAD as a civil so-
ciety organization has attained one of the main 
milestones of its mission. From now on it is cru-
cially important that Turkey pursues the accession 
negotiation process with a realistic and rationalistic 
approach. 
In the forthcoming period, the main issues that 
could influence the EU accession negotiations 
process are as follows: 
1.  Turkey’s approach to the accession negotiation 
process should embody comprehensive reforms 
and reconciliatory bureaucratic culture; 
2.  It is necessary to launch capacity building ef-
forts in terms of human resources with the aim 
of educating the staff required to analyze the 
EU acquis and policies as well as the political 
balances among the Member States; 
3.  Turkey should take into consideration the EU’s 
global economic competitiveness targets (Lis-
bon Strategy) and political efforts to deepen its 
integration. (EU Constitution). 
TÜSİAD considers that the outcome of the Euro-
pean Summit on December 16-17, 2004 will have a 
valuable contribution to the endeavours to obtain a 
comprehensive solution regarding the Cyprus issue.  
 
To this end, the EU established a more balanced 
stance by discarding the Southern Cyprus govern-
ment’s condition to be recognised by Turkey in or-
der to give a green light to the launch of accession 
negotiations and by agreeing that the declaration of 
Turkey stating its readiness to sign the protocol 
which adapts the Ankara Agreement for new mem-
ber states would be sufficient. TÜSIAD believes 
that the European Council’s decision to end the iso-
lation of Turkish Cypriots should be put into force 
and consequently, the related regulations on “Direct 
Trade” and “Financial Aid” should be adopted 
without further delay with the aim of compelling 
the Southern Cyprus government to come to the 
negotiation table. 
Cyprus issue is a source of instability in the context 
of Turkey –EU relations. At this stage TÜSIAD 
expects the Turkish government to initiate a new 
diplomatic effort to bring the two sides back to the 
negotiation table to achieve a breakthrough for a 
final settlement based on the “Annan Plan”. How-
ever, it is equally important that Turkey’s efforts 
are accompanied with the goodwill and support of 
the EU by mastering the political resources and 
pressure needed to bring the Greek Cypriots back to 
negotiations, despite the fact that they clearly re-
jected the U.N. Plan in April 2004 
In the coming period it is crucial to deal with the 
difficult issues, both the ones that are stated in the 
Presidency Conclusions of the EU Council and oth-
ers which are not included in the Conclusions but 
may be brought into discussion in the future, with a 
reconciliatory and constructive approach. It is im-
portant to have the political will that struggles to 
solve problems instead of living with them. In addi-
tion, the accession negotiations should be pursued 
within a structural discipline by the setting of in-
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Introductory Note from CEPS 
 
This issue of CEPS Turkey in Europe Monitor 
presents a Working Paper titled “The Impact 
of Turkey’s EU Membership on EU Voting”, 
prepared by Richard Baldwin from the Gradu-
ate Institute of International Studies, Switzer-
land and Mika Widgren from the Turku School 
of Economics, Finland.  
The paper evaluates the impact of Turkey’s 
membership on EU voting structures. The as-
pects that are discussed are decision making 
efficiency and the distribution of power in the 
EU’s leading decision making body, the Coun-
cil of Ministers, under two alternative voting 
rules: those accepted in the Treaty of Nice and 
implemented by the Accession Treaty of the 10 
entrants in 2004 and the rules that are laid 
down in the Constitutional Treaty. 
 
 
The paper concludes that if Constitutional 
Treaty voting rules come into effect, Turkey’s 
membership will only have a negligible effect 
on EU’s capacity to act. As far as power con-
cerned, it is found that Turkey will have a big 
impact. Under either the Nice or Constitu-
tional Treaty rules, Turkey will be the second 
most powerful member of the EU29. Under the 
Constitutional Treaty Rules, Turkey will be 
substantially more powerful than France, Italy 
and Britain, while under the Nice rules the 
power differences among the 50 – million – 
plus members will be small. This is expected to 
have impacts on the acceptability of the Con-
stitutional Treaty and\or Turkey’s EU mem-
bership.  
The Working Paper will also be available on 
the CEPS website, www.ceps.be. 
 
Michael Emerson and Senem Aydın 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF TURKEY’S 
MEMBERSHIP ON EU VOTING 
Richard Baldwin, Mika Widgren
1 
1.  Introduction 
The Treaty of Nice in 2001 and the Constitu-
tional Treaty in 2004 radically reformed the 
Council of Ministers’ voting rules.
2 Political  
                                                                                                 
1 Richard Baldwin is from the Graduate Institute of 
International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, and 
CEPR. Mika Widgren is from Turku School of 
Economics, Turku, Finland, and CEPR. 
2 Legally, the Accession Treaty of 10 new member 
states in 2004 implemented the voting system 
agreed politically in the Nice Treaty. The voting 
 
acceptance of the Constitutional Treaty rules 
was achieved in Brussels summit in June 
2004. Soon after in November 2004 the Nice 
rules came into effect in November 2004. The 
changes made in the Constitutional Treaty 
were postponed by five years and even that 
requires that the Constitution is ratified in all 
25 member states. The next enlargement is 
scheduled for 2007 when Bulgaria and Roma-
nia are expected to enter. Thus, they will enter 
under the current Nice rules but the next new 
members are likely to join under the rules of 
the Constitutional Treaty. 
                                                                                   
rules of the Constitutional Treaty come into force 
on 1 November 2009 if the Constitution is ratified 
in all member states
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In this paper, we evaluate the impact of Tur-
key’s membership on EU voting. The aspects 
that we discuss are decision making efficiency 
and the distribution of power in the EU’s lead-
ing decision making body, the Council of 
Ministers. We compare two alternative Coun-
cil voting rules: those accepted in the Treaty 
of Nice and implemented by the Accession 
Treaty of ten 2004 entrants and the rules that 
are laid down in the Constitutional Treaty. 
2.  Council of Minister voting reforms 
The Constitutional Treaty explicitly sets out 
two sets of Council’s voting procedure and 
implicitly recognises the current system set up 
by the Accession Treaty (Article 24): 
Up to 31 October 2004 
The pre-Treaty of Nice rules apply, i.e. quali-
fied majority voting with weighted votes and 
the old majority threshold of 71% to win. The 
numbers of votes for the incumbent 15 are 
unchanged; those for the 10 newcomers are a 
simple interpolation of EU - 15 votes as speci-
fied in the Accession Treaty.  
From 1 November 2004 to 31 October 2009  
The Nice Treaty rules apply (as per the “Draft 
Council Decision relating to the implementa-
tion of Article I-24”). The Nice rules maintain 
the basic ‘qualified majority voting’ frame-
work, but add two extra criteria concerning 
the number of yes-voters and the population 
they represent. Specifically, the vote threshold 
is 72.2% of the Council votes (232 of the 321 
votes), the member threshold is 50% of mem-
bers (13 members), and the population thresh-
old is 62% of the EU population.
3  
From 1 November 2009 onwards 
The Constitutional Treaty (CT) rules apply, so 
weighted voting is out and double majority is 
in. A winning coalition must represent at least 
                                                                                                 
3 The rules that take effect in November 2004 are 
not those agreed at the Nice Summit, December 
2000. The deal struck at 4 a.m. at the end of the 
longest EU Summit in history was a political 
commitment. The legally binding changes are in 
the Accession Treaty. Since EU leaders eventually 
realised how inefficient the Nice rules were, they 
improved efficiency by lowering the vote threshold 
from the 74% mentioned in the Nice Treaty. 
55% EU members and 65% of the EU popula-
tion. A last-minute Summit compromise in-
serted the requirement at least 15 members 
vote ‘yes’, but this is irrelevant; 15 members 
of 25 is 60% and thus greater than 55%, but 
by the time these rules take effect, the EU 
should have 27 members and 55% of 27 is 15 
(Bulgaria and Romania are pencilled in for 
membership in 2007). The 15 member rule 
will be redundant when it takes effect. Tur-
key’s and Croatia’s membership will, in any 
case, materialise after that date. 
To come into force, the CT rules need the rati-
fication of all member states. The fall-back 
position is the Nice-rules, which makes it pos-
sible that Turkey and Croatia enter under the 
Nice rules. Therefore, in the following we 
evaluate these two rules in the EU-25 and EU-
29 and compare especially the impact of Tur-
key’s membership on the countries of EU-25 
who have the most substantial say in the rati-
fication process of the Constitution. 
3.  Our tools of assessment 
Capacity to act 
‘Capacity to act’ and ‘decision-making effi-
ciency’ are slippery concepts. There is, how-
ever, a quantitative tool in voting game theory 
that helps make things more precise. The so-
called ‘passage probability’ gauges how likely 
it is that the Council would approve a ran-
domly selected issue – random in the sense 
that each EU member would be equally likely 
to vote for or against it. The best way to de-
scribe this measure is to explain how it is cal-
culated. 
First, the computer calculates all possible coa-
litions among EU members, namely every 
possible combination of yes- and no-votes by 
EU members (there are 134 million possible 
coalitions in the EU27). Then the computer 
checks each coalition to see if it is a winning 
coalition under the Nice voting system; this is 
done using each member’s actual weight on 
the three criteria (votes, members, population) 
and the three thresholds. The passage prob-
ability tells us what fraction of these coalitions 
are winning coalitions. It is called the passage 
probability because it is the likelihood that a 
random proposal would attract a winning coa-
lition, assuming all coalitions are equally 
likely (random in the sense that member states NO. 13 / JANUARY 2005 | 131 
 
do not know what their stance would be). 
Admittedly, this is a crude measure, but it is 
objective, precise and its strengths and short-
comings are clear. 
Even if the exact passage probability is mean-
ingless (the Commission does not put forth 
random proposals), Figure 1 shows that the 
Nice Treaty fails on efficiency grounds since 
it implies a level of efficiency that is far, far 
below that of the EU15. Indeed, the Nice re-
forms actually made matters worse. Admitting 
12 new members without any reform would 
have cut the passage probability to a third of 
its already low level, namely to 2.5%. With 
the Nice reforms, the figure drops even further 
to 2.1%. We note that the main source of the 
lower efficiency is the high threshold of the 
Nice rules for Council votes. A second, cruder 
but more transparent efficiency-measuring 
tool – i.e. blocking-minority analysis – con-
firms these efficiency findings.  
As with the ability to act, there can be no per-
fect measure of power, but even imperfect 
measures are useful when considering com-
plex voting rules since a voting scheme’s po-
litical acceptability turns almost completely on 
its power implications.  
The measures we use are called the Normal-
ised Banzhaf Index (NBI) and the Shapley-
Shubik index (SSI). In plain English, they 
gauge how likely it is that a nation finds itself 
in a position to “break” a winning coalition
4 
on a randomly selected issue. Thus, the NBI 
and SSI tell us how influential a country is 
likely to be on a randomly chosen issue. More 
concretely, the NBI assumes that each possi-
ble coalition has the same probability of oc-
currence. This makes all winning coalitions 
equally likely too and the measurement of 
power is simply counting the score of break-
ing positions for each player. To get a relative 
measure of power this is then divided by the 
total number of scores. Of course, on particu-
lar issues various countries may be much more 
or much less powerful – especially if they are 
part of a like-minded group (see Baldwin, 
Berglof, Giavazzi and Widgren 2001 for de-
tails and simple numerical examples), but the 
NBI has recently proved its worth especially 
as an un-bribable tool in assessing and design-
ing voting rules. 
                                                                                                 
4 In the literature, the term ‘swing’ is quite often 
used instead of ‘break’. 
To make our way to approach political power 
more transparent let us illustrate how it works 
with the following simple example. Consider a 
simple three person voting body, like the 
Council of Ministers, with voters labelled with 
A, B and C. Suppose that A has four votes, B 
has 2 votes and C has one vote. The total 
number of votes is seven. Let us assume that 
five votes are needed to pass proposals. Here, 
we have three winning coalitions: 
AB, AC, ABC 
where the actors that are able to “break” a 
winning coalition are underlined. Now, A has 
three breaking positions, B has 2 and C only 
one. The number of breaking positions is six, 
which means that the NBI of A is 1/2, whereas 
the NBIs of B and C are 1/3 and 1/6 respectively. 
The SSI tries to capture a different abstract 
voting model. It assumes that voters have dif-
ferent intensities to accept or reject a proposal. 
Suppose that these intensities can be ex-
pressed on a line having the extremes of more 
spending and less spending. For instance when 
the issue is the support for hillside farmers it 
may be that A is the most reluctant to increase 
spending, then B leaving C as the most fa-
vourable to increase support for this purpose. 
On the other day, the issue might be the inclu-
sion of reindeer meet in the CAP’s price sup-
port mechanism, This time we might get a 
different order of preferences.  
In general, one can think that after considering 
a big enough number of issues all preference 
orders of A, B and C are equally likely. In our 
numerical example we get six orderings as 
follows:  
ABC ACB BAC BCA CAB CBA 
where the critical voter is underlined. A criti-
cal voter exerts power as (s)he is able to break 
a winning coalition. In the first order ABC, B 
can do that by breaking a winning coalition 
AB. Voter A favours more spending on this 
issue than B. Therefore A is not critical. 
Should voter A try to break the winning coali-
tion AB by voting against spending, voter B 
would have already broken that as (s)he is less 
eagerly in favour of spending. In the example, 
voter A has four pivotal positions, voters B 
and C one each. In relative terms we get 2/3 
for A and 1/6 for both B and C. If SSI is a 
meaningful estimate for power and if power 
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should be A’s, B’s and C’s budget shares re-
spectively.  
Clearly, these measures of power do not pro-
vide a detailed description of real-world vot-
ing procedures. For instance they lack all stra-
tegic aspects, like who makes the proposal to 
be voted on or the sequence of moves. They 
both contain, however, some information of 
voters’ preferences understood as intensities 
of holding a favourable position. On the other 
hand, the measures consider all possible order-
ings of intensities (SSI) or presume equal like-
lihood of all coalitions (NBI), which makes 
them a very long-term concept. For a general 
evaluation of voting rules this is a desirable 
property. 
The example above demonstrates that the NBI 
and SSI can have very different values. Which 
one we should then choose? There is no clear 
answer to that but as a rough distinction if one 
is interested in voting rules as such, the NBI is 
more advantageous; but if one is more inter-
ested in decision-making and bargaining under 
certain rules knowing that actors communi-
cate, then the SSI is far more suitable tool.
5 
4.  Turkey’s impact 
4.1  Implications on EU’s capacity to act 
Turkey’s membership would have only mod-
erate implications for the passage probabilities 
as Figure 1 shows. This is not surprising since 
moving from 27 members to 29 does not 
change much. Although Croatia increases the 
number of small nations in the EU Turkey’s 
large population means that there is little dam-
age in efficiency. (Efficiency, if not legiti-
macy, tends to be higher when a large share of 
power is in the hands of just a few nations.)  
                                                                                                 
5 See e.g. Laruelle and Widgrén (1998), Widgrén 
(1994) and Laruelle and Valenciano (2004). A re-
cent empirical application of the SSI is Kauppi and 
Widgrén (2004). 
As usual, the Nice rules – which are essen-
tially unworkable even in the EU27 – become 
even less viable in an EU29. The vote thresh-
olds that are used in calculations are extrapo-
lations of the current Nice/Accession Treaty 
threshold. In EU-29, it is 276 out of total 381 
votes plus the two additional criteria: at least 
15 member states and 62 per cent of popula-
tion. In EU-27, it is 250 out of total 345 votes 
plus the two additional criteria: at least 14 
member states and 62 per cent of population. 
As usual, the Nice rules – which are essen-
tially unworkable even in the EU27 – become 
even less viable in an EU29. The same does 
not hold for the Constitutional Treaty’s voting 
rules. The passage probability jumps drasti-
cally from the Nice rules low levels up to the 
level of EU-12 and even higher. Surprisingly, 
under the Constitutional Treaty’s rules the 
EU’s ability to act is improving when its 
membership expands from 25 to 27 or 29. 
There is only a slight drop from EU-27 to EU-
29 from 12.9 to 12.2 per cent.
6 
In sum, the passage probability calculations 
demonstrate that Turkey’s membership does 
not deteriorate EU’s ability to act. Under the 
Constitutional Treaty’s rules, the effect of 
Croatia and Turkey together is significantly 
smaller – one percentage point – than Tur-
key’s alone. The most important impact on 
EU’s capacity to act is due to the switch from 
the Nice rules to the Constitutional Treaty’s 
rules. 
 
                                                                                                 
6 Note that in EU-28 (EU-27 + Turkey), the pas-
sage probability is 11.2 per cent, hence lower than 
it is in EU-29 (see Baldwin and Widgrén 2003b). 
That is because the membership quota - 55 per cent 
of membership – is 16 in both EU-28 and EU-29. 
It is thus closer to 55 per cent in EU-29 than in 
EU-28 the exact numbers being 55.2 and 57.1 per 
cent respectively. NO. 13 / JANUARY 2005 | 133 
 



























Historical 21.9 14.7 13.7 9.8 7.8
Status quo: May 04 to Nov 04 2.8
Nice rules: Nov 04 to Nov 09 3.6 2.8 2.3
CT rules: Nov 09 onwards 10.1 12.9 12.2
EU6 EU9 EU10 EU12 EU15 EU25 EU27 EU29
 
Notes: The figure shows the passage probability which measures the likelihood of that randomly selected issue 




4.2  The impact on the distribution of power 
The Constitutional Treaty and the Nice rules 
have substantial differences in power evalua-
tion as well. Figure 2 shows the difference of 
these rules in terms of the NBI and SSI in EU-
25 and Figure 3 the respective numbers in EU-
29. The difference is measured in percentage 
points.  
Figure 2 shows that before Turkey’s entry the 
CT rules favour the four biggest nations and 
the six smallest, i.e. Latvia and smaller, if the 
comparison is made using the SSI. Based on 
the NBI the conclusion is somewhat different: 
then Germany and Slovakia and smaller coun-
tries would gain from the CT rules compared 
to the Nice rules. Note that this result differs 
from what was obtained in Baldwin and 
Widgrén (2004b) for EU-27 where the NBI 
showed exactly the same pattern as the SSI 
here. 
After Turkey’s entry the biggest nations gain 
more from the CT rules than in EU-25. This 
holds for both power measures. For the small-
est countries the effect is ambiguous: the NBI 
shows gains for Latvia and smaller nations 
whereas the SSI shows small losses. Other-
wise both indices show consistent results.  
Figure 4 makes an explicit comparison of the 
Nice and CT rules. The figure shows the NBI-
values under both rules. The message of the 
figure is very clear. The countries that gain the 
most from the CT rules are the biggest nations 
Germany and Turkey. The biggest losers are 
Spain and Poland but also the medium-sized 
countries from the Netherlands to Austria. 
That might affect these countries’ attitude ei-
ther towards the ratification of Constitution or 
Turkey’s membership. An interested reader 
can find both index-values in EU-25 and EU-
29 in Appendix. 
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Figure 2. Change in power in EU-25, Nice to CT rules, %-points 
































Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Figure 3. The power difference between the CT and Nice rules in EU-29, %-points 
































Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Enlargement’s impact on incumbent’s 
power 
Figures 5 and 6 evaluate the impact of the 
enlargement from EU-25 to EU-29 in terms of 
both power indices. In Nice, the countries’ 
power losses are proportional to their sizes. 
Germany, the biggest country, loses most 
while the smaller nations lose less. The rela-
tive losses are of the same magnitude. This 
reflects the fact that in weighted voting power 
indices tend to converge to voting weights if 
the number of actors increases and if the vot-
ing weights have relatively small variance. 
In Figure 6, the result is more interesting. 
When evaluated by the NBI, the expansion 
from EU-25 to EU-29 benefits France and the 
UK.
93 The losses of other big countries are 
very small (the Netherlands and larger na-
tions). For the countries smaller than Roma-
nia, the losses are slightly increasing towards 
the smallest nations. The SSI gives, however, 
a somewhat different picture. The most nota-
ble exceptions are the biggest countries, espe-
cially Germany. The power loss of the Nether-
lands remains small. 
                                                                                                 
93 This phenomenon is often referred to as the 
paradox of new members.  136 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
 
Figure 5. Enlargement’s impact on EU25 power, %-points, Nice rules 
































Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 6. Enlargement’s impact on EU25 power, %-points, CT rules 
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5.  Conclusions 
This paper investigates the decision-making 
impact of expanding the EU from 25 to 29 via 
new memberships for Bulgaria, Romania, 
Turkey and Croatia. We focus on a measure of 
the EU’s capacity to act – the passage prob-
ability – and the power distribution among 
members.  
As far as the capacity to act is concerned, the 
enlargement is projected to have relatively 
little impact, as long as the CT voting rules 
come into effect. In particular, Turkey’s 
membership has only a negligible effect on 
EU’s capacity to act. The answer, however, is 
quite different if the CT is rejected and the 
Nice Treaty rules remain in place. Under the 
Nice voting rules, the 25-to-29 enlargement 
would substantially lower the EU25’s ability 
to act. Thus, our findings confirm that the 
enlarged EU cannot function well under the 
Nice Treaty rules. It also suggests that if the 
CT is rejected, the Nice voting rules must be 
reformed before further enlargement.  
As far as power is concerned, we find that 
Turkey will have a big impact. Under either 
the Nice or CT rules, Turkey would be the 
second most powerful member of the EU29. 
Under the CT rules, Turkey would be substan-
tially more powerful than France, Italy and 
Britain, while under the Nice rules the power 
differences among the 50-million-plus mem-
bers would be small. Plainly, this might de-
crease the acceptability of the Constitutional 
Treaty and/or Turkey’s membership.  
The 25-to-29 enlargement’s impact on the vot-
ing power of EU incumbents depends heavily 
upon the rules. Under the CT rules, the 
enlargement lowers the power of all incum-
bents on a fairly even basis with the marked 
exception of Germany; Germany loses more 
than twice as much as any other member. Un-
der the Nice rules, the power loss is more 
heavily skewed towards big incumbents. 
Again, all incumbents are projected to lose 
power, but power loss increases progressively 
with member size. For example, the power 
loss to France under the Nice rules is some-
thing like 7 times larger than the power loss to 
Malta.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Power indices under CT rules 
Member state  NBI_EU29  NBI_EU25  SSI_EU29  SSI_EU25 
Germany 0.10203  0.10407  0.13556  0.15816 
Turkey  0.09960   0.13152  
UK 0.07644  0.07614  0.09389  0.10332 
France 0.07611  0.07587  0.09339  0.10278 
Italy 0.07469  0.07475  0.09121  0.10041 
Spain 0.05491  0.05670  0.06313  0.06798 
Poland 0.05429  0.05602  0.06203  0.06694 
Romania  0.03786   0.03664  
Netherlands 0.03052  0.03715  0.02701  0.03440 
Greece 0.02495  0.03304 0.01991  0.02721 
Czech Republic  0.02474  0.03287 0.01964 0.02693 
Belgium   0.02463  0.03279  0.01950  0.02680 
Hungary 0.02453  0.03271  0.01936  0.02666 
Portugal 0.02442  0.03262  0.01922  0.02651 
Sweden 0.02314  0.03162  0.01758  0.02489 
Bulgaria  0.02250   0.01676  
Austria 0.02239  0.03103  0.01663  0.02403 
Slovakia 0.01940  0.02870  0.01288  0.02000 
Denmark 0.01940  0.02870  0.01288  0.02000 
Finland 0.01918  0.02854  0.01261  0.01975 
Croatia  0.01886   0.01221  
Ireland 0.01768  0.02737  0.01077  0.01785 
Lithuania 0.01768  0.02737  0.01077  0.01785 
Latvia 0.01628  0.02630  0.00905  0.01631 
Slovenia 0.01585  0.02598  0.00853  0.01568 
Estonia 0.01521  0.02547  0.00774  0.01487 
Cyprus 0.01445  0.02490  0.00680  0.01384 
Luxemburg 0.01413  0.02465  0.00641  0.01342 
Malta 0.01413  0.02465  0.00641  0.01342 




Table A2. Power indices under Nice rules 
Member state  NBI_EU29  NBI_EU25  SSI_EU29  SSI_EU25 
Germany 0.07189  0.08630  0.07814  0.09292 
Turkey  0.07189   0.07814  
UK 0.07189  0.08630  0.07814  0.09292 
France 0.07189  0.08630  0.07814  0.09292 
Italy 0.07189  0.08630  0.07814  0.09292 
Spain 0.06821  0.08159  0.07237  0.08613 
Poland 0.06821  0.08159  0.07237  0.08613 
Romania  0.03832   0.03615  
Netherlands 0.03565  0.04195  0.03340  0.03983 
Greece 0.03305  0.03881 0.03082  0.03648 
Czech Republic  0.03305  0.03881 0.03082 0.03648 
Belgium   0.03305  0.03881  0.03082  0.03648 
Hungary 0.03305  0.03881  0.03082  0.03648 
Portugal 0.03305  0.03881  0.03082  0.03648 
Sweden 0.02771  0.03246  0.02560  0.03024 
Bulgaria  0.02771   0.02560  
Austria 0.02771  0.03246  0.02560  0.03024 
Slovakia 0.01954  0.02291  0.01777  0.02099 
Denmark 0.01954  0.02291  0.01777  0.02099 
Finland 0.01954  0.02291  0.01777  0.02099 
Croatia  0.01954   0.01777  
Ireland 0.01954  0.02291  0.01777  0.02099 
Lithuania 0.01954  0.02291  0.01777  0.02099 
Latvia 0.01124  0.01324  0.00999  0.01190 
Slovenia 0.01124  0.01324  0.00999  0.01190 
Estonia 0.01124  0.01324  0.00999  0.01190 
Cyprus 0.01124  0.01324  0.00999  0.01190 
Luxemburg 0.01124  0.01324  0.00999  0.01190 
Malta 0.00841  0.00998  0.00755  0.00895 
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With the conclusion of the EU Council Sum-
mit on December 17, 2004 a historical era has 
opened before Turkey. As a consequence of 
Turkish government’s successfully accom-
plished reform agenda and vigorously con-
ducted diplomacy, EU has decided to launch 
the accession negotiations with Turkey on Oc-
tober 3, 2005. TÜSIAD as a civil society or-
ganization has attained one of the main mile-
stones of its mission. From now on it is cru-
cially important that Turkey pursues the acces-
sion negotiation process with a realistic and 
rationalistic approach. 
In the forthcoming period, the main issues that 
could influence the EU accession negotiations 
process are as follows: 
1.  Turkey’s approach to the accession nego-
tiation process should embody comprehen-
sive reforms and reconciliatory bureau-
cratic culture; 
2.  It is necessary to launch capacity building 
efforts in terms of human resources with 
the aim of educating the staff required to 
analyze the EU acquis and policies as well 
as the political balances among the Mem-
ber States; 
3.  Turkey should take into consideration the 
EU’s global economic competitiveness 
targets (Lisbon Strategy) and political ef-
forts to deepen its integration. (EU Consti-
tution). 
TÜSİAD considers that the outcome of the 
European Summit on December 16-17, 2004 
will have a valuable contribution to the en-
deavours to obtain a comprehensive solution 
regarding the Cyprus issue.  
 
 
To this end, the EU established a more bal-
anced stance by discarding the Southern Cy-
prus government’s condition to be recognised 
by Turkey in order to give a green light to the 
launch of accession negotiations and by agree-
ing that the declaration of Turkey stating its 
readiness to sign the protocol which adapts the 
Ankara Agreement for new member states 
would be sufficient. TÜSIAD believes that the 
European Council’s decision to end the isola-
tion of Turkish Cypriots should be put into 
force and consequently, the related regulations 
on “Direct Trade” and “Financial Aid” should 
be adopted without further delay with the aim 
of compelling the Southern Cyprus govern-
ment to come to the negotiation table. 
Cyprus issue is a source of instability in the 
context of Turkey –EU relations. At this stage 
TÜSIAD expects the Turkish government to 
initiate a new diplomatic effort to bring the 
two sides back to the negotiation table to 
achieve a breakthrough for a final settlement 
based on the “Annan Plan”. However, it is 
equally important that Turkey’s efforts are ac-
companied with the goodwill and support of 
the EU by mastering the political resources 
and pressure needed to bring the Greek Cypri-
ots back to negotiations, despite the fact that 
they clearly rejected the U.N. Plan in April 
2004 
In the coming period it is crucial to deal with 
the difficult issues, both the ones that are 
stated in the Presidency Conclusions of the EU 
Council and others which are not included in 
the Conclusions but may be brought into dis-
cussion in the future, with a reconciliatory and 
constructive approach. It is important to have 
the political will that struggles to solve prob-
lems instead of living with them. In addition, 
the accession negotiations should be pursued 
within a structural discipline by the setting of 
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Introductory Note from CEPS 
 
This issue of CEPS Turkey in Europe Monitor 
presents the executive summary of the Re-
search Report titled ‘Turkey in the EU: Con-
sequences for Agriculture, Food, Rural Areas 
and Structural Policy’, prepared by Arie Os-
kam and Alison Burrell from Wageningen 
University, Siemen van Berkum from the Agri-
cultural Economics and Research Institute 
(LEI), and Tuğrul Temel, Natasha Longworth 
and Irene Molina Vilchez from the Agricul-
tural Economics and Rural Policy Group 
(AEP).  
The report aims to provide a comprehensible 
overview of Turkey’s agriculture and food 
sectors, and the situation in its rural areas, 
which is then used to examine potential con-
sequences of Turkey’s EU accession.  
The report first describes recent and current 
trends in agricultural production and resource 
use, the structure and performance of the agri-
food chain, foreign trade in agricultural and 
food products, the environmental impacts of 





Second, taking Turkey’s accession to the Un-
ion in 2015 as a working hypothesis, the con-
sequences of accession for both Turkey and 
the EU are explored on the basis of the infor-
mation assembled and discussed in the over-
view.   
The main focus of the overview is on the eco-
nomic and policy issues relating to agricul-
ture, food and rural areas. In evaluating these 
issues and discussing future perspectives, 
long-term processes and institutional devel-
opments are emphasised. 
The full text of the Report is accessible at 
http://www.socialsciences.wur.nl/aae/projects/
Turkey/totaal-including%20cover.pdf  for a 
limited period. A revised version will shortly 
be published by CABI   entitled Turkey in the 
European Union: Implications for Agricul-
ture, Food and Structural Policy, edited by 
Burrell and Oskam. 
 
Michael Emerson and Senem Aydın 
 
 
Turkey in the European Union: 
Consequences for Agriculture, Food, Rural Areas and Structural Policy 
by 
Arie Oskam, Alison Burrell, Tuğrul Temel, Siemen van Berkum, Natasha Longworth 
and Irene Molina Vilchez
94 
 
Overview of the Turkish Agricultural Sector 
 
Turkey’s economy is about half the size of the total for all the new member states of the EU, but per 
capita GDP is much lower and, after correcting for purchasing power differences, is just 25 per cent 
of the average for EU-15. Turkey’s long-term economic growth rate is relatively low and has been 
heavily influenced by negative growth in years of economic crisis. 
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The distribution of income is very unequal 
between Turkish households. In addition, Tur-
key has much higher regional income inequal-
ity compared to other large EU countries. Re-
ducing these regional income gaps will be 
very difficult because of the dependence of 
low-income regions on agriculture, which we 
argue will come under increased economic 
pressure within the single market of the EU. 
 
The foundations of Turkey’s formal institu-
tions derive from the guiding principles of 
Atatürk’s ideology, as enshrined in the Consti-
tution of 1923. Turkey is a secular sovereign 
state, whose economy (except for agriculture) 
is largely open to foreign competition. How-
ever, some key economic organisations are 
still partly state-owned or state controlled. 
Moreover, various important institutions that 
affect economic performance and social out-
comes are weak relative to EU standards. 
 
For example, the benefits of the social security 
and pension system are mainly limited to 
those working in the ‘formal’ economy, which 
covers about 50 per cent of economic activity. 
The education system offers 8 years of com-
pulsory schooling. However, quality is vari-
able, and enrolment rates are well below 100 
per cent, particularly for girls. Spending on 
education 
and levels of educational attainment in Turkey 
are low, relative to virtually all OECD and 
EU-25 countries. With respect to agriculture, 
the national farm extension system has per-
formed inadequately for several decades. 
 
In recent years, there has been rapid progress 
in aligning key economic legislation more 
closely with that of the EU. 
However, many important differences remain, 
and our research has found recurrent concerns 
about the current administrative capacity and 
resolve to enforce the existing legislation ef-
fectively. For example, competition legislation 
dating from the late 1990s is partly compatible 
with that of the EU, but needs to be applied 
with more rigour. Land property rights are 
well recognised in principle but are not always 
well defined in practice. Land surveys and 
land registration are incomplete, although they 
now cover over 75 per cent of agricultural 
land. Institutional arrangements concerning 
labour and farming contracts, water use rights, 
land purchase/sale rules and environmental 
impact regulations are still weak and not ade-
quately enforced. 
 
In Turkey’s food safety and quality legisla-
tion, 93 per cent of Turkish standards are now 
based on European and international stan-
dards, while over 90 per cent of EU standards 
have been adopted as Turkish standards. Here 
too, however, enforcement constitutes a chal-
lenge, not least because of the fragmented and 
dual nature of the whole Turkish agrifood sys-
tem. 
 
The duality of the primary production sector 
means that commercial farms and export-
oriented chains for individual products co-
exist with subsistence or semi-subsistence 
farming. Similar duality is observed in the 
processing and retail sectors, with modern 
production facilities and supermarket outlets 
accounting for a considerable share of activity 
whilst many small-scale facilities and informal 
market outlets characterise the remainder. 
 
Agriculture accounts for 12 per cent of Tur-
key’s GDP, 34 per cent of employment and 11 
per cent of merchandise exports. About 7 mil-
lion people work in Turkish agriculture, 
roughly the same number of agricultural 
workers as in the entire EU-15. Total agricul-
tural area was somewhere between 35 and 41 
million hectares in 2001, of which about 27 
million hectares was cultivated or fallow, the 
rest being pasture land. 
 
The value of Turkey’s agricultural production 
in 2002 was EUR 29 billion (one tenth of EU-
15 output value). The crop sector in Turkey 
accounts for a much larger share of output 
value (77 per cent) than in the EU (55 per 
cent). Fruit and vegetables together account 
for 43 per cent of total output value in Turkey, 
but only 15 per cent in the EU. Field crops 
have the largest share (35 per cent) of Tur-
key’s agricultural output. Livestock products 
are less than 25 per cent, although livestock 
output may be under-recorded in the official 
statistics by up to 30 per cent. 
 
Cereals account for 60 per cent of field crop 
area, with rain fed yields constant at around 2 
tons per hectare for some years. Fruit produc-
tion has increased by 55 per cent since 1980 
while grazing livestock numbers have been 
falling for two decades, and red meat produc-NO. 14 / FEBRUARY 2005 | 143 
 
tion has remained constant. Poultry numbers 
have increased by over 300 per cent in the 
same period. 
 
Turkey has little agro-ecological potential for 
increasing total cultivated land area, but there 
is scope for extending irrigation and for in-
creasing the productivity of existing 
farming systems. 
 
Producer prices for most commodities in Tur-
key are higher than in the EU, with the excep-
tion of sheep meat, milk, sugar, tobacco and 
cotton. However, wholesale prices for dairy 
products are higher than in the EU, indicating 
an inefficient dairy processing sector. 
 
Average income per employed household 
member in Turkish agriculture is less than 40 
per cent of the level for non-agricultural 
workers. Labour productivity in agriculture is 
low. Gross Value Added (GVA) in agriculture 
per person is one eighth of the average EU-15 
level, lower than the averages for the NMS 
and Bulgaria, but higher than in Romania. Be-
cause of the more land-intensive nature of the 
fruit and vegetable sectors, land productivity 
is relatively better than labour productivity. 
GVA per hectare is 45 per cent below the EU-
15 average, but higher than in the NMS, Bul-
garia and Romania. 
 
In 2003, Turkey exported EUR 4.3 billion of 
agricultural and food products and imported 
EUR 3.7 billion. Turkey regularly has a trade 
surplus in agricultural products. Fruit and 
vegetables are the major export categories. 
EU-15 member states are the destination for 
about 45 per cent of Turkey’s agricultural ex-
ports. 
 
About 40 per cent (27.3 million persons) of 
Turkey’s civilian population is classified as 
rural (living outside larger towns and cities). 
Agricultural workers live mainly in areas clas-
sified as rural, and represent 34 per cent of the 
total work force. 
 
Relative to urban areas, rural areas have a high 
labour force participation rate, low unem-
ployment levels, and high rates of unpaid fam-
ily labour, particularly amongst females. 
These urban-rural contrasts are partly due to 
the way employment is measured, whereby 
part-time work of even a few hours per week 
(which is more common in agriculture) counts 
as employment. 
 
The 15-24-year-old age group comprises 20 
per cent of the population. Unemployment 
among well educated individuals in this age 
group is much higher than for the adult labour 
force as a whole, although it tends to be lower 
in rural areas. This probably indicates an out-
migration of well educated young people from 
rural areas, rather than better job provision for 
this category of worker. 
 
The rate of illiteracy is 18 per cent among ag-
ricultural workers (28 per cent for female ag-
ricultural workers). Beyond primary school 
(which ends at age 11), school enrolment rates 
are lower in rural areas (particularly for girls) 
than in urban areas. A number of disincentives 
for rural children to obtain education have 
been identified. 
 
There are large differences in quality of life 
indicators between urban and rural areas, and 
between ‘west’ and ‘east’. Poverty is inversely 
correlated with education level. Even within 
each level of education, however, rates of 
poverty are much higher in rural areas. Most 
agricultural workers have no social security 
coverage. 
 
The industries upstream of farming are either 
dominated by a few large enterprises, or char-
acterised by many smaller firms, or public 
sector-dominated with an increasing private 
sector involvement. The Agricultural Bank of 
Turkey, although still publicly owned, now 
operates according to commercial banking 
guidelines. Agricultural credit subsidies have 
ceased, and credit to agriculture has declined 
since 2001. The government had a dominant 
role in the agricultural cooperatives, which 
purchase, process and sell major agricultural 
commodities. The co-operatives are now being 
transformed into fully independent organisa-
tions that have to compete with private traders 
in the marketing of agricultural commodities. 
 
The wholesale market system for fresh prod-
ucts is still dominated by government-
appointed commissioners and its efficiency 
seems low. The system hinders the develop-
ment of quality standards and low economic 
transparency limits opportunities for tracing 
products in the food chain. 144 | TURKEY IN EUROPE MONITOR 
 
 
The Turkish food industry contributes 5 per 
cent of GNP, and accounts for 20 per cent of 
total manufacturing output. Its share in manu-
facturing industry export is 5-6 per cent and is 
in slight decline. There are over 100 thousand 
registered workers in the food sector, whereas 
the number of unregistered workers is un-
known. 
 
In general, the food industry suffers from 
over-capacity. Although generally fragmented, 
there is marked concentration in a number of 
branches. Market power does not seem to exist 
but hard evidence to verify this is not avail-
able. 
 
Food retailers offer relatively low quality 
standards, given low consumer demand for 
quality. As the economy grows and more con-
sumers become quality aware, the agrifood 
sector will face the challenge of meeting de-
mand for higher quality standards all along the 
chain. Failure to meet consumer requirements 
may result in further import penetration. The 
share of supermarkets in the food retail sector 
is growing rapidly, at the expense of tradi-
tional stores. Modern food stores had a market 
share of 42 per cent in 2003. Foreign invest-
ment in the retail sector is rather limited. The 
new law on foreign direct investment, ratified 
in 2003, may encourage more investment from 
abroad in the food sector. Processors purchase 
most agricultural commodities on the whole-
sale market. Supermarkets, on the other hand, 
are moving towards the use of more integrated 
channels in order to purchase guaranteed 
quantities and quality against competitive 
prices. 
 
For many years, agricultural policy formation 
has been dominated by political vote-seeking, 
at the expense of longer-term aims such as 
improving efficiency and adjusting to social 
needs and expectations. The main players 
have been the government, state-owned pur-
chasing, processing and/or trading companies, 
the many government-influenced product-
specific agricultural sales co-operatives and, 
more recently and indirectly, external organi-
sations such as the World Bank and IMF. 
 
Farmers’ representation by semi-public 
‘Chambers of Agriculture’ is weak, although 
there are also a few genuine farmer-controlled 
organisations and other independent NGOs. 
The countervailing power of consumers and 
taxpayers in the agricultural policy process has 
been very limited. 
 
The Agriculture Reform Implementation Pro-
ject (ARIP) of 2001-2005 is a radical change 
of direction for agricultural policy, and brings 
Turkey more in line with the EU. Price sup-
port has been reduced, subsidies have been 
removed and direct income support for farm-
ers, in the form of a system of flat-rate pay-
ments per hectare of area (capped at 50 hec-
tares), has been introduced. Many products, 
however, still enjoy high levels of trade pro-
tection. Since these changes, a short term pro-
duction fall of 4 per cent has been observed. 
 
The institutional reform of State Economic 
Enterprises and state-controlled Agricultural 
Sales Co-operatives, however, is proving more 
difficult. Steps are being taken, but up to now 
there is no clear indication that a competitive 
private sector has emerged. 
 
Food policy in Turkey mainly consists of 
measures to impose international food safety 
standards. Domestic demand for higher stan-
dards of food safety and quality is low. The 
private sector in Turkey has just begun its in-
volvement in the food safety standards of 
EUREPGAP in the fruit and vegetable sector. 
 
Rural development policy in Turkey is more 
focused on large-scale investments in areas 
such as irrigation. Structural policy would be a 
new concept for Turkey. 
 
With the exception of agriculture, the Turkish 
economy is relatively open to foreign trade. In 
2003, total imports and exports of goods were 
29 and 20 per cent of GNP, respectively. The 
EU is Turkey’s main trade partner. Agricul-
tural products accounted for 11 per cent of 
Turkey’s merchandise exports in 2002, and 4 
per cent of imports. Since 1989, agricultural 
trade volumes have fluctuated around a con-
stant level; the agricultural terms of trade im-
proved in the later 1990s, but are now close to 
the level of the early 1990s. 
 
Fruit and vegetables represent over half of 
Turkey’s agricultural exports, whereas the 
composition of agricultural imports is more 
diverse. One third of agricultural imports are NO. 14 / FEBRUARY 2005 | 145 
 
intermediate goods (textile fibres, hides/skins, 
tobacco, animal feed ingredients). 
 
A customs union between the European Union 
and Turkey came into force in January 1996. 
Agricultural products have remained outside 
the customs union, although (asymmetric) 
trade preferences operate for agricultural 
product flows in each direction. Since the EU 
had already accorded trade preference to many 
of Turkey’s agricultural exports, the customs 
union had no discernible impact on Turkey’s 
exports to the EU. Turkey has a strong posi-
tive balance on agricultural trade with the EU.  
 
Turkey also has developing country status in 
the WTO. It is a party to various regional trade 
co-operation agreements. Turkey retains some 
very high tariff bindings for agricultural and 
food products. The tariff structure for these 
categories exhibits tariff escalation. Turkey 
has no allowance for domestic support expen-
diture under the Uruguay Round Agreement, 
all domestic support having been declared as 
de minimis support (i.e. not exceeding 5% of 
the value of each relevant output). Currently, 
export subsidies are used for a number of 
products. 
 
At the WTO, Turkey has faced three formal 
complaints about using sanitary and phyto-
sanitary (SPS) regulations for protectionist 
purposes and with insufficient scientific justi-
fication, two of which appear to be unre-
solved. In particular, Turkey’s 8-year ban on 
imports of red meat has been repeatedly chal-
lenged as an illegal use of SPS measures for 
protectionist purposes. Other complaints about 
the lack of transparency in Turkey’s import 
regulations for agricultural products concern 
frequent unnotified changes in import regula-
tions, and cumbersome bureaucracy. 
 
In the Doha Development Round, Turkey fol-
lows the EU negotiating position as regards 
non-agricultural products, whereas for agricul-
ture, its position is close to that of the “G-20” 
developing countries, who insist on large re-
ductions in export subsidies and support by 
developed countries as a condition for further 
tariff reductions. 
 
With full harmonisation of agricultural trade 
between Turkey and the EU, livestock prices 
in Turkey would fall significantly and domes-
tic animal production would shrink. Consum-
ers’ welfare gain would be greater than pro-
ducers’ welfare loss. Turkey could do much to 
improve its net trade position in agriculture 
and food products even without trade har-
monisation with the EU, by internal restructur-
ing and raising the efficiency of supply chains. 
 
Turkey’s current pattern of self-sufficiency 
levels is the result of trade and market distor-
tions, and in particular an over-protected live-
stock sector, to the possible detriment of hu-
man nutrition. 
 
The main environmental impacts of agricul-
ture in Turkey are water and soil degradation, 
due to the overuse of water and chemicals. 
Fertiliser and pesticide use has decreased 
slightly in the last few years. However, the 
expansion of irrigated areas may stimulate 
excessive use of water, leading to more nutri-
ent run-off and salination. 
 
In the last 10 years, Turkey has adopted much 
new environmental legislation. The implemen-
tation of global and regional conventions, par-
ticipation in international environmental fora 
and the goal of joining the EU have been ma-
jor driving forces behind these reforms. How-
ever, institutions dealing with agri-
environmental issues are still poorly coordi-
nated and there is a lack of effective imple-
mentation at local level. Regulations are the 
main policy tool and there are few economic 
instruments. There are few incentives for 
farmers to use environmentally friendly prac-
tices. Turkey has only just started to include 
environmental concerns in its agriculture and 
rural development policies, and there is still 
ample scope for further regulation and im-
provements to existing regulations. Although 
public opinion gives low priority to the envi-
ronment, civil society in Turkey is becoming 
more involved in environmental policy mak-
ing. Non-governmental organisations have an 
important role to play in increasing environ-
mental awareness and public participation, and 
in advancing governmental policy. Recent 
changes facilitate registration and financing of 
non-governmental organisations and their pro-
jects in the field of the environment. 
 
Typically, environmental investment is fi-
nanced by government out of scarce budget 
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projects is limited. Funding for these projects 
is mostly provided by international develop-
ment agencies and other international donors. 
Most of these projects are scattered and of 
small scale. 
 
Organic farming has developed rapidly since 
the mid-1980s, but still covers less than 0.5 
per cent of the cultivated area. Production is 
export-driven and the sector offers potential 
for further growth. Both the government and 
nongovernmental actors are making efforts to 
develop the domestic market for organic prod-
ucts. Turkey is very rich in biodiversity. Many 
species and habitats are, however, at risk due 
to factors such as agricultural intensification, 
agricultural land abandonment and the con-
struction of large infrastructure projects. 
 
Turkey’s plant health situation gives relatively 
little cause for concern. Export quality fruit 
and vegetable products are already accepted 
on the EU market and around the world with-
out difficulty. For livestock, however, where 
the most infectious diseases are more destruc-
tive physiologically and economically, it is 
likely to take years to achieve standards that 
permit Turkey’s participation in a single mar-
ket for all animal products. 
 
Turkey faces major challenges with respect to 
animal health. Some highly infectious animal 
diseases that have been virtually eradicated in 
western and northern Europe remain endemic 
in Turkey. The situation is complicated by the 
fragmentation of the livestock sector, Turkey’s 
geographical location and its porous borders to 
the south and east. Other relevant factors in-
clude operational shortcomings that limit the 
efficiency of the veterinary services, the extent 
of political commitment to pursue effective 
control and eradication, and the availability of 
resources to do so. 
Three highly infectious diseases (foot and 
mouth disease, peste des petits ruminants and 
sheep and goat pox) have occurred in virtually 
every year since 1996. Turkey is also prone to 
outbreaks of anthrax and brucellosis. Turkey 
has had no registered case of BSE, but the 
BSE risk has been classified as not negligible. 
The most important zoonoses recorded in hu-
mans are anthrax, brucellosis, leishmaniasis 
and salmonellosis. 
 
There has been progress towards harmonisa-
tion with EU veterinary legislation. However, 
enforcement capacity is still underdeveloped, 
as is bio-security awareness at every level of 
the livestock production chain. Even with ef-
fective implementation of the acquis, it will be 
many years before Turkey reaches full dis-
ease-free status for all the most infectious dis-
eases. Until this is achieved, a single market in 
animal products with the rest of the EU will be 
problematic. Zoning might be used to allow 
the country to acquire disease-free status on a 
region by region basis. 
 
The lower level of concern about plant health 
relative to animal health reflects the fact that 
the scope for catastrophic consequences fol-
lowing an outbreak of plant disease or infesta-
tion is much smaller and more easily con-
tained, and not that the incidence of plant 
health problems is low. Many plant diseases, 
weeds and insects of an economically damag-
ing nature have been reported in cultivated 
crops in Turkey. Typically, phytosanitary 
chemical use has been the main line of de-
fence, but biological control programmes are 
now starting to be developed for various open 
field and greenhouse crops. New plant quaran-
tine legislation to bring Turkey more in line 
with the EU has been adopted. 
 
Consequences of Turkey’s Hypothetical 
Accession to the EU 
 
Following this overview, the report focuses on 
the consequences of Turkey’s hypothetical 
accession to the EU in 2015. In order to dis-
cuss the likely impacts, and especially in order 
to provide estimates of budget costs, assump-
tions are needed regarding economic growth 
rates in Turkey and in EU member countries, 
population growth, and the exchange rate be-
tween the euro and the Turkish lira at the mo-
ment of accession. In addition, assumptions 
about prevailing policies, both within the EU 
and as a result of the WTO Doha Develop-
ment Round, are needed. These assumptions 
are summarised at the beginning of the analy-
sis. 
 
As an EU member, Turkey has to align its in-
formal and formal institutions with EU norms 
and expectations. Informal institutions are 
more difficult to change and slower to adapt 
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edges Turkey’s on-going progress in adapting 
the institutional framework for agriculture, 
and the various steps being taken, on a broad 
front, to bring Turkey’s formal institutions and 
institutional bodies closer into line with the 
acquis. 
 
Regarding economy wide institutions, tax col-
lection, the functioning of the judicial system, 
and the credibility and time-consistency of 
public policies are identified as key areas still 
to be improved. 
 
As regards the agricultural and food sectors, 
visible progress in adopting legislation and 
formal rules is typically accompanied by con-
cerns expressed about implementation. More-
over, although some structural change is being 
driven by private sector developments up-
stream and downstream from agriculture, a 
stronger and more competitive food supply 
chain also requires restructuring of the farm-
ing sector, the pace of which will be too slow 
if it is left to market forces and economic 
pressures. The implementation of ARIP has 
been an important step towards alignment of 
agricultural policies with the CAP, but con-
tains no direct incentives for structural change 
within the farm sector. 
 
As an EU member, Turkey would adopt the 
common external tariff of the EU for agricul-
tural products. Given current tariff structures, 
agricultural trade harmonisation between the 
EU and Turkey by 2015 will for the most part 
mean tariff reductions in Turkey. The largest 
downward tariff adjustments would be ex-
pected in the livestock sector. 
 
The greatest challenge for Turkey on the ex-
ternal trade front does not, however, concern 
policies. It is in fact to develop the infrastruc-
ture, administrative capacity and commitment 
necessary for effective control of external bor-
ders by the time of accession. It is unlikely 
that by 2015 a single market in all animal 
products, without internal SPS border controls 
between Turkey and the rest of the Union, can 
be operated. 
 
Limited progress has been recorded in the 
adoption of the environmental acquis. The 
Environmental Impact Assessment regulation 
has been adopted but so far implementation 
has been rare and poor, and there appears to be 
considerable ground to cover if Turkey is to 
adopt fully the environmental acquis by 2015. 
On accession, Turkish farmers would also be 
subject to the cross compliance conditions 
linked to direct income payments. This would 
offer an opportunity to improve agriculture’s 
environmental performance, but will require 
good quality extension services and monitor-
ing expertise, which has to be in place by the 
time of accession. 
 
In 2015, market and price support, and direct 
income payments to Turkish farmers, would 
amount to EUR 3.6 billion respectively (at the 
2004 value of the euro). Rural development 
expenditure would be EUR 1.6 billion. Budget 
payments arising from structural and cohesion 
policy would be between EUR 9.5 and 16.6 
billion (2004 values). Turkey’s budget contri-
bution would be EUR 5.4 billion. Net receipts 
by Turkey from the EU budget are estimated 
at EUR 11-18 billion (2004 values). An im-
portant challenge is to design programmes for 
structural and cohesion spending that address 
some of Turkey’s specific weaknesses, such as 
low levels of human capital, poor opportuni-
ties for non-agricultural employment in rural 




Improving the provision, quality, access and 
attainment levels in education must become a 
top priority for Turkey in the coming years, 
together with improved access to the labour 
market for educated young people. Increases 
in education spending should directly target 
the rural population in Turkey. The perform-
ance of Turkey as an EU member, and the 
success of its economy within a competitive 
single market, depend crucially on the human 
capital of young Turkish people. However, 
because the acquis  focuses more on regula-
tions to support the single market and to im-
pose EU level policies, there is a danger that 
the attention of Turkey’s policy makers in a 
pre-accession phase may be drawn away from 
national education policy as a top priority 
area. 
 
The adjustment of the agricultural sector to the 
single market will put pressure on a large 
socio-economic group with little social protec-
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jobs in both rural and urban areas is needed, 
accompanied by liberalisation of the labour 
market and extension of the social security 
system to act as a genuine safety net. Turkish 
accession could mean that EU budget spend-
ing cannot be re-oriented more towards meas-
ures to support and increase competition, or to 
enhance growth by stimulating knowledge-
intensive industries, but instead remains 
dominated by redistributive transfers aimed at 
supporting 
agriculture and rural development. 
 
At the same time, the evidence available in the 
literature suggests that the boost to macroeco-
nomic growth in EU-27 from Turkish acces-
sion would be low and could be cancelled out 
by high budget transfers from EU-27 to Tur-
key. 
 
Turkey’s accession would add to the number 
of EU member countries that have difficulties 
in implementing EU requirements with respect 
to food safety, environmental, veterinary and 
phytosanitary standards, and would reduce 
average levels of governance and transpar-
ency. The accession of Turkey to the EU will 
lead to a large increase in the EU’s external 
borders. The initial and permanent costs of 
controlling these borders are huge. It is not yet 
clear how feasible it is to establish correct and 
effective controls on these borders. 
 
During and after accession, Turkey would be 
an interesting and growing market for the food 
industry and retailing companies of EU-27, for 
both exports and FDI. 
 
Because of Turkey’s low per capita income, 
Turkish accession would automatically pro-
duce a reduction in annual average EU per 
capita income by about EUR 2520 (at 2004 
values). This would lower the threshold below 
which regions qualify for structural aids. With 
Turkish entry to the EU, new regions with a 
combined population of 79 million people will 
be eligible for structural funds at the top rate. 
However, regions in EU-27 with about 33 mil-
lion inhabitants would no longer be eligible 
for this funding. 
 
The total annual budget cost for the EU-27 of 
Turkey’s accession in 2015 is likely to be 
EUR 11-18 billion (in 2004 prices). The un-
certainty of these estimates comes mostly 
from the structural fund component, and de-
pends on the absorption rate of structural 
spending. The upper limit corresponds to an 
absorption capacity of 3.5 per cent of GDP. 
These estimates are somewhat lower than the 
numbers in other published studies. 
 
From the perspective of the agricultural and 
food sectors, and rural areas, the main oppor-
tunities for the EU from Turkish accession are, 
first, an increase in profitable opportunities for 
companies in EU-27 to export products, tech-
nology and capital to Turkey, and second, the 
long-term benefits that the EU’s environ-
mental protection legislation would bring to 
the eastern Mediterranean area when imple-
mented by Turkey. Although the Turkish gov-
ernment is currently very welcoming to for-
eign direct investment (FDI) in general, con-
cerns about Turkey’s economic stability con-
tinue to inhibit FDI. Moreover, the high level 
of trade protection for Turkey’s agricultural 
markets, even within the EU-Turkey customs 
union, reduces opportunities for agrifood ex-
ports to Turkey. These conditions would 
change upon, or even before, the moment of 
accession. On the environmental front, Turkey 
has a lower level of rural environmental prob-
lems than a number of existing member states, 
and the opportunity to apply environmental 
legislation more in a preventive than a correc-
tive capacity is attractive. 
 
An additional, more general and long-term, 
opportunity is the geo-political strengthening 
of the Union in its southeastern corner. In the 
short term, however, the large increase in the 
EU’s borders in this part of the world could 
bring particular problems for the agrifood sec-
tor in its attempts to impose sanitary and phy-
tosanitary controls, and other border inspec-
tions required by the acquis, unless effective 
border controls can be implemented from the 
moment of accession. 
 
The report identifies various potential threats 
to EU common interests in the areas of agri-
culture, food and rural development. These 
include the possibility that levels of food 
safety and quality are diluted or become more 
difficult to enforce, that average standards of 
governance are reduced by the incorporation 
of a country with very different institutions 
and a poor record in this respect, and that the 
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whole may increase – or may be perceived as 
having increased, which also has negative 
consequences in trade terms. 
 
The possibility of increased migration from 
Turkey to other parts of the EU after accession 
is seen by some as a potential threat, by others 
as an opportunity. The report does not cover 
the migration issue per se. However, it docu-
ments the low incomes, poor living conditions 
and low levels of human capital that currently 
characterise many rural areas in Turkey. We 
conclude that agriculture and rural areas are 
likely to bear the main brunt of post-accession 
adjustment. Whether or not this results in in-
creased migration within the country or across 
national frontiers, large pockets of poor, un-
educated and unemployed people anywhere in 
the Union can be seen as a threat in both eco-
nomic and social terms, and pose a problem 
for policy makers. Large-scale rural and struc-
tural development programmes will be needed 
in order to reduce these consequences. 
 
In considering whether the large budget trans-
fers that would go to Turkey represent a nega-
tive consequence for the EU as a whole, it is 
important to consider their opportunity cost in 
terms of other initiatives and benefits that 
would be foregone by the Union. Relevant 
questions are whether the size of the economic 
multiplier of this expenditure, in the countries 
that would forego it, is larger or smaller than 
its multiplier in Turkey, and whether under 
existing rules the transfers would be spent in a 
way most appropriate to Turkey’s current 
needs, and with the best long-term benefit. 
From the evidence we have been able to 
gather, a definitive answer either way to these 
questions is not possible. 
Amongst the many challenges that Turkey’s 
accession would provide for the EU as a 
whole, our analysis of the agricultural and 
food sectors, and rural areas, leads us to single 
out three major issues. The first challenge 
concerns the need to adapt and strengthen the 
formal and informal institutions necessary for 
implementing the acquis  and for allowing 
Turkey to perform within the EU on an equal 
footing with other member states. The second 
challenge relates to the large educational defi-
cit that characterises the Turkish population in 
general, including younger age groups, and 
particularly in rural areas and in agriculture. In 
order to optimise the potential arising from 
Turkey’s accession whenever it occurs, these 
challenges should be given heavy weight in 
designing pre-accession and accession strate-
gies. The third challenge is to harness the 
value-creating potential of Turkey’s growing, 
active population. This challenge involves a 
whole set of inter-related issues, including the 
need for labour mobility, more job creation in 
the formal economy, and greater opportunities 
for female employment. Appropriate strategies 
for meeting these challenges would need to go 
beyond what has been done in previous 
enlargements and be tailored specifically to 
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A Prelude to FDI to be a part of food and 
agriculture sectors of Turkey 
 
Food industry and agriculture are among the 
strategic sectors in the 21
st century. Apart 
from being a vital necessity, contribution of 
these sectors to the economy is indispensable. 
In this respect, current conditions of food and 
agricultural sectors in Turkey need to be up-
graded. In order to achieve such improvement, 
innovative, progressive programmes should be 
carried out, international technology and 
knowledge transfer should be available for 
these sectors to better tackle and overcome the 
actual structural problems. 
Due to its share in total exports and industrial 
production capacity, food sector is known as 
one of the most important sectors in Turkey. 
5% of GDP is derived from food sector in 
Turkey and it accounts for 20% of total manu-
facturing output. The amount of domestic in-
vestment is also high in this sector. It is also 
one of the most flexible sectors with its dy-
namic structure. 
Turkey is the world’s third largest exporter of 
fruit and vegetables. The share of fruits and 
vegetables in total agricultural production is 
43% whereas in the EU it is amount to 15%. 
In the segment of the organic food production, 
Turkey has also the potential to be a world 
leader. 
However, the food and agriculture sector in 
Turkey have not been successful in attracting 
foreign direct investment. It is expected that, 
EU membership process will accelerate the 
adaptation of the EU institutional framework 
for agriculture and environment. In a few 
years time Turkey will meeting the European 
standards. The momentum to invest in Tur-
key’s food sector, both in the agricultural and 
industrial production, is strong. 
 
 
With her mild climate conditions, fertile and 
unpolluted soils, Turkey is very suitable to 
raise different industrial crops and plants. 
With 70 million inhabitants, Turkey herself is 
a large market for food and agricultural prod-
ucts. 
Besides, Turkey is at the crossroads of Euro-
pean, Asian, Caucasus and the Middle Eastern 
markets. Among all, it is worthwhile to men-
tion that, fertile Turkish soils are very suitable 
for organic farming and there is a huge growth 
potential in that export oriented sector. 
Between 2001-2005, the launch of the “Agri-
cultural Reform Implementation Project” in-
fluenced the agricultural reform in Turkey in a 
positive way. Price support to farmers had 
been reduced, subsidies had been removed, 
and instead of these instruments direct income 
support to the farmers has been introduced. 
As the EU process takes off, Turkey aims to 
reinforce social cohesion in the rural area by 
increasing the income level of the people in 
the area. Developing human resources, pro-
tecting the rural heritage and environment are 
also some other challenges before Turkey. 
Modernisation of agriculture and food proc-
essing facilities are essential to attain Euro-
pean standards. Within this clear perspective, 
the foreign direct investment would always be 
welcome to contribute to Turkey’s success. 
 
For more information: http://www.tusiad.org 
and 
http://www.sls.wau.nl/aae/projects/Turkey/ 
description.html 
 
 